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This study seeks to examine the role that a national narrative has on 
policymaking with regards to motivating and understanding ‘non-strategic’ state 
behaviour. Building on relevant scholarship, this study will look at the role that a 
popular, foundational narrative plays and how this shapes the moral, 
humanitarian and honour-driven motivations that contribute to Canada’s foreign 
policy behaviour in NATO. By extension, it will also chart how attempting to 
change a core foreign policy narrative can affect the influence and perception of 
Canada in NATO. This study explores competing interpretations of Canada’s 
‘middle power’ narrative, both in Canadian foreign policy literature as well as 
among policymakers to understand how it influences the practice of 
policymaking. Through constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis and Role Theory, 
this study will illustrate how Canada’s ‘middle power’ narrative as articulated at 
the individual level, generates roles which shape and routinize its foreign policy 
behavior. In doing so, this narrative acts as a multidimensional pressure on its 
policymaking options as they relate to NATO operations. This study will not 
seek to invalidate competing explanations of Canada’s foreign policy behaviour, 
but rather seeks to expand on alternative examinations of policymaking practice. 
To do so it will survey Canadian foreign policy in the context of two of NATO’s 
major operations between 2001 and 2011 in Afghanistan and Libya. By using 
interpretivism to construct an institutional ‘story’ about the narratives articulated 
by Canadian policymakers, both in Parliament and in NATO this study explores 
how these narratives are interpreted and transmitted in the Canadian media and 
as well as by foreign policymakers in NATO. This study adds a new theoretical 
dimension to the study of Canadian foreign policy and depth to the ‘middle 
power’ narrative, while also exploring the motivations and pressures which shape 









Nous ne devons pas perdre de vue le fait que l’OTAN n’est pas une 
institution multilatérale. Nous sommes une alliance. Il y a une 
différence qualitative – ou du moins il devrait y en avoir une.	 	– Peter 
MacKay, 2009 1  
 
This statement made by Canadian Defence Minister Peter MacKay in 2009 was 
meant to inspire greater solidarity among the member states of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) in order to solicit greater troop contributions towards 
the conflict in Afghanistan. In doing so, it suggested an adherence to a particular 
narrative on the part of the Conservative government regarding its view of NATO 
and the conflict in Afghanistan. This narrative sought to emphasise the common 
values which underpinned NATO membership, and by extension was meant to 
highlight Canada’s unwavering commitment to those values. In articulating his 
conception of foreign affairs and Canada’s place in the world MacKay’s remarks 
reflected the principles of the Conservative government that sought to remind NATO 
members of the sacrifices Canada had made in support of the Alliance, while also 
shaming other member states into contributing more to the Afghanistan mission.2  
This type of statement in Canada’s foreign policy is not new, as former US Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson observed in 1966 (paraphrasing William Wordsworth) that 
listening to Canadians discussing foreign affairs reminded him of the “stern daughter 
of the voice of God.”3 Indeed, as will be explored in this examination, there are 
certain themes, such as morality, which often run through Canadian foreign policy 
and frequently still appear in foreign policy statements. Nonetheless, while not 
uncommon for a Defence Minister to discuss his country’s relationship with NATO, 
the way in which MacKay seeks to inject morality into the requirements of the 
Alliance in an address to a foreign audience raises questions about Canada’s 
relationship with NATO. Moreover, given Canada’s participation in NATO’s 
																																																													
1 Peter MacKay, Munich Security Conference, 8 Feb 2009, 
https://www.securityconference.de/veranstaltungen/munich-security-conference/msc-
2009/reden/peter-mackay/, accessed 15 November 2011.  
2 It should be noted that ‘Alliance’ and ‘Allies’ are used to refer specifically to NATO and NATO 
member states, while ‘allies’ refers more generally to countries with whom Canada is aligned. 
3 Norman Hillmer and Jack L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s, 




Afghanistan and Libya operations between 2001 and 2011, MacKay’s statement 
takes on greater importance as it points to a way in which the Canadian government 
perceives the utility of NATO and the ways in which interpretation of foreign policy 
narratives shape foreign policy behaviour. This opens a number of avenues of 
inquiry both with regards to the analysis of foreign policy and the examination of 
multidimensional forces; from individuals, domestic and international levels on the 
formation of foreign policy. This study is interested in how foreign policy narratives 
interact, shape and influence foreign policy behaviour and the mechanisms by which 
it does so. Given the importance of these various elements to the study of 
International Relations (IR), this raises deeper empirical questions about the ways in 
which identities, narratives and policymaking become linked, interact with and 
ultimately, affect states’ behaviour.  
Using a constructivist interpretation, this study examines Canada’s ‘middle 
power’ narrative which historically represented a short-hand description of its 
foreign policy tradition and how this has influenced successive governments to get 
involved in and remain in conflicts which did not necessarily threaten Canada’s 
strategic interest as defined by traditional IR theory. In this case, the middle power 
narrative represents a number of elements, namely a reflexive belief in 
multilateralism, an inherent support for the international order, a preference for 
multipronged solutions (diplomacy, development) without a prioritisation of military 
involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding. The elements informing this 
narrative are elaborated upon in detail further on, however, this offers a starting point 
for this analysis and Chapter 2 will explore how this has become intertwined with 
Canadian foreign policy tradition.  
More specifically, this examination queries what the links are between 
national narratives, the roles they articulate and how these shape international 
behaviours. This is important as it lends a deeper understanding to the forces shaping 
policymakers’ preferences and decisions which in turn, affect state actions in 
international affairs. This also addresses how these behaviours then affect Canada’s 
ability to shape NATO’s policy and operations. While first and foremost an 
empirical examination, in exploring Canada’s role in the Afghanistan and Libya 




with the practice of policymaking and the extent to which it constrains or enhances 
how that policy is made manifest, thus generating behaviour which reinforces its 
foreign policy narrative. Through the use of Role Theory as part of a Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) approach, this study is concerned with the options and decisions that 
were made, rather than examining what foreign policy decisions should have or 
could have been considered.4 In undertaking this type of examination it makes a 
contribution to the literature on Canadian foreign policy by refining and integrating 
newer theoretical innovations into the discipline.5 Both of these aspects will be 
elaborated upon through the course of this work.  
This study contends that, with regards to NATO operations between 2001 
and 2011, successive Canadian governments’ interpretations of elements of the 
middle power narrative had a clear effect in shaping Canada’s foreign policy 
behaviour. The importance of this narrative and its attendant behaviours also shaped 
the expectations of its allies in relation to Canada’s international role in these 
conflicts.6 As such the middle power narrative informed the decisions of Canadian 
policymakers and thus contributed to Canada taking significant roles in the 
interventions in Afghanistan and Libya. This middle power narrative is relatively 
complex and requires deeper examination, but nonetheless invokes a historically 
informed interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy and behaviour often closely 
linked to peacekeeping, multilateralism and diplomacy. In short, it allows 
																																																													
4 Marijke Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Analysis, (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007), 61. Breuning makes the distinction between empirically focused and normatively 
focused models of rationality. As will be explored in the next chapter, this helps us to better 
understand the process and context of policymaking. 
5 For an overview of the FPA field see Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and 
Contemporary Theory, (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007). As it relates to 
national identity and narratives, it is important to look at K.J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in 
the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sep., 1970), 233-309 
for the foundational work. Additionally, Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms 
and Identity in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), provides more 
conceptual clarity to the interaction between identity formation and the influence on policy. 
Highlighting some of the shortcomings in this field of study, Juliet Kaarbo, "Foreign Policy Analysis 
in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas," Foreign Policy 
Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium, Ed. Jean A. Garrison, International Studies Review, Vol. 5 (2003), 
155–202. As an example of some of the work being done to better highlight the work linking 
cognitive interaction with policymaking, Rose McDermott, “The Meaning of Neuroscientific 
Advances for Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Dec. 2004), 691-706.	
6 Noting the utility and perils of using narrative as an analytical device see, Molly Patterson and 
Kristen Renwick Monroe, “Narrative in Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1 




policymakers to construct narratives of their country’s international role that helps 
them to understand their experiences and how these experiences fit with their own 
interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy identity.  
This study also examines how policymakers articulated their interpretation of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative as a role that defined Canada’s behaviour and 
contribution to NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya. As Canadian foreign 
policy has changed between 2001 and 2011, it has disrupted the traditional narrative 
informing Canada’s international behaviour and as a result diminished Canada’s 
influence in NATO while nonetheless, still levying an expectation of Canada’s 
international engagement in future interventions. This will also explore the various 
changes to Canadian foreign policy under the Liberal governments of Prime 
Minister’s Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin, as well as that of Conservative Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper. In doing so, one can also see how the interpretation of a 
narrative influences foreign policymaking as different governments articulate 
different motivations and thus priorities for foreign policy. Indeed, as will be 
explored, there has been increasing examination of foreign policy under the Harper 
government which many have contended represents a marked departure from 
previous Canadian foreign policy practices.7 Both the current fields examining 
Canadian foreign policy and FPA will be addressed, as both often focus on issues of 
identity and narrative as well as actor-specific social actions.8  
Each chapter will explore how multidimensional forces flowing from the 
middle power narrative, including both internal and external sources, informs the 
way Canadian policymakers create policy. Certainly, Canadian participation in 
Afghanistan was contested at the domestic level in Canada and as such it is 
important to see how a dominant interpretation of this manifested in its Afghan role, 
																																																													
7 John Ibbitson, The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada’s Foreign Policy, CIGI 
Papers, No. 29 (April 2014); Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, Eds., Canada in the 
World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
8 Social action in this context is based on the Weberian model, though this study implies a rational 
actor, it will not delve into the surrounding literature on the broader IR debate surrounding the 
interpretation of social actions. Found in, Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic 




as well as in Libya.9 Using the middle power as an independent variable one can 
examine how the narrative influenced policymakers across multiple levels. The final 
concluding chapter will then tie all the various threads together to chart how the 
middle power narrative is intimately tied to the practice of Canadian foreign policy 
and thus influences Canadian foreign policy behaviour in NATO by informing 
responses to events. Moreover, it charts how while many of the central tenets which 
have defined Canada’s foreign policy narrative have been de-emphasised under the 
Conservative government, it nonetheless informs the context against which Canadian 
foreign policy action is measured and as such, remains a benchmark of continuity 
when assessing past, present and future foreign policy actions. As a result, it forms a 
central part of the way in which Canadian policymakers construct a narrative of 
Canadian foreign policy.    
Methodology and theory 
This analysis is derived primarily from three main primary sources for qualitative 
analysis, Canadian Parliamentary Hansard records including debates from both the 
House of Commons and the Senate, Canadian news media and semi-structured, 
focused, interviews with relevant individuals in NATO, the Canadian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Canadian Department of National Defence. 
Additionally, the memoirs of Prime Minister’s Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin will 
also be incorporated. It should be noted that the majority of interviews were 
conducted anonymously as this encouraged candid responses and assisted in 
attaining further interviews in NATO headquarters and elsewhere. Moreover, by 
getting off-the-record responses this allows a much more frank exchange that 
avoided talking points and also protected the interviewees from any possible 
professional repercussions that could arise from these exchanges. Given the wide 
range of personnel interviewed only the most relevant remarks will be cited. Taken 
together, these different sources provide a way to undertake a narrative analysis of 
Canadian foreign policy as articulated by Parliamentarians, as well as felt by 
																																																													
9 Matthew Willis, “An Unexpected War, A Not-Unexpected Mission: The Origins of Kandahar 




Canadian and non-Canadian policymakers within NATO.10 Through the media 
chapter it is possible to then see Canadian foreign policy as a subject of examination 
given that the reportage on Canadian foreign policy is not the same as policymaking 
itself.  In this way it constructs a narrative of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan 
and Libya and whether this echoes the middle power narrative more generally.  
To explore these different sources, this study will utilise an interpretivist, 
Verstehen-informed approach to inform a qualitative analysis exploring the 
translation of narrative into practice.11 This is due to the fact that it is more 
concerned with understanding social action rather than explaining it, and as will be 
explored further in the theoretical chapter, does not offer a positivist examination of 
this subject.12 In this circumstance this study is concerned with the meaning ascribed 
to narratives rather than examining how these narratives are created, nor does it 
assume a direct causal link between narrative and action. Indeed, this recognises the 
inherent challenge of analysing a narrative as it is reliant on the interpretation of the 
researcher to construct meaning from the research at hand and recognising as Molly 
Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe do, that narratives and experience are 
mediated by our understanding of the world.13 Drawing on the work of Mark Bevir 
and R.A.W. Rhodes on interpretivism, the qualitative analysis undertaken here will 
examine social actions as identified by this research, how these are ascribed meaning 
																																																													
10 Non-Canadian is preferred to foreign as these interviews take place in the confines of an 
international institution in which all members are ostensibly ‘foreign’ and potentially aware of, but 
unfamiliar with each other’s foreign policy narratives. As a result, ‘non-Canadian’ simply acts to 
highlight that they are not Canadian, without prejudicing their familiarity with Canada.  
11 Verstehen is largely drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology, Guenther Roth, Claus Wittich, Eds., (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968). Fundamentally 
this concerns itself with the understanding and the meaning attached to social action. In reference to 
this Paul Furlong and David Marsh, “A Skin Not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political 
Science,” Theory and Methods in Political Science, David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., 3rd Ed., 
(London: Palgrave, 2010). This stands in contrast to Erklären focusing on explanation of natural 
phenomenon and is inherently positivist based on observation. See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 
Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Georg 
Henrik von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971). 
12 See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenther Roth, Claus 
Wittich, Eds., (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968). 
13 Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe, “Narrative in Political Science,” Annual Review of 




and in doing so become narratives which inform future actions (reflexivity).14 This 
method has been criticised as lacking empirical foundation, particularly noted by 
Hendrik Wagenaar and though Bevir and Rhodes have responded to the complaint, it 
serves as a caution and an inducement to ensure a standard of empirical rigour.15 
Indeed, while elite interviews provide an important empirical component, it should 
be noted that these work in concert with the other sources as a way to help ensure 
that these narratives are triangulated and, as much as possible, provide the 
aforementioned rigour.16 As mentioned, social actions in this instance are concerned 
with the rendering of preferences into foreign policy. This draws, in part on Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s work in philosophical hermeneutics and its relationship to 
interpretivism as a way to reconcile the reflexive interaction between the subject and 
the observer.17 While Colin Hay identifies a potential issue with regards to 
interpretivism’s potential privileging of agency, this can be rectified through 
Giddens’ observations about the two, namely that they are mutually reinforcing.18 
Thus both structure and agency are not considered external to actors, but abstractions 
which both constrain and enable behaviour, meaning agents drive structure and 
sustain them through individual preferences.19 As noted previously, the issue of 
agency does remain a critical concern for this study insofar as it is interested in 
understanding the factors which inform agents. Similarly, Hay’s assertion that 
interpretivism helps to illustrate constructivist and institutionalist change that arises 
																																																													
14 Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, “Interpretive Theory,” Theory and Methods in Political Science, 
2nd Ed., David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., (London: Palgrave, 2002), 149; There has been a 
significant expansion with regards to the volume of work done on this as outlined in a literature 
review conducted by the authors’ in 2012 in Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, “Interpretivism and the 
Analysis of Traditions and Practices,” Critical Policy Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2012), 201-208.  
15 Hendrik Wagenaar, “Dwellers On the Threshold of Practice: The Interpretivism of Bevir and 
Rhodes,” Critical Policy Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2012), 85–99; Response in Mark Bevir and R.A.W. 
Rhodes, “Interpretivism and the Analysis of Traditions and Practices,” Critical Policy Studies, Vol. 6, 
No. 2 (2012), 201-208. 
16 Colin Hay, “Interpreting Interpretivism Interpreting Interpretations: The New Hermeneutics of 
Public Administration,” Public Administration, Vol. 89, No. 1 (March 2011), 173. 
17 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 1960, Translated Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall, (London: Bloomsbury Academic), 2013. 
18 Colin Hay, “Interpreting Interpretivism Interpreting Interpretations: The New Hermeneutics of 
Public Administration,” Public Administration, Vol. 89, No. 1 (March 2011), 175. 
19 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, (Los 




in the process of policymaking is, as will be explored, congruent with previous work 
focusing on constructivist examinations of foreign policy.20  
In keeping with a constructivist focus and an FPA approach, it is necessary to 
go into some depth on the foreign policy decisions through the analysis of key texts 
that can provide insight into decision-making and its attendant processes by way of 
preferences, articulated through reference to specific narratives. This will be further 
explored by speaking to relevant individuals to examine awareness of these 
narratives and their expression in policy. Consequently, this study will need to 
examine a variety of sources including Canadian Parliamentary Hansard records, 
government sources and other media to try to identify and examine the presence of a 
distinct Canadian middle power narrative in both the Afghanistan and Libya 
campaigns.21 These texts will be interpreted through a hermeneutic approach in order 
to dissect how policymakers articulate Canada’s role in these operations and its 
relationship to the middle power narrative in Canadian foreign policy. In particular, 
it utilises Elizabeth Kinsella’s hermeneutic approach which, 
 (a) seeks understanding rather than explanation; (b) acknowledges the 
situated location of interpretation; (c) recognizes the role of language and 
historicity in interpretation; (d) views inquiry as conversation; and (e) is 
comfortable with ambiguity.22  
Adopting these criteria helps to establish an integrative way in which to examine 
both the content of what is being said but also to critically examine the context and 
continuity of the policymakers’ actions. Using a hermeneutic approach allows the 
examination of the context and the continuity of actions without assuming, as 
Friedrich Kratochwil suggests, that the observations are reducible to scientific 
principles or laws.23 In this regard, it must be acknowledged that this type of 
examination does not provide a quantitative analysis of what constitutes national 
																																																													
20 Colin Hay, “Interpreting Interpretivism Interpreting Interpretations: The New Hermeneutics of 
Public Administration,” Public Administration, Vol. 89, No. 1 (March 2011), 180. 
21 This includes relevant releases, briefings and interviews from the Prime Minister’s Office, 
Department of National Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(DFAIT/DFATD) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).  
22 Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, “Hermeneutics and Critical Hermeneutics: Exploring Possibilities Within 
the Art of Interpretation,” Forum: Qualitative Social Research Sozialforschung, Vol. 7, No. 3, Art. 19 
(May 2006), 13. 





narratives. Rather, it looks at the ways in which a specific narrative is invoked as a 
component of the policymakers’ understanding of Canada’s place in the international 
system and how their interpretation of this narrative shapes foreign policy behaviour. 
As previously mentioned, this study will examine a variety of media and conduct 
interviews with relevant policymakers in government and in NATO to establish the 
dominant narrative.24 While a quantitative analysis could establish the frequency 
with which certain descriptors are used, this does not adequately account for the 
context surrounding the use and perception of these terms by the audience, or 
similarly, how other policymakers could use different terms to describe the same 
phenomena. Given that this is an examination of how the middle power narrative 
interacts with both individual and systemic levels it is important to remain adaptive 
and comfortable with a degree of ambiguity, particularly in the role of perception of 
this narrative at the individual level.25 A narrative analysis approach embraces this 
ambiguity while offering a way to understand the interaction between understandings 
of a narrative at an individual level and the ways in which they can shape foreign 
policy preferences. Ultimately, it is necessary to examine these individual 
preferences and thus the attendant national roles as expressions of a desire to 
maintain continuity with foreign policy traditions.  
Sources and analysis 
In examining the Hansard records, it will be necessary to note the political party 
affiliation of each speaker referencing the middle power narrative as they relate to 
Afghanistan and Libya, in order to account for potentially different interpretations. 
In this process it will also be important to recognise individual speakers’ consistency 
with regards to narratives and by extension, language.26 There will also be a section 
on the Senate Debates on Afghanistan and Libya, though it should be noted that 
																																																													
24 To that end, this study views them as ‘elites’ the challenges of which are outlined in Susan A. 
Ostrander, “Surely You’re Not in This Just to Be Helpful: Access, Rapport and Interviews in Three 
Studies of Elites,” Studying Elites using Qualitative Methods, Rosanna Hertz and Jonathan B. Imber, 
Eds., Sage Focus Edition, (London: Sage, 1995). 
25 This recognises that the middle power narrative and its influence over individual policymakers will 
vary and thus may manifest in a variety of ways. As such it is necessary to not only establish 
awareness of this narrative but to determine if it levies expectations on the conduct of Canadian 
foreign policy both by Canadian diplomats as well as foreign policymakers.  
26 This will prioritise the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition, Party Leaders, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Minister of Defence and their respective critics. It does not, however, exclude relevant 




given that the Senate serves as an unelected body, the interpretation of Canada’s 
foreign policy narrative and its influence is mediated by the fact that its ability to 
actually shape policy is circumscribed by Parliament. As will become evident, the 
impact of discussions on foreign policy in the Senate is negligible and receives little 
coverage in the news. Nonetheless, discussions on Afghanistan can reflect the same 
elite understandings of Canada’s foreign policy narrative. It is possible that 
depending on political orientation (i.e. right-wing, left-wing), variations may exist 
with regards to the interpretation of Canada’s middle power narrative. However, this 
does not rule out the possibility that there may be some consensus on some of these 
competing narratives, however, in accounting for political party affiliation this helps 
to determine whether this is a substantive redefinition of the Canadian foreign policy 
narrative by the various governments rather than simply contestation due to 
“narcissism of minor differences.”'27 Analysis of each House of Commons debate 
will be done sequentially in order to better chart how each separate debate reflects 
not only different context, but also allows us to chart the progression, or lack thereof, 
of the Canadian foreign policy narrative as it reflexively adapts to the reality of 
Canadian foreign policy behaviour. Analysis for the Senate debates will be done at 
the end of that section reflecting the much more limited influence the Senate has on 
the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. Moreover, Senate debates are often much 
more frequent and wide-ranging rather than issue specific debates conducted in the 
House of Commons. 
 Alongside the Prime Ministerial memoirs, these narrative analyses will focus 
on descriptor terms for middle power and aim to categorise how they relate to 
narratives explored in Chapter 2 as a way of helping to construct the dominant 
narrative related to Canadian foreign policy. For example, terms such as 
‘peacekeeping’ used in relation to middle power and depending on the context of the 
article, can be seen as contributing to the Canada-as-peacekeeper middle power 
narrative. Conversely, an article equating Canada’s middle power narrative to a 
‘staunch ally’ could be construed as an alternative narrative with an emphasis on 
alternative military-focused behaviours.  
																																																													
27 Sigmund Freud, “The Taboo of Virginity,” has since entered foreign policy discourse; see Michael 




In doing this however, it is vital to account for the context in which these 
remarks are made, and similarly, how they reflect the narrative and the preferences 
of the policymaker articulating it. This allows this study to try to construct distinct 
motivations founded in the wider middle power narrative explored in Chapter 2 that 
inform how policymakers seek to characterise Canada’s international behaviour. In 
order to link this with FPA it will seek to integrate Role Theory with the work done 
on ‘ontological security’ as a way of helping to examine motivations and how they 
shape roles.28 Specifically, ontological security draws on analyses done by R.D. 
Laing and further integrated into IR by Antony Giddens which posits that actors seek 
stability by maintaining a coherent biographical narrative which is derived from how 
they interpret the actions and events in one’s life.29 While the ontological security 
research agenda examines how narratives and identity shape state behaviour, as will 
be explored in the next chapter, it remains a flawed research agenda. Nonetheless, 
Brent Steele’s Ontological Security in International Relations attempts to examine 
how state narratives interact with policymaking and provides a loose structure by 
which one can assess and parse, approximately, which motivations dominate at 
different times; in his case using honour, moral and humanitarian as terms by which 
patterns of behaviours are constructed and thus try to interpret how preferences 
shifted between different governments.30 In adapting some of the elements of 
ontological security it will provide greater clarity into the way in which the 
interpretation of narratives translates into foreign policy behaviour. Whilst there is 
overlap of some terminology between the competing understandings, by accounting 
for context and critically examining the sources this should reveal a dominant 
interpretation which can be compared with the extant scholarship. This helps to 
understand the way in which narratives shape policy and by extension, foreign policy 
behaviours.   
Following the same qualitative narrative analysis as the Hansard records, it 
will also examine news media and will be cross cutting in its examination of sources 
from the mainstream political spectrum, whilst also remaining within a manageable 
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analysis and will be incorporated into the FPA analysis.  
29 Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2008), 3.	




scope for one researcher.31 Indeed, the examination of Canadian media can be useful 
in highlighting foreign policy narratives as observed by Nathalie Frensley and 
Nelson Michaud in their examination of Canadian coverage of US foreign policy 
statements.32 In relation to this study, the media offers a way in which to view the 
contestation of different competing narratives in public discourse, beyond the 
policymaker level and thus help establish the dynamic process through which 
narratives are constructed at a wider, national level. As Alister Miskimmon, Ben 
O’Loughlin and Laura Roselle note, journalists and editors can serve as gatekeepers, 
promoting or minimising a narrative and thus they shape the public understanding of 
foreign policy outside of the (elites) policymaking circle.33  
Rather than attempting to cover 10 years of all media, this study undertakes 
succinct examination of major Canadian newspaper and magazine outlets34 and their 
coverage of Canada’s participation in Afghanistan and Libya operations with a 
specific focus on articles which employ the term middle power. The newspapers and 
magazines examined in this analysis provide a cross section of high circulation 
publications thereby offering further insight into the ways in which foreign policy is 
discussed outside of policymaking circles on wider scale. Additionally, this will also 
include the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) which as a government 
agency, possesses and disseminates a narrative about Canada, though it remains at 
arm’s length from government oversight. In looking at the descriptive terms used to 
discuss Canadian foreign policy in Afghanistan and Libya it is possible to ascertain 
what kinds of narratives are constructed and transmitted in the popular news media. 
This provides insight into how the Canadian foreign policy narrative is constructed 
and shared with the public as well as foreign policymakers and how this dynamic 
also shapes the domestic policymaking process.  
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the viewpoints which dominate Canadian political discourse with a significant readership, in this case 
with a circulation ~800,000 upwards. See Newspapers Canada, 
http://www.newspaperscanada.ca/daily-newspaper-circulation-data, accessed 23 October 2015.  
32 Nathalie Frensley and Nelson Michaud, “Public Diplomacy and Motivated Reasoning: Framing 
Effects on Canadian Media Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy Statements,” Foreign Policy Analysis, 
Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 2006), 201-222. 
33 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Laughlin and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication 
Power and the New World Order, (London: Routledge, 2013), 157. 
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National Post (National), La Presse (Quebec), Montreal Gazette, Toronto Star, Ottawa Citizen, 




Augmenting these sources, semi-structured, focused interviews have been 
conducted, largely between 2012 and 2013, in order to demonstrate a relationship 
between policymakers’ preferences related to a Canadian middle power narrative and 
policymaking behaviour and thus, the practice of policymaking. Responses from 
Canadian policymakers in NATO including members of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD – formerly Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade, DFAIT), the Department of National Defence and Canadian 
members of NATO’s International Staff will be included alongside the examination 
of the Hansard records to help to shed some insight into the ways in which the 
foreign policy narrative espoused by policymakers in Ottawa are interpreted, shared, 
negotiated and potentially conflict with the reality of policymaking in NATO 
headquarters. Responses from non-Canadian diplomats and members of NATO’s 
International Staff will be compared with the findings of the media to examine the 
transmission and negotiation of narratives and their related behaviours. In turn, this 
study will then attempt to establish the reflexive process by which this potentially 
shapes Canadian policymakers’ actions as NATO policymakers generate a set of 
expectations. Specific or ambiguous responses are integrated into the broader 
research project given the variety of possible answers and specific roles played by 
the interview subjects.35 As such, this does not provide an easily quantifiable result 
and recognises that the ambiguity derives from individual experience of the 
questions being asked; nonetheless this is to be expected, particularly with such an 
inherently subjective topic focused on experience and preference formation. 
 In speaking with elites and experts in this field, issue-specific responses are 
not generalisable but rather, focused on Canada’s role in NATO operations in 
Afghanistan and Libya.36 The purpose of these interviews is to gain understanding as 
to the way in which the narrative about Canada’s involvement in these operations 
reflected policymakers’ understandings of Canadian foreign policy. Interviews were 
not undertaken in Canada due to funding constraints and issues with access to 
relevant individuals serving in government at the time. The interviews used in this 
																																																													
35 Peter Burnham, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics, 
(London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 205. 
36 Ariadne Vromen, “Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches,” Theory and 





analysis were undertaken in NATO Headquarters and consisted of semi-structured 
discussions aimed at establishing the subject’s knowledge of Canadian foreign 
policy and how this was linked to the middle power narrative. The researcher had a 
pre-existing working relationship with many of the subjects as well, which provided 
an avenue by which to build rapport and encourage candid responses. Some 
interviews were recorded and transcribed, while others, due to security restrictions 
and bans on recording devices, were transcribed directly through short-hand notes. 
Indeed, NATO Headquarters maintained strict regulations about the use of recording 
equipment in the building and most delegations forbid their use. Additionally, a key 
challenge was the issue of anonymity of the responses, as the majority of interview 
subjects did not want to be fully identifiable. Given that they were commenting on or 
criticising an active member of NATO in an unofficial capacity, i.e. not as 
spokespeople for NATO; but rather in their personal and to an extent, professional 
capacities. Moreover, given the recent timeframe of this analysis many of the 
individuals interviewed continue to work in NATO and having their name published 
alongside criticism would potentially threaten their ability to continue to work 
reliably with Allies.  
In conducting these interviews, the researcher sought to draw out responses 
related to, but not limited to, the subject’s understanding of Canada’s middle power 
narrative, Canada’s policymaking within NATO and what attributes they most 
associated with Canadian diplomacy. Responses reflected not only the policymaking 
process, but also the presence of preferences and awareness of a number of 
behaviours which are commonly associated with Canada’s middle power narrative. 
This was accomplished by examining the language used in response to the questions, 
particularly in the descriptions of Canada’s role in NATO, its middle power narrative 
and how these terms correspond to the narrative found in the media, Hansard records 
and other previously outlined sources. As with the other sources, analysing these 
interviews qualitatively establishes context, as much as possible while allowing, in 
many cases for anonymity of the interviewee. In part, responses will, where possible 
identify the interviewees’ relationship to Canada and NATO Operations. What are 
the behaviours they associate with Canada? Are they aware of a middle power 
narrative? If so, do they perceive a link between Canada’s policymaking efforts in 




hermeneutic approach to gain a better understanding of Canada’s policymaking in 
NATO.  
 During interviews, responses appear in relation to the behaviours associated 
with Canada’s middle power narrative. This will be explored in greater depth to see 
how this links with the relationship to shaping Canada’s foreign policy behaviour 
with regards to NATO Operations. While they may be non-attributable they do 
constitute a cross section of staff ranging from senior positions such as 
Ambassadors, Assistant Secretary Generals down to NATO Staff members. These 
interviews are vital in that they establish that an awareness of a middle power 
narrative is present beyond Canadian policymakers or at the very least, that non-
Canadian policymakers associate and expect a certain set of behaviours to Canada. 
This offers some insight into the ways in which narratives are also received and 
interpreted by other actors in the policymaking process. As such it is possible to 
observe an association between Canadian foreign policy and certain behavioural 
roles that goes beyond simple correlation between the two. While subjective, the 
hermeneutic approach recognises that, this data, in relation to the other sources used, 
helps provide context to establish how the narrative informs policymaking practice. 
Thus interviews also elucidate the presence of Canada’s middle power narrative as a 
factor in the policymaking process which can shape policy choices. 
As discussed, this will not use a coding method but remains interpretive. 
Namely, this focuses on the middle power narrative of Canadian foreign policy as a 
way to identify disjunctures in the time period examined and allows a wide range of 
sources to be utilised as a way to explore the Afghanistan and Libya cases. The 
context of the relevant articles, newspapers and the viewpoints espoused by the 
authors help to understand not only the narrative but also how it affects the practice 
of policymaking. By examining how this narrative in the media compares to the 
previously explored strains in Canadian foreign policy literature and subsequently 
comparing them with Canada’s foreign policy behaviour, it is possible to gain a 
much clearer insight into the ways narrative and behaviour interact. Interviews with 
relevant individuals then help to link the middle power narrative and its related 
preferences with the practice of policymaking, allowing an immediate way to see 




In combination, the examination of these sources will look to establish the 
broad narrative of Canada as a middle power, the dominant interpretation of which, 
constitutes the shaping of policy preferences.37 This requires an historical 
examination of the events leading to and during the operations in Afghanistan and 
Libya. Indeed, as seen in the analysis of the study of Canadian foreign policy and the 
middle power narrative in Chapter 2, the lenses used to interpret Canada’s 
diplomatic history often shape the perception of its national narrative.38 It is 
necessary, in part, to turn to diplomatic history as a way of interpreting and 
synthesising the events which occurred and how they can be interpreted in such a 
way to explore the middle power narrative and NATO. Given the period of time 
examined, it is useful to have an understanding of the historical context and as a 
result, it is important to recognise that these are interpretations of historical policy 
decisions. As Robert Schulzinger observed, when examining history, policymaker’s 
memory acts as a framing device which helps determine what is important during 
decision-making.39 Consequently, this is not a strictly historical approach, but it will, 
where necessary draw upon the relevant diplomatic historical elements in order to 
help interpret how the different recollections interlink with the timeline of events and 
policies. Indeed, history also helps to construct a narrative in and of itself and the 
interpretation of history is vital to the construction of a national foreign policy 
narrative. Indeed, such iconic works in the FPA canon are linked closely with 
diplomatic history, such as Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision or, given its 
examination of the views of individual policymakers and thus more closely linked to 
this analysis, Robert Jervis’ Perception and Misperception.40 Thus, incorporating 
																																																													
37 Shaping policy preferences refers to both the preferences held by elites in the policy formulation 
process, but also expectations levied by allies. The process of feedback between the two sides thus 
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international system and thus making policy which reflects this. Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, 
“Interpretive Theory,” Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd Ed., David Marsh and Gerry 
Stoker, Eds., (London: Palgrave, 2002), 149. 
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Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984, (Toronto: UBC Press, 2007) or 
Adam Chapnick, “Where Have All of Canada’s Diplomatic Historians Gone?” International Journal, 
Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer 2010), 725-737.  
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elements of diplomatic history provides a way in which to interpret events whilst 
remaining cognisant of how those events are being simultaneously shaped by the 
processes examined in this study.   
Utilising qualitative analysis these sources provide an empirical basis upon 
which to examine differing interpretations of Canada’s foreign policy narrative. This 
helps us to construct the characteristics of the dominant foreign policy narrative 
informing Canadian policymakers and, in turn, the extent to which this shapes 
Canadian foreign policy behaviour. Examining the existing texts through a 
hermeneutic, interpretative approach allows this study to account for both context 
and meaning in the use of words and phrases, whilst relating them to the 
policymaking process. As a narrative analysis, this study is not just aiming to unpack 
the middle power narrative but also establish the motivations foreign policy 
behaviours which emerge from interpretation of this narrative. Rather than a clinical 
approach that would focus on frequency of word use and code for specific phrases, 
this allows a more organic categorisation which can provide insight into the complex 
processes which shape policymaking. The addition of a diplomatic history 
component allows this study to provide some insight into the interpretations present 
in Canada’s middle power scholarship and the perceptions that shape these 
competing interpretations. Indeed, the concern with the context and continuity in 
which policymaking occurs means that it is important to understand how history 
helps to shape the foreign policy narrative. The qualitative analysis of this material 
also contributes to the FPA constructivist interpretation by providing some 
empirical, actor-specific insight into how the use and interpretation of language 
constructs and shapes preferences and thus by extension roles and behaviours. In 
doing so, the researcher must interpret the data in such a way as to develop the 
presence of the middle power narrative and link behaviours explicitly to this tradition 
in foreign policy. As will be explored further on, this is not meant to invalidate or 
dispute other approaches to this topic, but rather, expand and develop FPA’s Role 
Theory in which empirical study has thus far been lacking. Ultimately, it will also 
shed light on the ways in which foreign policy narratives can encourage commitment 






Why NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya?  
As the most active international organisation involved in military operations during 
the previous decade, NATO has demonstrated its relevance as a key actor in the fight 
against terrorism and a vital component in shaping the contours of international 
security and defence. Canada has played an instrumental role in the organisation 
since NATO’s formation in the immediate post-Second World War era. Canadian 
diplomat Escott Reid attested to the vital role that Canada played in building the 
organisation’s architecture and his position as a negotiator in the foundational North 
Atlantic Treaty.41 Some of Reid’s contemporary writers coming out of the Canadian 
Department of External Affairs such as John W. Holmes42 and James Eayrs43 also 
reflect positively on the role that Canada played in the formation of these post-war 
institutions and the importance it imparted to Canada. This importance continues 
into today. Scholars from the various schools of thought in Canadian foreign policy 
such as David Haglund and Frédéric Mérand have argued that NATO is the main 
vehicle by which Canada can implement its security policy within a stable, 
multilateral institution.44 Michael Lawless also noted the organisation’s role as a 
transatlantic forum and an avenue for Canada to constrain American behaviour 
beyond what it can accomplish alone.45 Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky have also 
noted the importance of the NATO Alliance as an avenue for exercising greater 
																																																													
41 Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-49, (Toronto: 
McLelland and Stewart, 1977). Reid further elaborates on Canada’s role in shaping Article II of the 
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University of Toronto Press, 1961). 
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influence compared to coalitions of the willing.46 This is a sampling of literature 
reflecting the view that Canada needs to continue its engagement in the Alliance, 
though the nature of the various scholars’ analyses varies in its perceived utility for 
Canadian foreign policy more generally. The literature on Canadian foreign policy 
will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 2, however, it is worthwhile to have a 
brief justification as to why these two operations are useful in assessing how 
narratives shape foreign policy behaviour.   
Canada was an active military contributor to NATO’s Afghanistan and Libya 
operations and had a very proactive role in shaping both the military and political 
aims of these operations.47 Neither of these conflicts threatened Canada’s direct 
strategic interests internationally supporting the possibility that alternative factors 
informed its decision to participate.48 Specifically, from a material point of view, 
Canada had no strategic military or public sector assets based in Afghanistan and 
though there had been some Canadian-based private sector investment in Libya, 
there was no direct threat to Canada’s overall economic, political or security 
interests.49 While it could be suggested that Canada’s participation in Afghanistan 
was strategic in that it was undertaken in order to curry favour with the United States 
(US), however, this still neglects the extent or length of Canada’s contribution. 
Indeed, in both Afghanistan and Libya, Canadian participation in these missions was 
far more robust than many other participating NATO nations, including those with 
greater military capacity. Moreover, it was the Canadian Permanent Representative 
at NATO who, in part, prompted the declaration of Article 5 in support of the United 
States, authorising NATO action.50 Similarly, Canada took part in operations in 
Afghanistan in 2002 as part of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom.51 Following 
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48 David S. McDonough, “Stability Operations and the Renewal of Canada’s International Security 
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a re-deployment in 2003, Canada supplied roughly 2,000 combat troops annually 
from the start of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission until the 
end of 2011 and played a leading role in military operations in the dangerous 
Kandahar province.52 Canadian forces suffered the third highest number of troop 
losses of any of the ISAF contributing nations.53 Similarly in Libya, Canada was 
vigorous in its denunciations of then-dictator, Moammar Gaddafi and imposed 
sanctions against his government shortly before the start of hostilities.54 
Furthermore, Canada played an important role as one of only 10 NATO nations who 
contributed significant military assets of ships, planes and personnel to Operation 
Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya as well as undertook air strikes against Gaddafi’s 
forces.55  
These two operations have been chosen due to Canada’s role in each one, 
respectively, allowing this study to examine the relationship between the operations 
as part of the NATO structure and Canada’s popular narrative as a middle power. 
ISAF’s broad mandate represents the first time NATO has led such a large-scale, 
wide-ranging, kinetic operation involving elements of reconstruction and 
development alongside counterinsurgency.56 Unlike ISAF, OUP was a heavily 
circumscribed aerial and naval operation with a relatively narrow mandate.57 Each of 
these operations was very different in its scale, mission and duration as well as the 
international context under which they took place. Taken together, these operations 
while outside Canada’s direct strategic interest, as outlined previously, can be linked 
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as behavioural manifestations of the popular middle power narrative ascribed to 
Canada’s foreign policy. This study will explore how this narrative is embedded in 
the ways that Canadian policymakers understand and formulate foreign policy and 
thus highlights a possible avenue through which narrative becomes behaviour.  
Additionally, in examining the middle power narrative it offers a way to understand 
the ways in which the Conservative Party of Canada’s interpretation of the Canadian 
foreign policy narrative have affected Canada’s NATO policymaking. By charting 
Canadian foreign policy in NATO during the Afghanistan and the Libya operations 
it is possible to observe the re-interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy narrative by 
the Conservative government and its effect on its relationship with the institution. 
While these operations are very different, they present empirical puzzles against 
which one can test how Canada’s actions with regards to NATO, are ultimately 
influenced and shaped by policymakers interpretation of Canada’s middle power 
narrative.  
The Canada-EU relationship and NATO 
As will be explored in the Chapter 2, the mixed and expansive use of the middle 
power narrative as it relates to Canada obviously poses a number of challenges for its 
use in this analysis. Given the broad sweep of Canadian international relations that 
are tied up in this narrative it is critical to narrow the scope and focus on the critical 
components for this study. This is contextual and helps to understand the factors 
which help shape the system in which the middle power narrative is formed.  While 
the Canada-US relationship is a key theme in Canadian foreign policy scholarship as 
will be explored in Chapter 2; the EU and the European relationship remain an 
underdeveloped area of study.58 While there is a deep historical foundation to 
Canada’s relationship with Europe, particularly around the Canada-United Kingdom 
(UK) connection, this has not been carried forward as robustly due to the importance 
of the US in Canadian affairs.59 As such, for the sake of thoroughness this section 
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will very briefly touch on Canada’s relationship with Europe and the European 
Union (EU).60 This is to establish the importance of NATO as a link between Canada 
and Europe but also to reflect on the various elements which place more importance 
on the NATO relationship. Moreover, it also helps to establish the scope for the rest 
of this study’s analysis.   
As this narrative relates to NATO, Canada is often classed as a middle 
power, neither a small nation like Luxembourg, Iceland or Latvia nor a major power 
like the United States, France or the UK. Rather it bears a closer similarity to the 
NATO nations of Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway as based on the military’s 
size, capability, mission caveats and participation in Alliance operations, with a 
particular focus on Afghanistan and Libya. Canada also occupies a unique position 
as the other North American member and one of the few non-EU middle powers in 
NATO, though it is often lumped in among them. Critically, it does not possess the 
unilateral military strength of the United States or the second largest military force 
possessed by non-EU NATO member, Turkey.61  As regards the differentiation from 
other non-EU NATO Allies, Croatia acceded to the EU in 2013. Albania is gradually 
undergoing the process of accession into the EU; likely to be completed some time 
in the intermediate future and its ability to participate in EU and NATO operations is 
already fairly circumscribed by its economic and limited military capabilities. 
Norway, of course, is the other non-EU member of NATO though it has access to the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the European Defence Agency 
through an Administrative Arrangement.62 Interestingly, Canada has also concluded 
an agreement with the European Union for participation in CSDP operations in 
December 2005 allowing Canadian participation in EU crisis management 
missions.63 Over the past decade, Canada has participated with the EU in the 
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Democratic Republic of Congo, Palestinian Territories, Guinea Bissau and Haiti 
among other places. Authors such as Frédéric Mérand have pointed towards a closer 
relationship between Canada and the EU as a way of developing alternative security 
frameworks.64 NATO nonetheless remains the central way by which Canada can 
exert, influence and contribute meaningfully to international security.  Unfortunately, 
the area of study concerning Canada’s relations with the European Union, 
particularly with regards to security remains relatively underdeveloped, as noted by 
Donna Wood and Amy Verdun and lacks a comprehensive examination.65 Indeed, as 
Stormy-Annika Mildner observed, Canada’s relationship with the EU on trade issues 
is often characterised as a side note to US-EU trade negotiations as an “add-on.”66 
Nonetheless, Canada concluded, in principle, a Free Trade Agreement with the 
European Union in 2013 that remains to be ratified and implemented which has 
garnered the issue more attention.67  In the security realm outside of NATO, there is 
the concern that Canada would be excluded from future discussions between the US 
and the EU.68  However, the utility of the CSDP and, by extension, the EU as an 
international security organisation, remains severely constrained by a number of 
factors.69 As a result, Canada remains more reliant on multilateral organisations such 
as NATO as a route to implement defence policy.  
Iraq 
Finally, it should be clarified why this study does not examine the Iraq War (2003-
2011), another major conflict that occurred during the same time frame being 
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examined. This action to dislodge and disarm the Ba’athist regime led by Saddam 
Hussein, unilaterally spurred by the Bush Administration did not involve Canada in 
any significant way and occurred outside of the NATO structure. The Iraq War was 
not authorised by the UN Security Council and as such, a multinational force of 
willing nations rather than a formal alliance structure invaded and occupied Iraq. The 
Canadian government under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien failed to articulate a 
coherent message towards the Iraq War and as a result, created significant confusion 
in Canada and the US as to whether Canada would provide support.70 That being 
said, it does inform the discussions surrounding Canada’s deployment to 
Afghanistan.  
In their 2007 account of Canada’s involvement in the Afghanistan conflict, 
Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang contend that Canada’s robust engagement in the 
NATO-ISAF operation was in large part, due to a desire to appease the US after 
opposing the invasion of Iraq.71 Whilst the concern over the Canada-US relationship 
is certainly vital to Canada’s foreign policy and trade considerations, this view 
neglects the possibility that Canada’s non-participation was also due, in part, to 
deeper trends in Canadian foreign policy. Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky note that 
there are a multitude of historical reasons which pointed to Canadian involvement in 
Afghanistan and similarly observed that other countries which did support the US in 
Iraq only did so for a matter of months before pulling out their supporting forces.72 
Indeed, Jockel and Sokolsky allude to factors which actually prolonged Canada’s 
commitment in Afghanistan going beyond national considerations but are instead, 
tied to sentimental views of Canadian history.73 Similarly, in his account of the lead 
up to the Iraq War, Andrew Richter notes that the Canadian government sent mixed 
signals about its participation and ultimately refused its support due to its “intuitive 
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support of multilateral initiatives.”74 Neither of the accounts by Jockel and Sokolsky 
or Richter goes into great detail about what makes this sentimental support intuitive 
and the mechanism that relates this to Canadian foreign policymaking behaviour but 
nonetheless, point to factors beyond the Canada-US relationship which informed the 
decision to participate in the Afghanistan operation. Some of this will be explored in 
the chapter examining parliamentary debates and the narrative articulated there.  
Thus this study can provide greater clarity by illuminating how the key middle 
power narrative informs and shapes Canadian foreign policy behaviour.  
This narrative runs deeply through Canadian foreign policy literature and 
comprises a powerful lens through which Canadians see their place in the world, as 
will be explored in Chapter 2. The commitment to Canada’s middle power foreign 
policy tradition informed the decision to stay out of Iraq, alongside the practical 
considerations concerning overstretch of the Canadian military forces. Furthermore, 
speaking on the ten-year anniversary of the invasion, former Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien affirmed that the decision to stay out of the war was important for Canadian 
independence as well as maintaining that the UN was a vital institution not to be 
circumvented.75 As such, not only did the Iraq War go against the broader narrative 
of Canada as a middle power and, by extension, challenge its role in the international 
system, there were concrete domestic considerations within Canada that made 
participation unpalatable to Canadian leadership. Thus, in not participating in the 
Iraq conflict, Canadian policymakers avoided triggering a discontinuity with its 
larger middle power narrative. As this falls outside of the NATO structure it also 
goes beyond the remit of what is being examined. While this study recognises the 
importance of the debate surrounding the war in Iraq, to explore the Canadian 
reaction to it would not significantly add to the exploration of the Afghanistan and 
Libya deployments.  
Chapter outline 
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Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical framework on which this study is built as well as 
expands on its links with FPA. It also highlights how this works well with the study 
of Canadian foreign policy given that it also shares a focus on issues of identity, 
continuity and narratives. Chapter 2 is an analysis of the field of Canadian foreign 
policy which will provide an overview of the middle power narrative as well as an 
examination of peacekeeping as a vital component of any Canadian foreign policy 
discussion. Indeed, this middle power narrative provides some definitional 
challenges that will require deeper clarification and specificity. Moreover, it will also 
look to the deficiencies in Canadian foreign policy scholarship, particularly when it 
comes to adopting new approaches and engaging with new theoretical frameworks. 
Chapter 3 will examine the Parliamentary Hansard records from 2001 to 2011 to 
explore how or whether the middle power label is invoked in relation to Canada’s 
participation in the Afghanistan and Libya missions and in what context. This focus 
is ultimately on the Canadian policymakers inside and outside of NATO as agents 
who are translating Canada’s foreign policy narrative into foreign policy behaviour. 
This includes Members of Parliament, Senators and Canadians working in NATO 
both as diplomats and members of NATO’s international staff. Chapter 4 will then 
turn to media sources to chart the usage of the middle power label, as well as the 
coverage of Canada’s missions in Afghanistan and Libya and how Canadian foreign 
policy decisions were reported and examine how the narrative of Canada’s foreign 
policy is constructed and communicated. Additionally, it will incorporate interviews 
from non-Canadian NATO personnel and diplomats to see how Canada’s foreign 
policy narrative is transmitted and interpreted by policymakers and how these shape 
the expectations of Canadian foreign policy behaviour. This provides clarity as to 
how the re-interpretation of a foreign policy narrative by different governments have 
an actual impact on the practice of policymaking.  
 In order to fully examine these deployments, it is important to first examine, 
the theoretical underpinnings of this study and the middle power narrative whilst 
also integrating it into a constructivist FPA approach through the use of Role 
Theory. From there it is possible to turn to dissecting the Canadian foreign policy 
literature and the middle power narrative in order to then look at how this has 







Chapter 1 – Theoretical foundations  
In order to explore Canada’s foreign policy narrative and its relationship with 
policymaking in NATO this study will explore the concept of the middle power 
in Canadian foreign policy. This is done utilising a Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA) approach and in doing so, situates it within broader discussions in the 
discipline. In particular, this study builds on the examination of roles in foreign 
policy or Role Theory which, as will be explored examines the relationship 
between individuals and their understandings of history and foreign policy 
behaviour. In doing so, it will allow this study to better establish the links 
between foreign policy narratives and foreign policy behaviour while also 
maintaining a focus on the individual policymaker. As a qualitative examination, 
this study is seeking to not only conduct a narrative analysis but also how this is 
linked with policymaking practice, rather than a quantitative analysis of political 
language. This chapter will first establish what constitutes a narrative and then 
examine narrative formation. This is then followed by an exploration of the link 
between narratives, the policymaker and the state through the exploration of the 
ontological security research agenda and its weaknesses. This will, in part, 
clarify how the individual interpretation of foreign policy narrative links with the 
creation of foreign policy routines and elaborates this study’s interpretivist 
approach. Following this there is a brief review of the constructivist FPA 
literature to establish how Role Theory can highlight, through policymakers, the 
ways in which foreign policy narratives translate into foreign policy behaviour. 
Role Theory situates this analysis within the work being undertaken on national 
roles and policymakers while also making an important contribution to Canadian 
foreign policy scholarship. It then examines the link between the case study 
selection and how some ontological security components are integrated into this 
study’s FPA approach.  
What are narratives? 
Building on the previously mentioned sources, it is necessary to establish what 
exactly this study refers to when discussing Canada’s middle power narrative and 






to conceptualise but is nonetheless actor-specific given that it relies on 
individuals to generate and propagate. Similarly, narratives exist over time and in 
the case of the middle power narrative, can be charted from its early stages until 
the present as will be done in Chapter 2. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 
note that narratives contain an implicit sense of time, i.e. beginning, middle and 
end and can be distinguished as separate concepts from frames and discourses, 
though not unrelated to these ideas either.1 In particular, they note that discourses 
and frames lack the ability to actively shape outcomes or behaviours, though they 
do shape the ways in which narratives are understood.2 Discourses and framing 
remain incidental to this study and its focus remains purely on the foreign policy 
narrative itself. This study is distinguished from Miskimmon et al’s work in that 
narratives are examined from an ontological standpoint of the subject, rather than 
suggesting that there exists an ideal end-state or outcome to be achieved through 
these narratives.  
As Steele explores while building on the work of Antony Giddens, 
narratives consist of a collection of stories that give actors a sense of meaning to 
the events in their lives or in broader terms a ‘Self’ but do not necessarily 
articulate an end state in itself.3 As Gearóid Ó Tuathail suggests, “[s]torylines are 
sense-making organisational devices tying the different elements of a policy 
challenge together into a reasonably coherent and convincing narrative.”4 Indeed, 
not only are these stories linked with the foreign policy narrative, as noted by 
Bevir and Rhodes, “[s]tories explain past practice and events and justify 
recommendations for the future.”5 Rather than interrogating the stories, which 
constitute these narratives, it is useful to understand how they contribute to the 
development of an overarching narrative. Moreover, it is important to remember 
that these interpretations may not all be mutually agreed upon. Lebow 																																																								
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interrogates this aspect while exploring identity suggesting that while there are 
competing understandings of narratives, rather than existing as static entities or 
fixed points they can change to suit the circumstances of the moment.6 Indeed, 
narratives can shift and change over time, similarly they can be used to shape 
conversations about a subject or define courses of action. Nonetheless, 
understandings of these narratives can still be contested and are malleable. None 
of the works mentioned so far sufficiently explains why some narratives are 
dominant, have greater staying power than others, or the mechanism by which 
they shape behaviours.  
Narrative Formation 
As noted in the introduction, this study utilises an interpretivist framework to 
dissect the role of social action and behaviour in the construction of narratives 
and will privilege the ontological over epistemological ramifications.7 This is not 
to suggest that there are not epistemological issues worthy of exploration, 
however, to explore these would require a deeper examination of narrative 
formation. Indeed, in his Foucauldian examination of the middle power David 
Bosold suggests that the belief in the middle power narrative and the ontological 
security derived from this is from a distinct interpretation of diplomatic history.8 
This approach is novel as it seeks to deconstruct the concept of middle power 
itself rather than apply it to specific foreign policy behaviour. While more 
concerned with the epistemological ramifications of the middle power narrative, 
it nonetheless underlines that as a constituent narrative of Canadian foreign 
policy, it is deeply woven into the fabric of how many Canadian policymakers 
think about foreign policy. This points to the important role of historical context 
in the creation of narratives, however, rather than explaining their foundation. As 
the next chapter will explore, the history of the middle power narrative’s 																																																								
6 Richard Ned Lebow, The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves, (Cambridge: 
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relationship to Canadian foreign policy reflects a dynamic interplay between 
elites in academia and policymaking with each contributing different components 
to the understanding of this narrative. Moreover, there is an important element 
related to the way the media propagates this narrative which is then reflected 
back to the policymaking sphere. This study echoes Bosold’s examination in its 
use of Role Theory and the examination of the middle power narrative but has 
gone further in seeking to actually explore the mechanisms by which behaviour 
and narrative interact, particularly at the individual level. Fundamentally, this 
study is concerned with context and continuity as they relate to the individual 
Self; while the interpretation of a foreign policy narrative may vary, its 
construction remains rooted in the individual interpretation of diplomatic history.  
It is necessary to be clear about not only which kind of narratives are 
being examined as well as which actors are of primary interest. As stated 
previously, this study is concerned with the relationship between foreign policy 
narratives and behaviours as they are understood by elites. That said, it is 
important to also recognise that while elites may be the crucial actors for this 
study, there are other pressures which can shape or affect narratives. In 
particular, public opinion can be a factor as a way by which foreign policy 
behaviours and narratives interact as Laura Roselle explored in her paper on the 
strategic narratives employed during war.9 Roselle suggests that specific 
language can be used to induce specific behaviours as in the case of alliances, 
particularly in relation to the US and Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan and 
how the media was used to shape the public conversation about this conflict.10 
Steele notes that in Kosovo, public opinion actually hampered the ability to act 																																																								
9 Laura Roselle, “Strategic Narratives of War: Fear of Entrapment and Abandonment During 
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decisively in the face of possible genocide but in so doing, threatened the 
‘liberal’ narrative of the NATO member states.11 Domestic pressures within 
states force policymakers to generate options founded in national narratives and 
behaviours that reflect these narratives. This generates a process of contestation 
by which the policies adopted, generally must resonate with popular 
understandings of the foreign policy narrative. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and 
Roselle go into detail about the process of narrative contestation and the 
importance of creating narrative which ultimately ‘convinces’ its target 
audience.12 This study differs somewhat in that while there is a process of 
contestation over the popular understanding of Canada’s foreign policy narrative, 
as will be explored, it is comparatively divorced from public opinion given the 
elite consensus which forms about Canadian foreign policy.13 Rather than 
seeking to further critically dissect narrative formation, the next chapter will 
instead largely focus on the historical role of the middle power narrative in 
Canadian foreign policy and how this has shaped policy in the past, informing 
both domestic and international policymaking. As such, this is not focusing on a 
communication theory rooted approach, but is a much narrower narrative 
analysis of elite understandings of a specific foreign policy narrative. 
It must also be recognised that there are competing interpretations of this 
narrative between policymakers and academics that seek to try and emphasize 
different behavioural outcomes. This will be explored as narratives can also be 
used as ex post facto rationalisations for policy decisions which are arguably 
disruptive. That being said, the fact that policymakers feel the need to explain 
actions in relation to previous actions points to the force that narratives exert and 
thus suggest the need to explore how this affects the policymaking process. As 
Anthony Lang suggests, “[t]he diplomat does not just combine elements of 
national power in his presentation of the state…he represents the national 																																																								
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purpose, the historical record of the state, a historical record that embodies the 
political and ethical ideals of the community.”14 As such, this study will also 
endeavour to find the way in which certain roles as articulated by policymakers 
flowing from this narrative become dominant. Indeed, policymakers’ internal 
vision of Canada’s narrative carries with it a vision of what Canada can do 
internationally, therefore articulating a role gives them agency with which to 
conduct foreign policy behaviour.   
Foreign policy narratives, the State and the ‘Self’ 
It is useful to develop the difference between wider foreign policy narratives and 
strategic narratives a bit further given that there is a notable divergence in terms 
of the two phenomena. While the two are interrelated, it is necessary to make a 
distinction between the strategic narratives which articulate end-states and 
defined political goals, against the broader concept of interpreted foreign policy 
narrative.15 As Lawrence Freedman suggests these types of narratives “are 
strategic because they do not arise spontaneously but are deliberately constructed 
or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current.”16 In their 
examination of this issue, Miskimmon, O’Laughlin and Roselle break down 
narratives into different categories; system narratives, identity narratives and 
issue-specific narratives and are more concerned about how these differing 
elements interact to shape behaviours and outcomes in specific circumstances.17 
Whilst there is some overlap between this study and the work of Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin and Roselle this study is more concerned with the overarching 
narrative of Canadian foreign policy and how policymakers’ actions in 																																																								
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Afghanistan and Libya fit within this, rather than the state-level which these 
authors examine. Moreover, their work on strategic narratives focuses on the use 
of language and theory of communication, exploring discourses, framing, 
language and influence in order to achieve specific outcomes.18 In contrast, this 
study is not examining the strategic narrative of Canada in NATO, but rather 
with how Canada’s participation in the Afghanistan and Libya operations fit with 
the middle power narrative of Canadian foreign policy more broadly. While this 
study is examining narrative in the context of two NATO operations and their 
relationship with Canadian foreign policy, it is more concerned with the ways in 
which policymakers articulate the related narratives and their relationship more 
generally to concepts of Canada. Given the focus on the policymaker, it is, as 
observed by Ned Lebow, concerned with the process by which “[n]arratives tell 
people who they are, what they should aspire to be and how they should relate to 
others.”19 By focusing on individuals, this allows the parsing of a specific 
narrative from the broader framework of identity and its relationship with state 
behaviour rather than focusing overly on specific policy initiatives or immediate 
political ends.20 As this study is examining narrative, it is focused on the ways in 
which policymakers understand and articulate their understanding of Canadian 
foreign policy in relation to its traditions, stories and routines. This allows us to 
focus on the narrower field of Canadian foreign policy and the individual 
interpretation of this narrative in order to examine how this influences 
policymakers to articulate and adhere to roles in foreign policy behaviour.  
Utilising Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory others such as Jeffrey 
Huysmans, Jennifer Mitzen, Bill McSweeney, Ian Manners and Brent Steele 
have sought to explore the importance of narratives and identity in shaping state 
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action through the exploration of what is broadly termed ‘ontological security.’21 
Others such as Felix Berenskoetter and Bastian Giergerich, Stuart Croft, Amir 
Lupovici, Ayşe Zarakol and Bahar Rumelili have also sought to develop this area 
of study.22 This study shares some commonalities with this research area in that 
it examines how policymakers within states act outside of what can be seen as 
their strategic interest in order to maintain consistency with their conception of 
their state’s narrative.23 However, this study’s FPA approach differs from the 
ontological security research programme as it privileges the individual level of 
analysis over the state level and does not assume a unitary state identity.  
While there are some useful elements from the ontological security 
research programme, in particular the examinations of narrative, there are a 
number of problems with the way in which it is analysed. In order to borrow 
concepts from ontological security analyses it is necessary to explore its 
weaknesses in further detail to separate out the more useful components. In 																																																								
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particular, the concept of a state as having a Self is problematic, if only because 
states are not people and as such this study cannot ascribe any unitary identity or 
human characteristics. This remains a challenging issue for the IR scholarship on 
ontological security; in seeking to ascribe agency, it is fundamentally individual 
policymakers, acting as part of a corporate whole, who arguably strive for 
ontological security.24 Examining the interpretation of narratives at the individual 
level helps to work around the construction of Self and Other by focusing on the 
narratives generated within the state itself as opposed to narratives generated in 
opposition to an external influence.25 Moreover, there is often a reification of the 
state as the vital agent, and while not neglecting the importance of this level of 
analysis there is rarely enough granular detail in distinguishing that the 
individual and the state reactions to disruptions of ontological security may be 
quite different. Additionally, it is also important to recognise that foreign policy 
narratives are also interpreted and negotiated by agents outside the state (in this 
study NATO policymakers) and that these too affect the ways in which 
policymakers shape behaviour. As Stuart Croft noted, “instead of reifying the 
state, ontological security studies should be based in understanding the 
intersubjective framing of the insecurities of individuals.”26  
Similarly, in examining the Self in the context of the broader ontological 
security scholarship it is important to acknowledge that this is and remains as 
Ayşe Zarakol notes, situated in a fundamentally Western foundation.27 In this 
vein, the examination undertaken in this study is one rooted in the Western 
discourse, building as it does on work done by Giddens, Heidegger, Kierkegaard 
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and Weber as well as the broader IR and FPA scholarship.28 Trying to reconcile 
or explore these further goes beyond the scope of this analysis but nonetheless 
recognises this foundation and how it informs both the conceptual and theoretical 
underpinnings. As noted in the introduction, this remains a fundamentally 
qualitative empirical study and examines the relationship between national 
narratives and the ways they have shaped recent examples of policymaking. In 
exploring Canadian parliamentary debates, news media and interviewing 
Canadian and non-Canadian policymakers, this study will add some granularity 
to the study of how policymakers fundamentally shape their own ‘corporate’ or 
constitutive foreign policy narrative and the related roles that are articulated. 
This also means that this study will not aim to ascribe any universality to the 
middle power narrative explored here as it remains inherently concerned with the 
individual experience and interpretation of foreign policy. In this case, this is 
rooted in a fundamentally Canadian experience.  
Rather than relying on the psychological interpretation of this individual 
experience however, this study can instead rely on the examination of social 
actions as a way for policymakers to maintain a consistent narrative.29 In this 
case an interpreted consistent narrative of self-identity routinises foreign policy 
actions, thus creating a set of behaviours which other actors recognise as 
predictable and by extension, reduce anxiety both in the Self (either the 
state/policymaker) and the Other (foreign states/policymakers).30 In doing so, 
this creates a stable sense of Self which facilitates the process of foreign policy 
creation and by extension, informs identity. Frequently invoked to clarify the 
Self/Other dichotomy in IR, identity has been a fertile field of study and is often 																																																								
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Ontological Security,” Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004), 741-767. Kinnvall expands 
on the structuration premise of narrative construction and their role in ‘identity’ construction. 
This study is concerned with the ‘consistent’ narrative, while recognising that since they are open 






used as shorthand in order to describe collective behaviours, usually among 
states, in order to explain and understand the mechanisms driving these 
behaviours.31 IR scholarship frequently focuses on the dynamic interplay 
between the Self and Other, however, this is not the only factor driving foreign 
policy, rather as noted already, there are also internal forces within actors that are 
important.32 However, this again remains focused on the state-level and 
fundamentally, these elements are concerned with the individual interpretation of 
these narratives and behaviour. As noted already, this study takes issue with the 
proposition or assumption of a unitary state Self or identity in IR and instead 
chooses to focus on the constituent narratives which underpin these ideas.  
As will be explored in the next section the dissection of identity is 
problematic, however, the interrogation of the links between narratives and 
foreign policy behaviour presents a much more approachable and empirically 
examinable avenue. Moreover, as Ayşe Zarakol observes, ontological security 
subordinates the intersubjective understanding of social identities to the study of 
narratives emanating from within the state, about itself.33 As such, with the vital 
role these narratives play it is important to also recognise that narratives about 
foreign policy are contested between individuals within states and that while at 
certain times, some interpretations dominate, and they are not necessarily the 
same as the dominant narrative. This means that narratives shift in relation to the 
individuals articulating and interpreting them and as such, this study should look 
to examine how this affects behaviour. In order to make sense of how these 
narratives influence policymakers it is necessary to look to associated emotions 
																																																								
31 For a subjective overview of some related articles see William Bloom, Personal Identity, 
National Identity and International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); 
Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (Jun. 1994), 384-396; Iver Neumann, “Self and Other in 
International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jun. 1996), 
139-174; Richard Ned Lebow, “Identity and International Relations,” International Relations, 
Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec. 2008), 473-492.  
32 Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2008), 
32. 
33 Ayşe Zarakol, “Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Crimes: Turkey and Japan,” 






and why they are important.34 The triggering of emotions helps to link the 
interpretation of narrative with foreign policy behaviour and thus realises the 
agency of the policymaker and, in effect, reinforces a state’s narrative. To 
borrow from Brent Steele’s framework this renders moral, humanitarian and 
honour-driven motivations rational actions, as they are guaranteeing future 
stability of the state’s interpreted self-identity.35 By applying these three motives 
to three different case studies, Steele suggests that self-interrogative reflexivity is 
the key method by which states arrive at conclusions about how the maintenance 
of ontological security shapes their behaviour and by extension, find ways in 
which to reinforce specific preferences that support this.36 In particular, this 
study will note the presence and importance of shame as a factor which shapes 
actors’ responses to narratives and the ways in which this ultimately affects 
behaviours and routines.37 Bill McSweeney notes, social actions are inherently 
reflexive, as actors seek to create routines which make these actions 
comprehensible to others.38 In this case, this study will seek to understand this 
reflexive action in the context of how policymakers are influenced by their 
interpretation of a national narrative when articulating foreign policy roles rather 
than examining the more state-level action as Steele does.  
Resolving issues of agency 
By seeking to critically examine the relationship between Canada and NATO, a 
structure-agency issue is implied due to the way in which this study examines 																																																								
34 Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 515. Others are increasingly exploring the role of emotion in foreign 
policy. See Rose McDermott, “The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science,” 
Perspectives on Politics, Vol.2, No. 4 (Dec. 2004), 691-706; Irving Janis and Leon Mann, 
Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment, (New York: 
Free Press, 1977). 
35 Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2008), 
44. 
36 Ibid, 152. Steele’s use of reflexivity is built on Stefano Guzzini’s critical examination of 
constructivism where he sought to deconstruct the central trends in the evolving Constructivist 
framework with an emphasis on the role of reflexivity as a central component. See Stefano 
Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations,” European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2000), 147-182.  
37 Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2008), 
54. 







how agents within a systemic context, exercise agency. With regards to this 
study, the actors involved are policymakers in Canada and NATO who exercise 
agency within the broader structure of the international system. Similarly, this 
agency is shaped by the narrative, which can be considered another structure 
affecting this interaction. In shaping policy, policymakers exert agency within 
the NATO framework constrained by a multitude of structures in order to shape 
events at the broader systemic level. Given the wide variety of structures that 
exist (normative, ontological, epistemic, etc), there remains considerable 
uncertainty within the field of IR, over the interaction between agents and 
structures.39 As this debate relates to this study, it falls back on to Giddens’ 
structuration theory. Thus both structure and agency are not considered external 
to actors, but abstractions which both constrain and enable behaviour, meaning 
agents drive structure and sustain them through individual preferences.40 As a 
result, this creates a mutually reinforcing relationship between structure and 
agent rendering an examination of the dynamic between the two largely outside 
the purview of this study. This study is more interested in the policymakers-as-
agent, given that they are both representing and interpreting state narratives and 
will steer away from the state-as-agent tendency in IR.41 This also reflects 
Giddens who eschews categorising collectivities as agents.42 As noted 
previously, fundamentally, the phenomena examined here are not experienced by 
the state, but instead by the elites and as such they are the critical focus. Nor 
should one only focus on the state leader and implicitly link the state narrative 
with the leader’s interpretation of what that should be. While leaders articulate 
foreign policy preferences, it is important to recognise that narratives inform this 
																																																								
39 Walter Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis,” International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep. 1992), 245-270. 
40 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, 
(Oakland: University of California Press, 1984). 
41 See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 7th ed., (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education, 2005) for an iconic instance where Morgenthau articulates the state as the vital entity 
in international relations. Subsequent IR analyses place emphasis on the state as the key unit 
when examining international relations.  
42 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, 






process as well and moreover, these preferences are often contested, in this case 
in Parliament as well as among diplomats.43  
It is a frequent conceit in the field of IR to regard the state as an agent and 
then associate certain motivations to its actions as a way to simplify variables 
during analyses. This unitary-actor assumption presents a problem when trying to 
ascertain the rationality linked with these narratives.44 As noted already, this 
study takes issue with this contention in that it does not sufficiently account for 
the individual interpretations of those narratives and moreover, fails to 
adequately articulate how states themselves seek to maintain ontological security 
or take any other form of action. It is the policymakers within these states who 
do this and they are the ones who create institutions and practices which 
reinforce and reproduce these routines, not the state. Rather than trying to ascribe 
the interpretation of a distinct national narrative to a ‘state-agent’ this study is 
more interested in how individual policymakers are influenced by said narrative 
and how this shapes their policymaking. As such, this study is looking at the 
various influences on policymaking that derives from a state’s narrative on the 
agents, in this case policymakers, which generates behaviours within NATO. As 
the analysis in the next chapter will highlight, this middle power narrative is 
deeply ingrained among Canadian policymakers. However, as will be explored, 
this narrative is not uniquely interpreted by Canadians but also exists among 
NATO policymakers who interact regularly with Canadian policymakers in 
NATO.45 The resultant effect on Canadian policymakers’ agency is exerted 
across multiple levels as narratives are interpreted, reinterpreted and reflected 
																																																								
43 This is explored in a slightly different fashion in Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Laughlin and 
Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 140. While this is meant as a way of exploring how strategic narratives 
construct international order its contention remains applicable in that all narratives are 
contestable.  
44 For the sake of reducing variables in Foreign Policy Analysis, governments are often seen as 
unitary-actors however, this is rarely the case and indeed, there are important dynamics at play 
within the domestic level. For the iconic work on this see Robert J. Putnam, “Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 
(Summer 1988), 427-460. 






upon.46 This narrative then influences agents’ action due to Canadian 
policymakers need to reinforce their understandings of this phenomenon, thus 
helping us to understand Canadian foreign policy behaviour in NATO. So while 
this does concern Canada’s agency within NATO, the conditions surrounding 
that agency do not derive solely from a systemic structure but rather from 
Canadian policymaker’s need to maintain consistency with their understandings 
of Canadian foreign policy behaviour.47 This assertion does not deny the 
existence of national interest at these different levels nor does it suggest that it is 
not a motivating factor. While national interest can also be regarded as subjective 
it carries with it a different set of preferences that tend to favour more strategic 
ends. A close interrogation of the differing conceptions of national interest goes 
beyond the scope of this study, rather, it seeks to focus on foreign policy 
decision-making as it relates to two operations where Canadian policymakers 
could determine the level of contribution.  Canada’s robust participation in the 
Afghanistan and Libya missions implies that this would convey some benefit, as 
compared to the token contribution of many other NATO nations, raising 
questions as to why this was the case. Thus as noted, this study will seek to 
reconcile how a foreign policy narrative interacts with the practice of 
policymaking and the extent to which it constrains or enhances how that policy is 
made manifest, thus generating behaviour which reinforces its foreign policy 
																																																								
46 This builds on concepts elucidated by Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The 
Logic of Two-Level Games” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Jun. 1988), 427-460. 
Peter Katzenstein develops further the role of identity in influencing state choices at the systemic 
level in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996). Additionally, there has been work on how the domestic shapes 
foreign policy, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign 
Policy in Liberal Democracies,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jul., 1991), 479-512. 
47 Walter Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis,” International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep. 1992), 264. Carlsnaes warns that Foreign Policy Analysis 
scholarship has a tendency to overlook the implications of agency-structure on its analysis and 






narrative.48 As will be explored in the next section this become clearer through 
the examination of constructivist FPA work.  
Constructivism, FPA and links to Role Theory 
This study draws upon constructivist FPA scholarship, as it actively examines 
the production and reproduction of a popular narrative at the actor level and how 
this corresponds to national behaviour in international security policy. This is not 
to suggest this is the only course of examination as there are other potentially 
applicable constructivist models within the broader discipline of IR, such as 
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde’s work on the ‘securitization’ of 
issues which outlines that through speech acts, states can legitimate action to 
solve perceived existential security problems including those to identity.49 
However, Bill McSweeney has noted, most relevantly to this study, that this 
approach reifies concepts like identity, treating them more as social facts rather 
than as evolving and changing subjects.50 Indeed, Buzan, Waever and Wilde’s 
framework fits poorly with this analysis due to its largely static view of identity 
formation.  As outlined earlier, this study is interpretivist and as such steers away 
from a static interpretation of state action which is more unidirectional, i.e. 
identity determines behaviour; in favour of a reflexive approach and the dynamic 
interplay between the two.51 As this study steers away from identity and is more 
concerned with narrative, it will attempt to avoid this pitfall by recognising that 
the impact and the narratives themselves are variable and, ultimately, constructed 
by the agents involved. They only have as much meaning and weight as the 
individual policymaker is willing to accept.      
																																																								
48 ‘Pragmatic’ refers to what would be considered realist considerations of economics and 
military strength. I use this term as it has a pre-existing relationship in the literature concerning 
Canadian foreign policy. For the foundational work of pragmatism in Canadian foreign policy 
see: John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-
1957, Vol. 1 (1979) and Vol. 2 (1982), (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) as well as John W. 
Holmes, The Better Part of Valour, (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1970). 
49 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 
50 Bill McSweeney, “Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: A Response to Buzan and Waever,” 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan. 1998), 137-140. 
51 Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, “Interpretive Theory,” Theory and Methods in Political 






Writing on the broader construction of social norms, Nicholas Onuf noted 
the importance of culture as an endogenous factor in creating rules that, in turn, 
shape responses.52 Alexander Wendt expanded on the relationship between 
identity and culture to further examine state interaction in an anarchic system, 
though in doing so, introduced a relatively reductive and systemic view of 
identities (Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian).53 These important constructivist 
works reflected deeper questions about the relationship between discourse and 
action in the international system but their remit was far beyond the reach of this 
specific analysis. Similar to McSweeney’s criticism of Buzan, there are 
criticisms of constructivism such as those elaborated by Maja Zehfuss who in her 
postmodern criticism of Wendt, Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil, suggests that 
each reifies different elements of international politics which undermines the 
idea that reality is socially constructed.54 However, this model steers away from 
the normative side of Kratochwil’s theorising and remains cognisant of and aims 
to avoid the problem of reification. With regards to the ontological security 
model specifically and reflecting the criticisms highlighted earlier, Alanna 
Krolikowski notes that it also reifies identity, particularly at state level by 
expressing state personhood, however, as noted previously, given the focus on 
policymaker as actor this study aims to avoid this pitfall.55 Nonetheless, Zehfuss’ 
criticism of constructivism serves to highlight, that fundamentally, theorising at 
the systemic level remains fraught, particularly when ascribing characteristics 
grounded in other areas of social sciences, be they identity, rules or norms.  
Strategic culture and its weaknesses 
One of the more popular routes of examination which touches on many of the 
same themes as this study relies on the analysis of the normative frameworks 																																																								
52 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 127.  
53 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
54 Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
55 Alanna Krolikowski, “State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International 







which inform how nations approach conflict, broadly termed ‘strategic 
cultures.’56 Beyond the constructivist views of Onuf and Wendt, other scholars, 
namely Jack Snyder, Alan Ian Johnston and Colin Gray tried to refine and 
deepen the links between ‘culture’ and strategy.57 There remains a definitional 
issue in strategic culture in which the author must adequately define not only 
their distinct views of ‘strategy’ and ‘culture’ but also their interpretation of how 
these two interact. Indeed, there remain serious challenges with the concept, as 
Edward Lock noted in 2010 while seeking to find a more empirical way of 
examining the issue, much of the theorising about strategic culture remains 
focused around the debate between Alan Ian Johnston and Colin Gray.58 This has 
generated a body of literature on strategic culture ranging across a number of 
issues, but it largely remains static due to the theoretical impasse between Gray 
and Johnston; Gray views strategic culture as contextual and inseparable from 
the cultural milieu in which it is developed whereas Johnston sees it as 
behavioural.59 As they relate to Canada, Justin Massie (behavioural) and David 
Haglund (contextual) have both sought to define Canadian strategic culture and 
identity to examine how the country approaches conflict.60 This theoretical 
impasse cuts to some of the central challenges in social sciences, as David 
																																																								
56 Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).  
57 There is a vast amount of material on strategic cultures. The idea of ‘strategic culture’ focusing 
on elites was first articulated in, Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for 
Limited Nuclear Operations, RAND Corporation, 1977. Others who followed focused on broader 
society-based strategic cultures, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture 
and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Others 
focus on anthropological factors, see Colin S. Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American 
Example”, International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Autumn 1981), 21-47.   
58 Edward Lock, “Redefining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation,” Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jul. 2010), 685-708. 
59 Ibid, 690. 
60 For further reading on the challenges posed by strategic culture in Canada see: Justin Massie, 
“United West, Divided Canada? Transatlantic (Dis)unity and Canada's Atlanticist Strategic 
Culture,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jun. 2010), 118-138 see also, David 
Haglund, “Relating to the Anglo-sphere: Canada, ‘Culture’, and the Question of Military 
Intervention”, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005), 179-198. David 
McDonough has sought to take this further looking at broader questions of “grand strategy” 
suitable for a middle power in David S. McDonough, “Grand Strategy, Culture, and Strategic 
Choice: A Review,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies Vol. 13, No. 4 (2011) 
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perspective see Stéphane Roussel, Culture Stratégique et Politique de Défense: L’Expérience 






Haglund notes, looking at Verstehen and Erklären or interpretivism and 
positivism, while noting that future analysis may need to incorporate both.61 
Haglund’s contention goes beyond the remit of this study moreover, this study is 
clearly in the vein of interpretivism/Verstehen in order to highlight the 
importance of factors such as ‘identity’ and narrative in shaping policy. It can be 
argued that the constructivist research agenda should not be one that is couched 
in a positivist framework and should avoid engaging in a positivist-based 
analysis.62 As a result, while recognising the value in both approaches, this study 
does not seek to bridge the interpretivist-positivist divide. 
Focusing more on the aspect of state-level culture, Peter Katzenstein 
examined the role of culture in the formation of security policy norms and their 
central role in policymaking and in doing so, gives more depth to the strategic 
culture debate.63 Nonetheless, the continued conflict over what actually 
constitutes strategic culture limits its utility and furthermore, the literature tends 
to sustain its focus at the systemic and domestic levels but lacks the granularity 
and multidimensional focus on individual policymakers. This presents a 
challenge when trying to chart how the forces exerted by narratives flow back 
and forth between the domestic and international sphere. It should be stressed 
that this study is not meant to invalidate or deconstruct broader questions of 
strategic culture but rather, complement their focus and lend an alternative 
theoretical explanatory framework to Canadian foreign policy. This is not to 
neglect broader relations of culture and the construction of foreign policy; 
worthy of note here is Ned Lebow’s Cultural Theory of International Relations, 																																																								
61 David Haglund, “What Good Is Strategic Culture?: A Modest Defence of an Immodest 
Concept,” International Journal, Vol. 59 (Summer 2004), 489. As noted previously; Verstehen: 
an empathic understanding of human behaviour; interpretivist. Erklären: explanatory basis for 
behaviour based on observation; positivist.    
62 There is a notable debate within constructivism as to whether constructivism necessarily needs 
to adopt positivist methodology to assert its place within the social sciences. See Ted Hopf, “The 
Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security, Vol. 23, 
No. 1 (Summer 1998), 171-200; for a good accounting of the foundational debates regarding 
constructivism’s relationship with positivism see Stefano Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of 
Constructivism in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, 
No. 2 (2000), 147-182.  
63 Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” The Culture 
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where Lebow explores fundamental elements of constructivist scholarship as 
drawn from historical examples, though as a framework it does not offer the 
empirical depth that this study requires.64 Nonetheless, his work explores some 
of the underlying elements and supports some of the important motivations 
driving ontological security as a theoretical framework, particularly the role of 
self-esteem in generating the quest for honour and standing.65 Moreover, his 
work also categorises Canada’s behaviour as an international peacekeeper as one 
founded in an honour-based approach to the international system.66 While Lebow 
ultimately disagrees with much of the ontological security programme for many 
of the same reasons outlined in this chapter, his work offers clear insight into the 
expression of motivation behind policymaking particularly as it relates to moral 
and honour-driven motivations linked with Canada’s middle power narrative.67 
As will be explored further in Chapters 3 and 4, Lebow’s work gives greater 
depth to the vital role that the individual relationship with the state narrative 
plays. It also provides a way of examining the dynamic interplay between the 
policymaker and state behaviour and will be drawn on to elaborate a number of 
these conceits. Nonetheless, it is important to look at alternative models within 
the FPA constructivist framework that further develop the conceptual tenets of 
this theoretical model and thus help to better explore the relationship between 
narrative and behaviour. It is worthwhile to briefly examine the field of FPA to 
gain a clearer understanding of the approach and why it fits well with this 
analysis. 
Adapting FPA  
FPA is said to have diverged from the wider IR scholarship in the 1950s and 
since then, has proceeded at arm’s length from the broader discipline.68 Vendulka 																																																								
64 Richard Ned Lebow, Cultural Theory of International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).  
65 Ibid, 26.  
66 Ibid, 501. 
67 Richard Ned Lebow, Identity and International Relations (Book forthcoming), Draft chapter, 
2014. See also Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); to develop the idea of honour.   
68 Vendulka Kubálková, “Foreign Policy, International Politics, and Constructivism,” Foreign 






Kubálková suggests that the divergence between systemic international politics 
scholarship and more behaviourally oriented FPA work remains challenging due 
to the focus on systemic by one and individual by the other.69  Nonetheless, this 
agenda has been carried forward as David Houghton outlined, there is a definite 
synchronicity between FPA and broader constructivist theory as a way of 
expanding the way in which this study can examine foreign policy decision-
making and the various elements informing those decisions.70 Indeed, as Marijke 
Breuning suggests when examining foreign policy, “decision-makers are 
products as well as representatives of their society.”71 However, it should be 
noted that there are different interpretations of how to examine the role of 
identity, culture, narratives and other socially constructed elements of foreign 
policy.  
There has long been a recognition that there are important social factors 
shaping foreign policy, such as the role of public opinion and national identities, 
narratives or perspectives as explored by Philip Converse and carried forward by 
other scholars such as Thomas Risse-Kappen, Mark Peffley and John Hurwitz 
and continued more recently, to Timothy Hildebrandt.72 Similarly, scholarship 
has also looked at the decision-making roles of leadership and elites, notably by 
Robert Jervis, Irving Janis and Graham Allison carried into more recent 
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Toward a Constructivist Approach,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 3, No.1 (2007), 27. 
71 Marijke Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction, (London: Palgrave 
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72 For a subjective overview, see Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass 
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scholarship by Janice Gross Stein.73 Alongside this, Martha Finnemore and 
Michael Barnett have done seminal work on the interactions between 
international organisations and states and while their analysis is broadly 
systemic, they categorise the ways in which these organisations construct the 
international order in a useful way for FPA.74 As noted previously however, this 
study is not as concerned with the institutional side as much as the policymaker. 
While the institutional framework in which this study takes place is important, 
the interaction between narratives and behaviour, rather than the institution itself 
offers greater opportunities for analysis. Furthermore, Barnett’s work on role 
position versus role preference offers an interesting way in which Role Theory 
can bridge different levels of analysis by connecting the individual interpretation 
of foreign policy with the domestic and systemic pressures.75 Barnett’s 
distinction is vital in that it helps determine how to interpret the ways in which 
different roles can be categorised and understood in context and parsing how 
individuals form their understanding of their national role. This broad cross-
section of authors covers a variety of perspectives within the constructivist field 
and across the systemic, domestic and individual levels. Nonetheless, they 
provide a solid foundation on which to form a constructivist FPA approach.   
Looking elsewhere in related scholarship Jeffrey Checkel has noted the 
need for greater clarity on the role of ontology at the individual level by 
constructivists as a way of encouraging social constructivists to elaborate 
																																																								
73 Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Apr. 1968), 
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implicit cognitive models in their analyses.76 This study will endeavour to give 
some clarity to Checkel’s proposition whilst fulfilling the hallmarks of FPA 
examination as outlined by Valerie Hudson, namely viewing foreign policy 
decision making as multifactorial, multilevel, interdisciplinary, integrative, 
agent-oriented and actor-specific.77 This study’s actor-specific focus on the 
individual policymaker provides a clear convergence with FPA and as a result 
draws upon constructivist ideas that, in part, seek to bridge the gap between FPA 
and wider IR constructivist theory.78 This study utilises these theoretical 
frameworks due to their affinity for examining, as Juliet Kaarbo noted in a 
symposium on FPA scholarship, “the questions ‘Who are we?’ and ‘How are we 
perceived by others?’… [as possibly] prominent factors influencing the external 
behaviour of these states and their internal policymaking processes.”79  
There are currently a number of different avenues through which FPA’s 
actor-specific focus provides routes of analysis. Indeed, there has been 
interesting work in trying to expand quantitatively rooted cognitive approaches 
such as Kai Opperman and Alexander Spencer’s work relating priming and 
framing to salience and metaphor as ways to understand decision-making.80  
Others have looked to go further with Peter Hatemi and Rose McDermott who 
sought to examine the link between political violence behaviour and genetics.81 
These approaches, unlike this study, are fundamentally quantitative, nonetheless 
point to interesting avenues related to the examination of the policymaker and 																																																								
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decision-making at this level. However, as noted previously, these run into issues 
when operationalised on a wider scale, or in this case with policymakers. An 
interpretative approach as part of this narrative analysis offers an alternative way 
of constructing links between narratives and behaviour at the individual level 
through a more organic process. In this case, this study speaks directly with 
Canadian and non-Canadian policymakers as a way of exploring their 
understanding of Canada’s middle power narrative and its relationship to 
Canada’s foreign policy behaviour. However, it is necessary to add further 
granularity to this analysis and recognise that when discussing narratives it is 
important to ensure that their multidimensional character is sufficiently explored. 
Indeed, narratives while generated at the individual level, are important factors at 
the domestic and international levels.  
Thus far, the theoretical frameworks discussed are focused mainly on 
systemic level or state level. Given that this study is looking at how the state 
level and systemic level interact however, it is necessary to find a 
multidimensional theoretical framework which is more capable of bridging the 
gap between the domestic and international while also incorporating the vital role 
of the policymaker. In examining narratives and how they become linked with 
foreign policy, the individual is critical as they are the ones who effectively 
construct these narratives, stories and traditions. It is in this way that FPA and 
constructivism offer a clear way in which to explore how narratives and foreign 
policy intertwine through the construction of roles.  However, as Chris Alden 
and Amnon Aran have noted, constructivism remains somewhat overlooked by 
FPA scholars, while nonetheless speaking to many of the same key themes and 
ideas.82 Of particular note is how Alden and Aran examine the foreign policy 
change and constructivism in transitional states and importance of ideas in 																																																								
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driving this.83 While they largely focus on the state-level of analysis in 
transitional states, it does point to the need for greater understanding of this 
process of change in FPA by looking at the role of the individual’s construction 
of narratives and how this influences behaviour.  
Roles, narratives and Canadian foreign policy 
There has been some work in blending FPA with constructivist theory building 
on concepts articulated by Kalevi Holsti in his 1970 article, “National Role 
Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy” which imported the terminology 
from elsewhere in the social sciences to give greater clarity to policy formation 
during the Cold War.84 In building this model of analysis, Holsti borrows the 
concept from other social sciences, namely psychology and anthropology in 
order to develop how actors in international relations but acknowledges that the 
definition of ‘role’ remains somewhat nebulous.85 However, as with Holsti, one 
can consider roles to refer to behaviours and actions specifically.86 As noted 
previously, this study is then concerned with how roles and narratives interact 
with each other, and by extension, can affect each other.     
Since Holsti’s initial analysis, the Role Theory approach has expanded 
considerably, notably by Stephen G. Walker, Philippe G. LePrestre, as well as 
Cameron Thies and Marijke Breuning.87 While elements of their research inform 
this analysis, the interaction between roles and narratives remains an 
underdeveloped area. As a result, it is necessary to further develop the specific 
linkages between narratives and roles. Consequently, this section will first 
expand on how roles and identities interact and then further expand on the ways 																																																								
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in which these elements are interlinked. In doing so it will clarify how this 
ultimately affects foreign policy behaviour.  
There have been some more sophisticated attempts at expanding Role Theory 
to incorporate identity. William Bloom sought to try and formulate a more 
comprehensive view of the role of identity in IR utilising social psychology 
methods to examine how citizens reconcile the state’s relationship with broader 
national identities.88 This has been further explored through the works of Glenn 
Chafetz, Hillel Abramson and Suzette Grillot, who link policymakers’ ideas 
about national roles with broader state self-identities and thus creating a 
psychological line of inquiry both about how states function and how leaders 
conceive of those states, but also how these identities can shift over time.89 
Lisbeth Aggestam expanded this concept further and conducted an examination 
of cognitive and cultural factors which inform leader’s foreign policymaking in 
the context of post-Cold War European policymaking.90 Whilst the psychological 
and cognitive areas of decision making present an exciting avenue for future 
exploration, this study will look less to the political psychology elements. These 
tend to focus on the role of leaders or small groups whereas this study focuses on 
bureaucratic policymakers as well as leaders. As a result, this makes cognitive 
psychological analysis more challenging due to the variety of responsibilities and 
viewpoints on the policies in question.91 Additionally, in the case of this 
examination it is too challenging to operationalise this kind of research as it 
requires much more comprehensive psychological examinations of policymakers 
in order to develop cognitive models.  
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Role Theory, while reflecting many of the similar considerations related 
to identities and influence on foreign policy does not sufficiently account for 
internal divisions or motivations about what those roles are.92 Juliet Kaarbo and 
Cristian Cantir note that,  
[w]hile some within a state may believe that a certain role is what the 
nation or state should play on the world stage, and these domestic 
actors may want or assume that there is a national consensus on this 
role, this may not be the case. Internal divisions can exist over what 
should be pursued at the national level. One actor’s assertion of a 
national role is not synonymous with national-level agreement.93 
 
This presents a challenge for an analysis of anything related to Canadian identity, 
narratives or roles, as there is a significant amount of discourse on the various 
regionalisms and the issue of Québécois nationalism, nested within Canadian 
policymaking.94 Canada provides a challenging example when discussing issues 
of identity and cultures due to its heterogeneity (English-French dichotomy 
specifically), which while not unique amongst nations, presents difficulties when 
looking at issues of identity.  Moreover, there are other regionalisms in Canada 
which could also be explored, such as the East-West divide and different 
strategic cultures identified by Justin Massie or the ‘Laurentian consensus’ which 
John Ibbitson popularised.95 While these are interesting avenues worthy of 
greater scrutiny, the exploration of elite consensus is more interested in 
examining how these different attitudes are subsumed and incorporated into the 																																																								
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foreign policy decision making process.96 Nonetheless, cognisant of the 
challenges this poses, it goes beyond the remit of what this study seeks to 
accomplish. To note David Campbell’s post-structuralist perspective, 
“[w]hichever Foreign Policy practices are implemented, they always have to 
overcome or neutralise other practices that might instantiate alternative 
possibilities for identity.”97 More broadly, Campbell suggests that while foreign 
policy is a global discourse of power, legitimated by the national level, one must 
be careful equating foreign policy decisions with national identity and vice versa 
as these are discourses generated to support the ends of those who create them.98 
The post-structuralist approach to national identity fails to resonate with this 
study’s view of interaction between policy and practice due to the focus on 
epistemic frameworks. However, a meta-theoretical viewpoint reminds us of the 
need to be cautious, not only about ascribing unitary identity to a national foreign 
policy and critically, pay attention to where the discourse is generated when 
examining roles. Indeed, in discussing Role Theory, Cantir and Kaarbo note that 
roles are contested between elites, masses and decision makers, thus making 
nationally-specific roles more indeterminate and subject to a number of factors.99  
As such, in examining Canadian and NATO policymakers in NATO and 
the multidimensional forces that shape the relevant foreign policy behaviours in 
support of a narrative it is necessary to focus on specific decision-making units 
and how they conform to certain roles in foreign policy making.100 Roland Paris 
has recently sought to use Role Theory as a way to examine the relationship 
between the Harper government and public opinion in Canada and how this links 
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to what he suggests is Canada’s liberal internationalist tradition.101 While not 
focused explicitly on identity, Paris does not discard the concept either and his 
examination of roles is nonetheless tied closely to public opinion, rather than an 
examination of elites, unlike this study. Indeed, as this study avoids discussing 
identities it becomes easier to bridge the gap between domestic and systemic by 
making the discourse on narrative explicit amongst foreign policy elites, in this 
case policymakers in Canada and NATO.  
Given the open nature of Role Theory, this study interprets Canadian 
decision makers’ desire for consistency and the behaviours which flow out of 
this as a way which conforms to policymakers’ conception about their respective 
nations’ role in the international system. While Role Theory itself is more of a 
collection of interpretive elements to help unravel the questions of national roles, 
it provides a toolbox from which one can draw relevant concepts and add from 
other disciplines as necessary. As Aggestam observes referring to the work of 
D.D. Searing, “there does not exist a single general Role Theory to draw on as to 
why, when and how certain phenomena occur.”102 The flexibility of Role Theory 
presents the best way of coalescing the various elements of FPA into a structure 
which can shed light on the empirical puzzle that this study has proposed. 
Namely, how the Afghanistan and Libya campaigns link with differing 
interpretations of Canada’s middle power foreign policy narrative under the 
various governments between 2001 and 2011 and the extent to which these 
interpretations affected Canada’s foreign policy behaviour. Specifically, this 
examines the roles which are derived from distinct interpretations of Canada’s 
foreign policy narrative. Ultimately as the diagram attached here highlights it is 
possible to chart the links between narratives, roles and behaviours broadly as 
follows;  
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As noted earlier, this study will use a variety of input in addition to previous 
scholarship on Afghanistan and Libya, including Hansard records, journalism, 
press releases as well as interviews with policymakers in Canada and NATO. 
This study will look at the moral, humanitarian and honour-driven motivations 
for Canada’s behaviour in NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya. Given 
the ‘routinising’ effect that a consistent narrative has on a state’s behaviour, the 
effect of the middle power narrative should appear as a significant force shaping 
Canada’s policy options. Moreover, it should highlight the presence of roles, 
both preference and positional, in the articulation of foreign policy behaviour.103 
This requires cognisance of both the context and continuity which inform actors’ 
foreign policy decisions thus prompting reflexive actions which aim to reconcile 
foreign policy behaviour with foreign policy narrative.104 Through the qualitative 
research undertaken in this study and the subsequent analysis of the responses 
from interviewees, it should become clear that the middle power narrative feeds 
into a specific behaviours articulated by Canadian and NATO policymakers 
through speeches, declarations, policy documents and thus creates 
multidimensional expectations that Canada will conform to this role.  
In order to reconcile Role Theory with the broader role of narrative in 
Canada’s foreign policy this study looks to the ‘poliheuristic’ decision-making 
model developed by Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen as a way of understanding 																																																								
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how Canadian foreign policymakers created foreign policy.105 This model 
suggests that there is a two-stage calculus,  
(1) rejecting policies that are unacceptable to the policymaker on 
a critical dimension or dimensions and (2) selecting and 
alternative from the subset of remaining alternatives while 
maximising benefits and minimizing risks.106  
 
With this model one can see the variables which inform the decision making 
process, however, given the instrumental function of foreign policy elites in this 
process this study departs from Mintz’s model.107 Mintz suggests that the 
‘essence of decision’ lies in domestic politics, specifically; leaders will not take 
foreign policy decisions which pose a high political cost.108 Sarah Kreps suggests 
that elites, as they related to Canada and the Afghanistan mission, were insulated 
from political costs related to participation in the mission due to consensus 
between major parties over the issue, also known as ‘elite consensus.’109 Offering 
a critical take on Kreps’ point, Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgeson suggest 
that this insulation is not indefinite and sought to examine the link with public 
opinion and how government’s utilised strategic narratives, noting that Canada’s 
was weak and incoherent.110 Ringsmose and Børgeson offer an interesting 
interpretation, however, as this study has noted, it is not only strategic narratives 
that matter, but also the much broader narrative of Canadian foreign policy. This 
helps to better characterise the incoherence to which Ringsmose and Børgeson 
refer while also clarifying the reasons why the elites that Kreps examines are 
insulated. Expanding on this, George Dimitriu and Beatrice de Graaf built on 
Ringsmose and Børgeson’s research and undertake a quantitative analysis as to 																																																								
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how elites respond to shifting public support for strategic narratives, most 
importantly noting that elites are simultaneously responsible for both shaping 
and responding to public opinion.111 In part, this study addresses how these two 
elements interact by going beyond the relationship between strategic narratives 
and foreign policy but rather, exploring the broader foreign policy narrative and 
how this is interpreted by policymakers. Forsaking Canada’s middle power 
narrative and its attendant behaviours created a discontinuity in Canada’s 
narrative thus challenging policymakers’ understanding of Canadian foreign 
policy narrative.112 This in turn would have prompted both policymakers in 
Canada and NATO and potentially the Canadian electorate to seek to remedy 
this, thereby imposing the political costs Mintz suggests.  
As an example, it is possible to suggest that Canadian decision makers, 
driven by a desire to reinforce Canada’s foreign policy narrative viewed the 2003 
invasion of Iraq against the defining middle power narrative and found it 
conflicted with the central tenets. The lack of elite consensus on this issue as 
outlined by Sarah Kreps would have incurred potential electoral costs to the 
ruling Liberal Party.113 Indeed, the conservative Canadian Alliance and 
Progressive Conservative Parties supported the US invasion and urged strong 
Canadian involvement with the ruling centre-left Liberal Party, the left wing 
New Democrat Party and the Bloc Québécois ranging from ambivalent to 
outright opposition to Canadian support for the invasion.114 Given that polls 
taken at the time showed Canadians supported the decision to stay out of the Iraq 
War in the absence of a UN Security Resolution authorising military 																																																								
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intervention, it seems unlikely that the Prime Minister would have risked 
alienating the public on such a divisive issue.115 Mintz and DeRouen’s model of 
poliheuristic decision-making notes that the domestic factor comprises the 
‘essence of decision’ and as such, policymakers will not make foreign policy 
decisions that make them electorally vulnerable.116 Thus in exploring how the 
middle power narrative creates a perceived role for Canada it illuminates the 
decision framework informing the effects on Canadian foreign policy behaviour 
vis-à-vis Canada’s response to the invasion of Iraq. Additionally, this helps to 
clarify the link between narratives and behaviours and how disrupting 
longstanding foreign policy narratives can have a real impact on IR.  
As such, this study will try to answer within the wider context of this 
research, whether the roles articulated in Canadian foreign policy and driven by 
the middle power narrative support Canada’s foreign policy through their 
manifestation in the NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya. To do so, this 
study will draw upon the previous scholarship in Role Theory and the broader 
FPA constructivist field and create an empirical, interpretivist analysis. 
Ultimately, this will help understand how foreign policy decision-making 
influences policymakers both inside and outside of Canada and how this 
translates into roles and behaviours. In order to establish this however, the next 
chapter will explore the field of Canadian foreign policy scholarship and how the 
middle power narrative has developed and shaped the discussion. Additionally, it 
will also highlight how FPA fits into the broader discussions currently ongoing 
in the Canadian foreign policy scholarship.  
Case study selection and the middle power narrative link to FPA 
As outlined in the introduction, the two NATO operations in Afghanistan and 
Libya represent situations where Canada’s physical existence was not directly 
under threat but nonetheless prompted military action. This is meant as a counter 
to the realist school of IR that contends states act to maintain their own survival 																																																								
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and that all behaviour is motivated by these acts.117 Indeed, much of IR theory 
proceeds on the basis that states are inherently rational and will make decisions 
based on power and interest. The rational actor issue remains a central 
component in IR and a vital component in FPA. In a seminal work of FPA, 
Graham Allison famously outlined three models of foreign policy decision-
making; the rational actor model, the organisational process model and the 
governmental politics model in, Essence of Decision, examining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and positioned the issue of rationality in foreign policy as a vital 
component.118 Nonetheless, as outlined already, there are other factors which 
also inform policymakers that while they may be rational, do not conform to 
traditional conceptions of strategic behaviour.  
As such, NATO presents a structure within which Canadian policymakers 
can operate as rational actors to reinforce narrative and ensure the preservation of 
their interpreted foreign policy narrative. This does not discount the importance 
of the Alliance to Canada’s security and defence policy and by extension, its 
strategic interests; rather, it seeks to understand Canada’s foreign policy 
behaviour and how this is shaped or influenced by interpretations of its foreign 
policy narrative by policymakers. As Martha Finnemore and Michael Barnett 
note, international organisations have the power to shape behaviour through a 
number of methods such as incentivising, setting agendas and framing issues 
thus ensuring that states act within certain guidelines and under certain 
conditions.119 This study deviates from Finnemore and Barnett’s examination in 
that is more concerned with the national level rather than the institutional, 
however, it does not discard the contention that these institutions do have an 
important effect in constraining and shaping behaviour.  
This study is more concerned with Canadian policymakers and the 
friction that exists between the national foreign policy narrative and the role 																																																								
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expectations that are generated through institutional behaviour. In this case, 
Canadian diplomats in Brussels have previously acted in a certain way within 
NATO, while Canadian policymakers in Ottawa have articulated their preferred 
roles according to their vision of the Canadian foreign policy narrative. In both 
cases they have had to contend with the reality of working within the Alliance 
structure which generates another set of conditions which constrain and enable 
these roles. Laura Roselle has explored, to a limited degree, the way in which 
strategic narratives shape behaviours in alliances, but nonetheless, does not 
sufficiently explore the internal foreign policy narratives nor the specific 
mechanisms by which behaviours are shaped.120 This study remains cognisant of 
the pressures arising from institutions that influenced policymakers towards 
Canada’s participation in the Afghanistan and Libya missions. Nonetheless, it is 
still necessary to explore how they were influenced by their interpretation of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative, but understanding the context in which they 
operate also gives depth to the examinations of the policymaker’s influence 
within NATO. In turn, this helps to illustrate the relationship between behaviour 
and influence in the organisation. In examining the narrative around the 
Afghanistan and Libya operations, this study can then examine them against the 
criteria of moral, humanitarian and honour-driven motivations and thus examine 
how this shaped Canadian policymakers preferences.  
Canada’s robust participation in the Afghan and Libyan NATO 
operations not only reinforced expectations of future involvement in future 
operations, but also served to reinforce ontological security at the international 
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and domestic levels.121 As will be explored in each of the case studies, this does 
not deny the existence of competing conceptions of the continuity of Canadian 
foreign policy amongst Canadian policymakers, however, given the existence of 
this narrative it is important to see how different interpretations dominate and 
affect behaviour. Indeed, Duane Bratt suggests that this is an area for deeper 
examination in his study of why Canada went to war in Afghanistan and also 
why Canada stayed involved in the conflict.122 As a result, narrative analysis is 
an important tool that allows a researcher to justify and understand the ways that  
policymakers reconcile how narrative and action affect each other. Deviations 
from the Canadian foreign policy narrative thus alter the ways in which these 
different components interact.  
Canada’s deviation from this narrative due to domestic level factors thus 
had consequences within NATO linked to differing interpretations of Canada’s 
foreign policy narrative. Additionally, as will be explored in the following 
chapters, there could have been domestic consequences within Canada by 
triggering a discontinuity within the narrative of Canadian foreign policy. 
Chapters 3 and 4 chart the change to Canadian foreign policy behaviour between 
2001 and 2011 in greater detail, although as will be seen, a foreign policy 
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narrative can exert a powerful force on the articulation of roles.123 As such, 
Canadian policymakers were compelled towards robust participation in NATO’s 
operations in Afghanistan and Libya; this behaviour, in turn, reinforced Canadian 
policymakers’ continuity with one of Canada’s narratives and, in doing so, also 
gave Canadian policymakers a greater degree of salience within NATO. This 
created a mismatch between the middle power narrative and action leading to 
what could be regarded as the disruption of the traditional narrative which, as 
will be explored had consequences for Canadian standing in NATO.  This shift 
will be explored in greater depth in the examination of Parliamentary debates and 
the news media. As a result, it is important to chart not only how the desire to 
maintain consistency with a national narrative shapes Canada’s engagement in 
NATO operations but also, how policymakers’ alternative interpretations of this 
narrative change this relationship.  
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Chapter 2 – Canadian Foreign Policy and the Middle Power Narrative 
 
This chapter will examine the literature surrounding Canadian foreign policy in 
order to conduct a deeper examination of the middle power narrative and 
demonstrate how this study can contribute to the broader debates in the field.  By 
exploring the relevant Canadian foreign policy literature it will identify the 
relatively underdeveloped theoretical avenues in this area of study as well as the 
need for alternative and critical approaches. The second part of this chapter will 
look more closely at the components of the middle power narrative and how they 
link to concepts of a role in Canadian foreign policy. The third part of this 
chapter will then reflect on the analysis undertaken here and highlight the need 
for closer attention to the role of narratives, identities and alternative approaches 
to understanding Canada’s foreign policymaking behaviour while also 
highlighting some key characteristics of the middle power narrative and how this 
emerged as the dominant characterisation of Canadian foreign policy. These 
characteristics then serve as a reference point against which to later assess how 
they relate to foreign policy behaviour in Afghanistan and Libya. This is an 
important part of this analysis as it provides insight into the ways in which the 
middle power is used while also exploring the concepts which underpin the 
empirical components of this study. The analysis undertaken in this chapter 
highlights the shortcomings present in the study of Canadian foreign policy 
whilst also highlighting how this study contributes to the current discussions 
occurring in the field.  
Indeed, concerns over the continuity of Canadian foreign policy in much 
of the literature along with the importance of narrative, tradition and identity 
mean that there is an inherent resonance with many of the same themes outlined 
within this study’s constructivist FPA approach. There is also a significant 
component of diplomatic history in this chapter as this field of research has a 
strong link with the study of Canadian foreign policy. As Jean-Christophe 




remains scattered and integrates a number of disciplines.1 Many of the authors 
cited in this chapter such as Adam Chapnick, David Bercuson, Robert Bothwell 
and Jack Granatstein are historians, but nonetheless remain commentators on the 
subject and form an important part of the discussion which often overlaps 
between historical analyses alongside other relevant disciplines such as political 
science, International Relations and cultural studies.2 
As will be explored in this chapter, there are clear themes that recur 
throughout Canadian foreign policy and more specifically, middle power 
literature, namely, the ‘interests vs. values’ debate, Canada’s relationship with 
international organisations, the influence of the US and a focus on continuity 
with historical traditions. Ultimately, as will be seen in this chapter, an in-depth 
examination of the middle power narrative through this study’s FPA approach 
presents a unique contribution to the field by adding a new, innovative approach 
for examining foreign policy behaviour and how this relates to Canada’s 
diplomatic initiatives and military operations. Similarly, as will be explored in 
this chapter, there is a clear convergence with regards to the themes in FPA and 
Canadian foreign policy that lend themselves to greater examination.  
Part I: Canadian Foreign Policy 
 
The study of Canadian foreign policy is wide-ranging across a number of areas 
of policymaking. However, there are some discernible trends within the literature 
worth highlighting in order to situate this study in the broader field of Canadian 
foreign policy. Nonetheless, as will be seen in this section, Canadian foreign 
policy literature tends to re-tread the same ground repeatedly and falls back on a 
number of tired conventions, often to the exclusion of new, innovative 
approaches. It remains preoccupied with the issues of context and continuity; two 
elements which are both important to this study. The middle power narrative is a 
feature of this scholarship, but not always the focus and indeed, the role of 
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narratives in shaping Canadian foreign policy, while previously neglected, is 
increasingly recognised. However, before exploring some of the newer 
approaches being taken in the field it is important to first gain an understanding 
of what the common themes and trends in the literature are. In a 2009 article, 
John Kirton proposed ten key works which form the foundation of the academic 
literature on Canadian foreign policy.3 Claire Sjolander and Heather Smith noted 
in their excellent rebuttal of this list that while Kirton’s subjective selection 
identified some important texts it failed to acknowledge alternative theoretical 
viewpoints.4 They also note, however, that literature identified by Kirton 
conforms to two traditional strands emanating from two diplomats-cum-scholars 
who wrote extensively on Canadian foreign affairs, John W. Holmes and James 
Eayrs.5 They identify Holmes’ strand as concerning Canada’s place in 
international affairs and Eayrs’ as more preoccupied with processes and 
determinants.6 Indeed, each of these authors has played an important role in the 
development of scholarship on Canadian international affairs with Holmes 
effectively defining Canada’s ‘place’ in the international system during the Cold 
War.7 Conversely, Eayrs laid the foundation for a more process-oriented 
examination of how domestic factors influenced Canadian policymaking.8  
Both of these relatively recent literature reviews echo criticisms of the 
field of Canadian foreign policy noted by Michael Hawes nearly 30 years ago in 
his 1984 monograph, Principal Power, Middle Power or Satellite.9 Specifically, 
Canadian foreign policy tends to hew towards established tropes usually falling 
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along well-established lines and rarely with much theoretical innovation. As will 
be explored in this chapter and throughout the analysis, there are recurring 
themes and descriptions of Canada’s foreign policy tradition that inform the 
understandings or criticisms of this subject. More vitally, these tropes are of 
particular interest as they reflect the popular understanding of Canada’s foreign 
policy narrative and both policymakers and academics repeatedly call on them, 
either to confirm or reject their interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy.  
This is a trend also highlighted by Maureen Appel Molot in 1990 in her 
review of Canadian foreign policy literature.10 David Black and Heather Smith 
writing in 1993 and revisiting the subject in 2014 also remark on the various 
theoretical approaches worth deeper examination, including the middle power 
concept which will be explored further.11 Nonetheless, Black and Smith note the 
overall trend in Canadian foreign policy to skew towards the descriptive, issue-
specific and theoretically limited and, in their 2014 re-visitation of the topic press 
for renewed engagement with a diverse range of theories.12 Indeed, more recently 
Jean-Christophe Boucher suggests that Canadian foreign policy scholarship 
remains overly descriptive and suffers from an underdeveloped field of research 
thus “debates become little more than a collection of well-worn and inconclusive 
anecdotes.”13 Given that Sjolander and Smith also remarked on the lack of 
sophistication in the field nearly 30 years after Hawes’ original observation, 
there is clearly a need for some additional theoretical innovation to better link the 
field with broader IR and FPA literature as well as integrate newer approaches.  
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Building on these reviews, it is possible to discern two key threads which 
define the traditional literature on Canadian foreign policy. This section will 
examine these, starting with the ‘Canada as satellite perspective’ and then 
‘Canada as internationalist.’ Contained within these different interpretations are 
somewhat differing interpretations of Canada’s middle power narrative, 
however, this will be examined in more depth in Part II of this chapter. The 
threads examined in Part I of this chapter each reflect different theoretical 
standpoints, but nonetheless, tend to focus on the systemic or domestic level 
pressures which shape Canadian foreign policy. This is not to suggest that there 
has been no alternative theorising in this field; however, these alternatives do not 
represent the mainstream literature on Canadian foreign policy. One of the more 
notable efforts comes from John Kirton and David Dewitt and their vision of 
‘Canada as principal power’ which posits that rather than a middle power Canada 
was a ‘principal power,’ capable of exerting Great Power (principal) influence in 
certain spheres while relegated to lower tiers on other issues.14 Dewitt and Kirton 
termed this a complex neorealist approach to examining Canada’s international 
affairs and effectively defined Canada’s capabilities as issue specific and through 
the lens of the Canada-US relationship.15 Writing more recently, Kirton 
maintains that Canada now increasingly compensates for a declining US and is 
freer to choose its own foreign policy path.16 While complex neorealism is one of 
the more interesting theoretical frameworks by which one can interpret Canada’s 
foreign policy it suffers when trying to interpret domestic level influence over 
this policy. As Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer and Fen Hampson note, “Kirton’s 
theory of complex neorealism has difficulty in explaining the origins of these 
values and why some issues gain the attention and interest of policy practitioners 
while others do not.”17 Nonetheless, given the lack of alternative theoretical 
models in Canadian foreign policy it remains an interesting theoretical 
framework. However, Kirton has also admitted that it has not seized the attention 
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of Canadian foreign policy scholars and remains an alternative analysis rather 
than a popular or mainstream framework.18 Though there remain shortcomings in 
the systemic focus of Kirton and Dewitt’s original ‘principal power’ model, it 
has prompted some of the more interesting theorising about the field. Patrick 
Lennox suggests Canada’s foreign policy can be understood through the lens of a 
neorealist ‘structural stability theory’ perspective which posits that Canada’s 
foreign policies rely on the United States as an anchoring force.19 While useful, 
this nonetheless remains an alternative approach in the Canadian foreign policy 
literature and fails to capture the depth of Canada’s broader international 
commitments.  
As a result, it is useful to look once again at the key threads in Canadian 
foreign policy scholarship and examine each in greater detail. The ‘satellite’ 
view largely focuses on Canada’s immediate security and foreign relations and is 
oriented towards a preoccupation with the United States. Prior to the Second 
World War, Canadian foreign policy was closely tied to the UK. This led to a 
pronounced strain of Atlanticism in Canadian foreign policy espoused by former 
diplomats such as Escott Reid as well as Prime Minister Lester Pearson.20 Justin 
Massie suggests that there remains an undercurrent of Atlanticism in Canadian 
foreign policy as a form of institutional soft balancing to curb the ambition of the 
United States, though this has waned in parts of Canada in recent years.21 Robert 
Bothwell notes that Canada largely dwelt in the orbit of the UK until after the 
Second World War when Canada’s primary foreign policy focus shifted towards 
the United States.22 George Grant’s Lament for a Nation captured this sentiment 
in his 1965 work in which he suggested that following the installation of 
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American nuclear-tipped Bomarc missiles in 1963 Canada’s independence would 
be gradually eroded in the face of the overwhelming influence of the US.23 This 
was a concern that still underpins much of Canada’s domestic and foreign policy 
narrative and indeed, has led to a continuing, tentative relationship with the US, 
particularly on issues of foreign policy.24  
Nonetheless, the United States was and remains a major preoccupation 
for policymakers and scholars. Jack Granatstein, for example, defines Canada’s 
role vis-à-vis the United States and the broader international community as either 
satellite or middle power with similar characteristics defining each one.25 
Stephen Clarkson, writing in 1968 noted that those supporting ‘continentalism’ 
believed that disagreement with the US would diminish Canada’s international 
standing, a view which he notes in 2007, persists in Canadian policymaking.26 
Certainly, Canadian policymakers were and remain concerned with US policy 
behaviour given the enormous level of interdependency between the two 
countries. As former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau famously remarked of the 
US, “living next to [the US] is like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how 
friendly, or even tempered is the beast, if one can call it that, one is affected by 
every twitch and grunt.”27 Culturally, Canada and the US share many of the same 
basic traits, with some variations and indeed as Andrew Cohen suggests, US 
influence is embraced, albeit occasionally and with reservations.28 Indeed, it is 
hard to deny the clear influence in real terms that the US has in Canada with each 
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country the others largest trading partner, doing $707 billion (US) in bilateral 
trade in 2012.29   
Whilst literature in this area tended to focus on trade policy during the 
1990s, this strain of Canadian foreign policy has enjoyed a resurgence of interest 
following a deepening of the Canada-US security relationship after 9/11.30 David 
Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Kent Roach captured this 
sentiment, suggesting after September 11, security and economics were now 
linked and that Canada could no longer pursue policies towards the US in 
isolation.31 David Bercuson similarly characterised the Canada-US relationship 
as focused around trade (for Canada) and defence (US) and argued that Canada’s 
comparative weakness on defence as costing it credibility with the US and, by 
extension, internationally.32 Elinor Sloan advocated a closer relationship between 
the two countries as a way of ensuring North American security in her 
examination of Canada-US relationship in the context of the broader war on 
terror.33 Others like Donald Barry and Duane Bratt suggest that Canada’s 
defence relationship amounts to a “defence against help,” in that Canada 
maintains just enough military capability so as not to be a liability to the US, thus 
preventing greater infringement on Canadian sovereignty.34 These perspectives 
tend to place Canada as an international actor defined by its relationship with the 
US and its external relations are seen through this lens.   
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 Similarly, writing from a critical theory perspective, Robert Cox 
provides a broad historical overview of Canada’s relationship with the United 
States noting the strength of the north-south axis in Canadian foreign policy and 
suggests that because of this, Canadian interests become subordinated to US 
strategic interests.35 This view, as touched upon earlier, is cited as the reason for 
Canadian involvement in Afghanistan. Specifically, it is argued that Canada’s 
rejection of the 2003 Iraq invasion spurred its involvement in ISAF and later, its 
taking the lead in Kandahar Province so as to placate the United States.36 While 
the Canada-US relationship is vital to the conduct of Canadian foreign policy, 
this explanation places too much emphasis on the influence derived from 
Canada’s relationship with the US, while also failing to adequately take into 
account other factors such as popular narratives, which inform Canadian foreign 
policy decision-making. As Karsten Jung noted in his overview of the satellite 
perspective, policymakers in Ottawa have placed some additional distance 
between Canada and the US on foreign policy issues, more so than in the past.37  
Indeed, as former Prime Minister Paul Martin noted in his memoirs, while the 
Canada-US relationship is important, however, “Canada’s role in the world is not 
simply to support a great power.”38 Suggesting that US interests predominantly 
dictate Canadian foreign policy preferences downplays the importance of the 
policymakers in the creation of foreign policy and diminishes Canadian agency 
in international affairs. US influence on Canadian foreign policy could arguably 
be interpreted as a Canadian foreign policy narrative in and of itself, however, 
even if this is the case, there has not been adequate individual-level analysis of 
why this occurs or how, at this level, it shapes Canada’s participation in military 
interventions. This is not to suggest that linkages do not exist between policy 
issues or that some policymakers may indeed internalise a Canada-US dynamic 
which sees the US as the dominant power. Nonetheless, much of the Canada-US 
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literature focuses more on the immediate context of the decisions, rather than 
their continuity with Canadian foreign policy narratives outside of this 
relationship and thus does not adequately account for alternative factors.  
With the end of the Bush administration and the reduction of public 
friction between the two countries, Canada-US focused scholarship has largely 
been subordinated to alternative examinations pertaining to a wider variety of 
foreign policy issues. Echoing the criticism of Smith and Black, the literature on 
the Canada-US relationship tends towards the issue-specific and policy 
upheavals between the two nations that consequently tend to prompt a spasm of 
writing on the topic at hand.39 However, it is worth noting here the collection 
assembled by Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne Cox, who together have collected 
some of the more interesting recent scholarship examining Canadian support for 
the post-9/11 international system buttressed by US hegemony.40 The scholarship 
on this issue continues more recently with Fen Osler Hampson and Derek 
Burney in 2012 suggesting that during the Obama administration, Canada-US 
relations were at their lowest point in decades due to failure to approve a key oil 
pipeline and more broadly, the contention that Canada’s relationship has been 
neglected in recent years.41 Most recently Jack Granatstein, examining Arctic-
related issues, in this same vein has asked whether NATO supports Canadian 
national interests and suggests that the US protects us in its own interest.42 The 
view of Canadian dependency has limitations as it relates to broader Canadian 
foreign policy and only obliquely addresses the key questions that this study 
seeks to answer. While it is important to recognise the importance of the US in 
Canadian foreign policy, it is important to account for the complex domestic 
motivations which do not necessarily arise from US influence.  Indeed, given the 
tendency to examine discrete, specific areas of study, the ‘Canada as satellite’ 
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view does not provide enough analytical breadth or depth with which to explore 
foreign policy narratives.  
The second and most expansive area of research focuses on Canadian 
internationalism. This is the most theoretically diverse field but broadly focuses 
on the system level of International Relations. Emphasising a realist-informed 
approach is the Conservative Party of Canada-affiliated “Calgary School” with 
David Bercuson as a significant contributor to the literature on Canadian affairs, 
both domestic and foreign.43 This end of the spectrum also hosts notable scholars 
of Canadian foreign affairs, namely Kim Nossal, Denis Stairs and Gordon Smith. 
Central to their view of Canada as an international actor is the idea of placing 
national economic and strategic interests at the core of foreign policy, ahead of 
what they see as values-based foreign policy decision-making.44 This also 
incorporates the views of other former Canadian diplomats such as Alan Gotlieb, 
who has advocated a return to Canadian ‘functionalism.’45 As Tom Keating 
observed, this stems from the post Second World War idea that suggested 
Canada be accorded international significance according to its material 
contribution; a strategy pursued by Canadian diplomats operating in the nascent 
international organisations of the time.46 These authors see Canada as having 
drifted away from this strategy towards one which privileges Canadian values 
over the pursuit of Canadian interests. Kim Nossal sought to term this 
idealpolitik, which found its greatest expression under the leadership of former 
Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy.47 Daryl Copeland suggests that this 
was diplomacy ‘on the cheap’ combining niche diplomacy with soft power to 
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create a foreign policy founded more on rhetoric than action.48 Similarly, Roy 
Rempel has suggested that Canada lacks an overall middle power strategy but 
instead has had a set of internationalist, dispersed, diplomatic ideals that fail to 
focus and support Canadian interests.49 While this emphasis on interests 
underlies this broadly realist view of Canada’s international engagement, many 
of these authors still view Canada as a middle power with a specific role to play 
internationally.  
Conversely, others such as Jennifer Welsh, Andrew Cooper and Nelson 
Michaud also see Canada as a middle power, however, for better or worse, 
foreign policy is an expression of its values.50 While these authors have differing 
views as to whether this is a positive or a negative, they see values as inherently 
linked to the practice of Canadian foreign policy.  Much of the interests-based 
criticism of this perspective focuses on the Canada in the World foreign policy 
review put forward by the Chrétien government in 1995. In this policy review, in 
line with its explicit promotion of Canadian values and culture, there was a 
considerable amount of emphasis on human rights, sustainable development and 
foreign aid; it made peacekeeping a central focus of the Canadian forces.51 In 
combination with this review, there were deep cuts to the defence budget as part 
of the Cold War peace dividend. Canada’s cuts however, as Benjamin Zyla 
notes, were in line with most other western European nations and not excessively 
harsh suggesting that this may not have necessarily been linked directly to the 
interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy narrative.52 Nonetheless, Canada’s 
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy during the late 1990s spearheaded an 
ambitious ‘Human Security Agenda’ that he outlined at the 51st UN General 
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Assembly.53 Human security is a broad concept that aims to provide different 
kinds of security in a number of areas including: food, economics, health, 
environment, community and politics.54 This approach aims for a more holistic, 
soft power approach to conflict prevention and places less emphasis on hard 
power.55 Axworthy outlined Canada’s role as a peacekeeping middle power with 
soft power assets it could bring to bear as a way of promoting international 
development and trade in order to ensure human security.56 John English 
suggests that the more interests-based critics of Axworthy and his foreign policy 
are incorrect and that this is in keeping with the Liberal Party’s traditions on the 
conduct of foreign affairs.57 This internationalist view of Canada places greater 
emphasis on Canada’s multilateral engagements, particularly with the UN and 
related institutions. David Jefferess outlined the pervasive influence this 
perspective has taken in the Canadian imaginary and how this has become deeply 
engrained in the Canadian public consciousness thus giving a deep resonance to 
these examinations of the Canadian foreign policy tradition.58  
Nik Hynek and David Bosold compiled some of the more recent 
scholarship on this issue in their recent volume which outlines the soft and hard 
power strategies of a middle power but critically, they outline that myths, clichés 
and stereotypes pervade the study of Canadian foreign and security policy.59 
Another recent volume from 2013 compiled by Claire Sjolander and Heather 
Smith focuses on Canadian Internationalism and builds on the ‘outside-in’ view 
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of Canadian foreign policy examined in the Hynek and Bosold volume to take an 
‘inside/outside’ perspective on Canadian foreign policy scholarship. Their points 
about the interrogation of the central questions of ‘what Canada is’ in the world 
are developed further alongside many of the ideas previously noted. The diverse 
range of contributions offers an interesting foundation on which to develop 
future scholarship and offers directions for greater innovation in the study of 
Canadian foreign policy. Paul Gecelovsky’s contribution examines the 
foundations of Stephen Harper’s view of foreign policy offers some insight into 
how individuals can shape foreign policy.60 Daryl Copeland also provides an 
insider perspective drawing on his extensive experience in the Canadian foreign 
service to map the changes to Canadian foreign policy and how to navigate a 
way forward without further disrupting or damaging Canada’s international 
influence.61 Similar to Hynek and Bosold’s volume, Canada’s International 
Journal has recently sought to publish issues focusing on a number of related 
topics examining new directions in Canadian foreign policy literature and more 
recently, interrogating whether Canada can still be considered a liberal 
internationalist actor. Indicative of the relevance of this study, in the September 
2014 issue using Role Theory, Roland Paris examined how Canada’s liberal 
internationalist tradition had shifted under the Harper government.62 Rather than 
rejecting the body of Canadian foreign policy literature, this study seeks to build 
on this foundation and expand the boundaries of study.  
The ‘Canada-as-internationalist’ thread of Canadian foreign policy 
scholarship has been a fruitful area of scholarship and while it still trends 
towards rehashing the same territory there has been more of an effort to try and 
develop some alternative approaches to the field. Other scholars have looked at 
this from a largely historical perspective either trying to situate Canada’s 
narratives and identity in its historical context, or alternatively, undertake 
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comparative analyses which attempt to offer explanatory reasons for Canada’s 
international behaviour.63 Fundamentally, most of the theoretical streams 
examined thus far focus on examining and explaining context and continuity in 
Canadian foreign policy. In the case of the Canada-US relationship the emphasis 
tends to be contextual, while in the case of Canadian internationalism it tends 
towards examining the continuity. This study provides an alternative way of 
understanding how Canada’s foreign policy maintains its continuity through the 
actions of individuals and how this, in turn, shapes the way in which foreign 
policy is made. Indeed, the constructivist FPA approach helps to develop a new 
and contemporary addition to the Canadian foreign policy field. This ties 
Canadian foreign policy scholarship to broader discussions occurring in FPA and 
International Relations in order to hopefully expose the field to greater critical 
inquiry by scholars within and outside of Canada. The next sections will seek to 
broadly categorise the different views of what the middle power narrative entails 
and as such, provide a basis for utilising the framework outlined previously. 
As has been explored in Part I, theorising about Canadian foreign policy 
tends to stay within relatively prescribed boundaries, but nonetheless, there has 
been an increasing effort to develop new approaches. Kirton and Dewitt’s work 
offers a valuable contribution to the alternative theorising about Canadian 
foreign policy and it is also important to note some of the other work which has 
previously been done by Mark Neufeld, Robert W. Cox and Cranford Pratt 
utilising Gramscian and hegemonic perspectives to explain Canadian foreign 
policy.64 As noted previously, Nik Hynek and David Bosold have applied 
Foucauldian perspectives to Canadian policymaking and the human security 
agenda.65 Similarly, Claire Sjolander, Heather Smith and Deborah Stienstra have 
																																																													
63 Jonathan Bays, From Fire-proof House to Middle Power: Narrative, Identity and Canadian 
Foreign Policy, 1939-1956, PhD Thesis: University of Oxford, 1999; Anton Bezglasnyy, Middle 
Power Theory, Change and Continuity in the Asia-Pacific, M.A. Thesis: University of British 
Columbia, 2010.  
64 See Mark Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle 
Power,” Studies in Political Economy, Vol. 48 (Autumn 1995) 7-29; Cranford Pratt, “Class 
Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of Counter-Consensus,” International Journal, 
Vol. 39, No. 1 (Winter 1983/1984), 99-135.  
65 Nik Hynek and David Bosold, “A History and Genealogy of the Freedom-from-fear Doctrine,” 




sought to explore Canadian foreign policy from a feminist viewpoint.66 These 
alternative theoretical perspectives remain more the exception than the rule in the 
Canadian foreign policy literature. As will be explored in the next section, up 
until recently the image of Canada as a middle power has been implicitly or 
explicitly understood in much of their work (save for Kirton and the complex 
neorealists), though it has different meanings depending on the authors’ different 
perspective and theoretical standpoint. Given the relative general theoretical 
stagnation in Canadian foreign policy, this study speaks to the critiques raised in 
more recent scholarship.67  
Part II: Canada as middle power and related challenges 
The following sections will aim to unpack the concepts surrounding the middle 
power narrative. Given the centrality of this narrative to much of the Canadian 
foreign policy literature there is some overlap between the sources here and those 
explored in Part I. As noted previously, the middle power narrative is an 
important component of Canadian foreign policy scholarship, particularly as it 
relates to Canada’s international engagement and as such it is important to 
examine this separately. In examining how the middle power narrative has 
shaped foreign policy practice it is important to understand the constituent 
components of this narrative and how they are contested and interpreted in 
academia. While the middle power narrative is wide-ranging as it relates to 
Canadian policymaking and its relationship with Canada’s foreign policy 
behaviour; in terms of this study, it is regarded as a vital foundation. Most 
critically in this case, the narrative occupies a space as both a narrative and as a 
role in itself. While this is a relatively simplistic characterisation, it nonetheless 
signals that rather than a simple narrative, it is complex as it also incorporates 
components of both narrative and role. It is important to explore the competing 
definitions of Canada’s middle power narrative in order to fully understand the 
stability that this narrative provides. However, given that the middle power 
encompasses a number of important elements of Canadian foreign policy and 
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runs through much of the scholarship it requires further elaboration in order to 
better understand it.  
The use of middle power to describe Canada’s foreign policy narrative 
carries with it a number of subjective conditions that must be acknowledged. 
Given the interpretivist nature of this examination and as it does not aspire to an 
objective view of this subject, it is necessary to observe that the author of this 
study is also informed by experience working in the Operations Division at 
NATO headquarters and also by being Canadian. Working there involved regular 
interaction with Canadians working as part of the international staff as well as 
diplomats in the Operational Policy Committee (OPC), the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) along with indirect reports on the outcomes of other important 
committees, namely the Political Partnerships Committee (PPC) and the Defence 
Planning Policy Committee (DPPC). However, in substantiating the middle 
power narrative it is not possible to provide a quantitative assessment of 
participation in said committees and further, it is not possible to attest to the 
value of the Canadian contributions as, due to security considerations, there is no 
access to the minutes or attendance records of these committees. Nonetheless, 
there are definite quantifiable elements such as military size, technology and 
budgetary contributions that cannot and should not be overlooked, however, 
these are not the sole determinants which define a country’s commitment, neither 
to an alliance, nor as a measure of power or influence within that alliance. 
Nonetheless, there is a structural component which places Canada in the ‘middle’ 
of its systemic power relationships linked to capabilities which must be 
acknowledged before going deeper into greater detail concerning this narrative. 
While recognising that there is an underlying complexity going beyond 
simple structural hierarchy in the concept of middle power as it relates to 
Canada, its relationship with and role in NATO it is nonetheless helpful to begin 
by looking at the structural elements behind this narrative. Indeed, in structural 
terms Canada can be classified first as a middle power within NATO, neither a 
small nation like Luxembourg, Iceland or Latvia, nor a major power like the 
United States, France or the UK. With a military of only 65,700 active duty 




assets, Canada falls firmly in the middle tier of NATO countries.68 In addition to 
the military size, this takes into account the capability, mission caveats and 
participation in previous and ongoing Alliance operations. This places it 
alongside the other NATO nations of Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway.69 
Despite these structural considerations, there is a belief that Canada remains 
capable of ‘punching above its weight,’ specifically, exercising greater influence 
or contributing disproportionately to international affairs for a country of its 
size.70 Laura Neack sought to categorise Canada as a middle power along these 
lines suggesting that the capabilities of a middle power (or secondary power) 
determined state behaviour.71 Nonetheless, the structural component, while 
relevant as it relates to capabilities and by extension the practice of Canada’s 
military operations, does not account for the creation of a narrative that 
encompasses a number of elements which go beyond capabilities. As will be 
explored further in this section, the narrative of Canada as a middle power has 
become linked with a several concepts as they relate to Canadian foreign policy, 
incorporating structural, behavioural and normative components. Indeed, it 
remains persistent and pervasive due to its parsimonious, albeit vague qualities. 
In this way the narrative retains its currency and has been used, albeit only once, 
by Prime Minister Stephen Harper to describe Canada’s foreign policy.72 As 
Adam Chapnick suggests in his refutation of the use of this term, “so long as 
there is a general understanding of the term, many will not accept the need to be 
overly objective.”73 Since it is not possible to reach an objective definition of 
																																																													
68 International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2012, Vol. 112, No. 1 (2012), 51. 
69 Germany is not included here due to a number of reasons worthy of deeper examination but go 
beyond the scope of this analysis. A combination of factors, namely military size coupled with 
national caveats, places it in a unique position amongst NATO allies. For more information see: 
Patrick Keller, “Germany in NATO: The Status Quo Ally,” Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Jun.-Jul. 2012), 95-110.    
70 Lawrence Cannon, Address by Minister Cannon at Carleton University, 23 Feb. 2009, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2009/55.aspx?view=d, accessed 20 
November 2014.  
71 Laura Neack, “Delineating State Groups through Cluster Analysis,” The Social Science 
Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1993), 347-371; see also Laura Neack, “Linking State Type with 
Foreign Policy Behaviour,” Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second 
Generation, (London: Prentice Hall, 1995). 
72 Stephen Harper, A Conversation with Stephen Harper, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 Sept 
2007, http://www.cfr.org/canada/conversation-stephen-harper-rush-transcript-federal-news-
service/p14315, accessed 20 November 2014.  





what a middle power is, the narrative’s relationship and usage with academia and 
policymaking make it challenging to define in a clear manner. As noted already, 
it generates a self-reinforcing relationship between narrative and behaviour 
meaning that it carries the characteristics of both. As the rest of this chapter 
explores, there is an interplay between policymakers and academics in defining 
the contours of this narrative, however, this was also rooted in the very real 
considerations of what Canada could do as an international actor. This study is 
interested in the narrative element of the middle power tradition in Canadian 
foreign policy, however, it is impossible to disregard the behavioural elements 
which also seem to define it. It is this ephemeral characteristic that makes it an 
interesting narrative about Canadian foreign policy as it encompasses such a 
wide range of policymaking behaviour and thus provides an opportunity to assess 
its influence.  
In exploring the middle power narrative one must account for the 
accumulated debate and context surrounding its usage in the academic and public 
spheres. As will be explored here, there is an interesting interplay between 
academia and policymaking which also shapes the narrative. Chapnick’s 
dissection of the middle power categorised its definitions into three streams; 
functional, behavioural and hierarchical suggesting that the functional and 
behavioural definitions serve to enhance state power while, hierarchical serves to 
organise states.74 While Chapnick offers some insights into the different ways 
one can categorise what middle power means, he does not explore it as a 
narrative in Canadian foreign policy but rather, remains a more descriptive label.  
One of the chief strengths and conversely, main difficulties with the term is its 
use to describe structural elements of the international system, the behaviours of 
the nations within the system and potentially the normative elements of that same 
system. In his dissection of the middle power ideational concept, Paul 
Gecelovsky refers to it as a ‘prism’ through which Canadian policymakers view 
the world, even though it continues shifting as the context in which it exists, 
changes.75 The remaining part of this chapter will seek to elaborate on what this 
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‘prism’ consists of by examining the history of the middle power narrative as 
well as look at the critical interpretations of this narrative and its normative 
elements. The final two sections of Part II will briefly touch on political 
developments in Canada and how this links to the middle power narrative and its 
influence on Canadian foreign policy behaviour.  
The middle power as paradigm in Canadian foreign policy 
The concept of middle power has existed for some time, though its historical 
links with national narratives are a far more recent development. As this section 
will explore, the narrative developed on dual tracks in relation to Canadian 
foreign policy, both as a way of describing Canada’s position in the international 
system, as well as its behaviour within that system. As such, it straddles a 
relatively unique space as it offers a way of understanding both how Canadian 
policymakers viewed, and to some extent, still view the international system, 
while also giving insight into how this understanding also shaped national 
foreign policy behaviours. The term’s early-recorded use by Italian Renaissance 
scholar and diplomat Giovanni Botero, in 1589, employed it as a very 
straightforward theoretical device for easily dividing up state power structures.76 
As a descriptive term and a simple concept it has existed in varying iterations 
throughout history, however, it did not become closely associated with national 
policymaking practices until the latter half of the 20th century. Subsequent 
historical iterations reflected this usage and are not all that relevant to this study 
until the early 20th century when elements of the idea re-entered the emerging 
discourse in the formal academic discipline of International Relations. During 
this time it increasingly became interwoven with nascent concepts of Canadian 
foreign policymaking. Writing in the 1930s, Oxford Professor David Mitrany 
saw the increasing role of smaller powers and suggested that these states could 
play ‘functional’ roles in international governance that great powers could not.77 
As will be shown below, this idea percolated through the academic sphere of the 
interwar period, finding its way from the nascent field of International Relations 
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into the policies of Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King. 
Concurrently with this, the British Parliament passed the Statute of Westminster 
(1931), which gave the British Commonwealth realms legislative independence, 
including the ability to shape their own foreign policies. Informed by the 
Canadian Department of External Affairs, King seized on Mitrany’s idea during 
and after the Second World War as an effective way to manage and promote 
Canadian foreign affairs.  
The Canadian Undersecretary of External Affairs, Hume Wrong, skilfully 
focused these concepts into practice as the ‘functional principle;’ a force 
multiplier for a country like Canada which had a number of limitations, namely a 
small population and massive territory.78 Nonetheless, Canada was a power 
which in certain roles and functions, could operate at a great power level given 
the resources and capabilities it could bring to bear. Several contemporary 
articles by government ministers attested to this view, such as then-Minister of 
Defence Brooke Claxton, diplomat Lionel Gelber and special assistant to the 
Minister for External Affairs, R.G. Riddell.79 The concept of functionalism fed 
into a burgeoning middle power narrative which was taking shape during the late 
1940s, as Canada was playing an instrumental role in developing the architecture 
of the United Nations as well as the treaties that would form NATO. Sceptically 
chronicled by Robert Bothwell, the narrative was popular amongst Canadian 
diplomats as a way of describing Canadian post-Second World War diplomacy.80 
Escott Reid noted this categorisation in his recollections of Canada at the 
founding of the United Nations, noting that he had instructions to align himself 
with the other middle powers present at the conference in San Francisco.81 
Indeed, as Adam Chapnick observed, in the 1947 Gray Lecture on international 
affairs, then-Foreign Minister Louis St. Laurent suggested that countries such as 
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Canada had a vital role to play in the conduct of international diplomacy 
provided the iconic first instance where the middle power narrative was 
articulated.82 The narrative continued to carry great currency in the Canadian 
Department of External Affairs and it waged an unsuccessful campaign for 
middle powers to play a recognised role in the United Nations in 1948.83  
Despite the failure of formal recognition in the UN, in his term as Prime 
Minister, Louis St. Laurent again referred to this narrative to define and give 
shape to Canada’s Cold War position. Ostensibly, what was meant by his 
definition was that while Canada was not neutral during the Cold War, it was not 
so small as to be completely insignificant on the world stage and as such, had a 
responsibility to maintain a stable international order.84 Moving beyond the idea 
of functionalism and its relationship with the middle power terminology, this 
partly reflected the structural view of the international Cold War system, with 
Canada positioned between the global superpowers (USA, USSR, UK, France, 
China) and the smaller powers, thus a literal middle power in the international 
hierarchy. However, after Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent articulated this role, 
it was further championed by a pivotal figure in Canada’s history, Lester B. 
Pearson, during his time in the Department of External Affairs and later carried 
forward as a defining principle during his time as Prime Minister. During 
Pearson’s time in the Department of External Affairs he successfully helped to 
refine and promote the UN as a peacekeeping organisation, thus defining 
Canada’s profile in diplomatic circles. Moreover, Pearson’s promotion of 
Canada’s middle power narrative whilst taking an active role in international 
affairs, in part through peacekeeping, raised the profile of Canada further and 
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added to a perception of “punching above its weight.”85 As former Canadian 
diplomat Arthur Andrews observed, it was during this time that some of the core 
behavioural tenets, such as peacekeeping, that would later define middle powers 
were enshrined and incorporated into this narrative.86 With behavioural elements 
increasingly becoming an important component of this narrative Adam Chapnick 
observed that being a middle power was not actually about possessing a certain 
level of power, but rather, the way in which a country behaved.87 Indeed, Prime 
Ministers after Pearson, both Conservative and Liberal, also largely subscribed to 
this understanding of Canada’s international behaviour. The middle power 
concept as it related to Canada was not static and often shifted in order to reflect 
the international political system and the priorities of the government.88 This 
reflects the dynamic through which the structural elements of the term, combined 
with the behavioural elements to develop a definition which encompassed a 
much broader view of international affairs both amongst practitioners and 
academics. While some like Pierre Trudeau, had sought to reorient or redefine 
the contours of this middle power narrative, the core tenets laid out previously, 
continued to endure.89 Moreover, this narrative has continued to withstand 
numerous setbacks and challenges including, most notoriously, the Somalia 
Affair in which Canadian peacekeepers were found to have tortured and 
murdered a Somali civilian.90 In their critical examination of this linkage, Heiki 
Härting and Smaro Kamboureli note that coupled with strong support for the 
United Nations and peacekeeping efforts, the ideas of middle power and 
peacekeeping are conflated in the national discourse and thus the narrative of 
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Canada’s international behaviour is tied to both concepts.91 The behavioural 
elements of this narrative will be explored in greater detail further on, but 
nonetheless highlight its complex relationship with deep roots in both academia 
and policymaking.  
As has been explored, the middle power narrative emerging from the 
Second World War was intertwined with the practice of Canadian diplomacy, in 
large part due to Canadian diplomats and policymakers’ central role as agents 
who constructed and propagated this narrative. These elites who had been 
steeped in the foundational academic elements that had emerged prior to the 
Second World War were intimately tied to the practice of Canadian international 
affairs in the early Cold War and as such, the two became, to an extent, mutually 
reinforcing. It is in this way that the middle power narrative as defined by 
policymaking and academic elites came to predominantly define the practice as 
well as the study of Canadian foreign policy. As noted previously there was 
generally an acceptance by Canadian leaders from Prime Minister Lester Pearson 
up until the Harper government, of the middle power narrative and as a result, 
shared understanding about Canada’s international behaviour.92 Successive 
governments built on Pearson’s legacy embedding the preference for 
multilateralism, an inherent support for the international order, a preference for 
multipronged solutions (diplomacy, development) without a prioritisation of 
military involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding. 
As will be explored further in this chapter and throughout this study, it is 
not until the Harper government that there has been a serious attempt to 
reinterpret Canada’s foreign policy narrative. The middle power narrative, 
having been established through both policymaking practice as well as in the 
academic study of Canadian foreign policy emerged as the dominant 
understanding of this subject. The close association that developed between the 
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practice of Canadian foreign policy and the study of Canadian foreign policy has 
played an important role in defining the middle power narrative, both 
domestically and internationally. Understanding the link between these elements 
establishes an important paradigm in this field of study. Consequently, 
examinations of Canadian foreign policy are generally defined either in their 
acceptance or rejection of an understanding of this narrative. In this way the 
middle power narrative continues to remain intimately tied to both the study and 
practice of Canadian foreign policy both as a narrative, a role and a set of 
behaviours. The study of Canadian foreign policy did not begin to unpack these 
different elements until the 1980s when increasingly critical examinations of 
Canada’s foreign policy started emerging in academic circles.   
Critical examination of the middle power concept 
Just as Canada’s narrative as a middle power grew out of an academic concept 
and found its way into the policy sphere, academics also continued to develop 
this topic further. Reflecting the expansion of critical theory in the International 
Relations discipline during the 1970s and 1980s, examinations of Canada’s 
international engagement moved away from purely structural considerations and 
began integrating other elements such as behaviour, identity and culture. In 
continuing the examination of this narrative, its continuity within Canadian 
foreign policy became such a central focus of the discipline that it became the 
key concept against which other approaches were created. Through this process 
it created a narrative that, while internally contested, has generated a dominant 
interpretation of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, despite the greater challenges 
to traditional definitions of the middle power narrative, the middle power 
concept retained validity in the popular consciousness, largely due to its ever-
expanding definition.  
Former Canadian diplomat John W. Holmes, writing in 1970, suggested 
the use of the term ‘middlepowermanship’ to describe the character of Canadian 
diplomacy imbuing a more abstract, proactive quality to its behaviour.93 While 
Canada had been characterised as an ‘honest broker’ and ‘helpful fixer’ in 
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international affairs this did not sufficiently explain Canada’s foreign policy 
behaviour. It was clear that the concepts surrounding middle power required 
deeper examination as the international system continued shifting and successive 
Prime Ministers continued to consider Canadian foreign policy priorities. 
Writing in 1984, Carsten Holbraad defined many of the behavioural traits 
associated with middle powers while also highlighting the growing difficulties 
with the use of the term, namely the three facets which he identified as 
constituent components; balance of power, diplomacy and international law.94 
These three elements, structural, behavioural and normative have created 
difficulties, or flexibility, for those attempting to classify Canada’s international 
position. However, this definitional challenge identified by Holbraad remains a 
persistent thread throughout the discussion of Canada’s middle power narrative. 
Writing in 1989, Robert W. Cox sought to provide more clarity to this by 
drawing a distinction between behavioural ‘middlepowermanship’ and structural 
‘middlepowerhood.’95 While this helped to distinguish behaviour from structural 
considerations and remains an important distinction in this literature, other 
scholars were driven to try and examine alternative theoretical models. As 
outlined in Part I, David Dewitt and John Kirton proposed in Canada as a 
Principal Power, that complex neorealism better represents the clear areas where 
Canada is a principal actor and others where it is not, rather than imposing the 
broader and more ill-defined term of middle power96 The ‘principal power’ 
concept highlighted by Dewitt and Kirton continues to be an important critical 
facet to the discussion and dissection of Canadian foreign policy.97 Moreover, 
this work helps to further contextualise the distinction between behaviour and 
structural considerations (place) as it relates to the middle power narrative.  
Reflecting the political upheaval at the end of the Cold War there was a 
need to revise the idea of Canada as a middle power to better reflect Canada’s 
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place amongst a number of new actors. The dramatic structural changes to the 
field of International Relations required a re-evaluation of traditionally accepted 
labels. In 1993, another definition of middle power by Andrew F. Cooper, 
Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal helped to redefine middle power 
status for the post-Cold War era and suggested that middle power behaviour is 
defined by an approach to diplomacy geared to mitigating conflict and building 
consensus and cooperation.98 Since its publication, this behavioural definition 
has largely been the touchstone for those referring to Canada as a middle power. 
It takes a much less structural view of international power reflecting the post-
Cold War period and the dramatic structural upheaval in the international system. 
Of course it is not without its problems, as the authors themselves highlighted 
“[t]o be included in the category of middle powers, countries have to act like 
middle powers.”99 This suggests that ultimately, the definition is somewhat 
tautological inasmuch as a middle power identifies itself as a middle power 
because it acts like a middle power.100 This presents some definitional 
challenges, however, as not all nations have the same ability to act as middle 
powers, though they may fulfil some, if not all the associated criteria. Despite the 
broad architecture proposed by Cooper, Higgott and Nossal not all middle 
powers are created equal and some, such as Canada, embody a unique set of 
circumstances.  
Concurrent to Cooper, Higgott and Nossal’s book, there were other 
differing interpretations of Canada’s middle power narrative. Mark Neufeld’s 
dissection of the theoretical foundations, which informed by Cooper, Higgott and 
Nossal’s work, tried to go beyond the “dominant theoretical traditions and 
analytical frameworks that have guided…thinking about world politics.”101 
While this article was very of its time in its use of Gramscian theory and concern 
over stability in a post-hegemonic world, critical theory-based work like 
Neufeld’s expanded the deeper theoretical foundations surrounding the middle 
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power narrative that had established a firm and popular hold in academia and in 
policy circles.102 Similar to Neufeld, Charles-Philippe David and Stéphane 
Roussel suggested that the traditional concept of middle power was being 
denuded due to Great Powers taking a more active diplomatic role with 
multilateralism and cooperation no longer the preserve of the middle power.103 
David and Roussel’s article incorporated and exemplified common trends in 
using the middle power label during the late 1990s, critically examining the 
term’s relationship with the contemporary foreign policy whilst also blending the 
structural and behavioural elements of the term. Nonetheless, as noted 
previously, there remains a lack of theoretical sophistication, particularly as it 
relates to the exploration of these narratives and themes in Canadian foreign 
policy.104 
The interpretations of an evolving middle power role gradually translated 
into policy through inclusion of middle power behavioural principles into the 
Canadian government’s foreign policy review released in 1995. While the 
linkages between Canada’s behaviour and the middle power narrative were not 
new, this represented their explicit inclusion and articulation as actual foreign 
policy preference. As mentioned previously, this review emphasised the ‘softer’ 
elements of Canadian foreign policy with a focus on sustainability, aid, 
development, human rights and peacekeeping.105 This deepened the linkages 
between the middle power narrative and Canada’s foreign policy behaviour by 
further ascribing certain policies to a middle power approach to post-Cold War 
diplomacy. In academia, this was carried forward into the early 2000s through 
the work of Jennifer Welsh who advocated a more normative transition away 
from the middle power to ‘model power,’ with a foreign policy which acted in 
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the global common good and more critically asked whether Canada could remain 
a middle power in the “middle of what?” given the end of the Cold War.106 
Welsh’s work typified a growing body of scholarship undertaking a more in 
depth and challenging examination of this narrative; a trend which had expanded 
throughout the 1990s into the present. At the same time, Welsh represented a 
strong advocate of the continued importance of values-based Canadian foreign 
policy literature as shown in her continued support for the human security 
agenda.107 Indeed, Nikola Hynek noted that, “Canada derives its advantageous 
position from the fact that it has been repeatedly successful in (re)constructing 
and (re)producing its external identity as a middle power.”108 While the 
definitions of the middle power narrative may have been contested among 
academics and policymakers it nonetheless carried great currency and remained 
an important component of Canadian foreign policy.  
Turning to more recent scholarship, it has increasingly focused on the 
constituent elements of the middle power idea and their relationship to broader 
international power structures. Patrick Lennox contends that this idea is best 
expressed through ‘structural specialization theory’ which emphasises variables 
that transcend individual political leaders or configurations to find the ultimate 
causes of a state’s behaviour within a structural context.109 Lennox’s effort is 
ambitious, relying on a systemic level analysis and arguing that Canadian 
identity as a middle power arises out of its hierarchical relationship with the 
United States as its southern neighbour.110  This approach however, does not 
adequately explain the internal narratives that also surround Canada’s identity 
and neglects to adequately address the challenges posed by the manifold nature 
of the middle power definition, focusing almost exclusively on the structural 
elements of Canada’s middle power status.  
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Writing more recently David Bosold and Nik Hynek compiled a volume 
on the latest literature surrounding the middle power narrative in Canadian 
academia.111 In this volume, Tom Keating presents an argument for the retention 
of this concept as a guiding signpost in Canadian foreign policy, not only as an 
internal narrative, but also as a way in which this narrative shapes how others see 
Canada.112 The volume goes into greater detail about the soft power and hard 
power elements of the middle power concept, highlighting not only the 
versatility of the term but also the need for greater and more diverse examination 
of how it relates to Canadian foreign policy. 
A germane contribution to this study, David Bosold, also using modified 
Role Theory, dissects the terminology surrounding the middle power narrative 
and breaks it down into three models for critical dissection: the hierarchical 
model, along the lines described by Lennox, the normative model and the 
behavioural model.113 Bosold noted that a number of scholars on the issue have 
observed “a term such as middle power, ‘model power,’ or ‘civilian power’ is 
simply an empty container that can be filled with new content. One should add 
that the most crucial point is that there is some content.”114 As noted previously, 
Bosold suggests that Canadian’s belief in the middle power narrative is derived 
from a shared, popular understanding of its diplomatic history.115 As such, in 
looking at the role of the middle power narrative in Canadian foreign policy this 
study carries forward Bosold’s assertion and in doing so, seeks to add detail and 
depth to how this influences Canadian policymakers. Indeed, the middle power 
narrative has come to incorporate more elements, specifically, its behavioural 
connotations and its conflation with specific behaviour, such as peacekeeping, 
has complicated its use. The inclusion of peacekeeping behaviour as a key tenet 
of this narrative has been an important factor in shaping not only the public’s 
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view of Canadian foreign policy but also how the country’s image has been 
projected internationally.  
As this relates to the popular use of the middle power narrative and its 
catch-all characteristics in more recent scholarship, Robert Murray and John 
McCoy noted that Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson saw Canada’s position in the 
international system as ideal for promoting peacekeeping as a form of 
engagement that was neither overtly aggressive, nor completely sidelined and 
thus the ideal form of ‘middlepowermanship.’116 Murray and McCoy’s 
behavioural definition of Canada’s international engagement is an example of the 
popular lens through which a significant amount of scholarship about Canada’s 
status as a middle power is viewed. The concepts of middle power and 
“Pearsonianism” are frequently invoked in tandem when discussing Canada’s 
international relations, speaking to both terms’ enduring popularity.117 The 
middle power narrative’s link with peacekeeping behaviour has been given 
greater visibility and exposure due to Canada’s involvement in the ISAF mission 
in Afghanistan.118 As numerous academics and the media have highlighted, for 
the first time since the Korean War, Canadian ground troops in Afghanistan were 
involved in an overseas combat role. The intertwining of peacekeeping with 
Canadians’ conception about their international role has caused, to a certain 
extent, a polarising effect in Canadian politics and public opinion as it is often 
placed at odds with more kinetic operations.119 In The Unexpected War: Canada 
in Kandahar Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang examined how Canada came 
to be involved in Afghanistan.120 While their study presented a thorough 
accounting of the policymaking process during the early part of the Afghanistan 
conflict, it also failed to capture how these decisions related to the broader 
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narratives surrounding Canadian foreign policy. This dynamic will be explored 
further in the examination of the Afghanistan operation as it points towards a 
reflexive interaction between behaviour and narrative.121 Nonetheless, given the 
nature of Canada’s international engagement in Afghanistan there has been 
considerable commentary about the use of the term middle power and its 
association with military intervention as well as the Canadian military’s 
relationship with peacekeeping operations.  
Exemplifying this trend Matthew Bouldin accepts the traditional 
narratives as they relate to the role of Canada as a middle power peacekeeping 
nation and suggests that the military is best adapted to these types of 
operations.122 This is also reflected in more recent scholarship from former 
Canadian military officer, Walter A. Dorn, who argues, in a similar vein, that 
Canada should maintain its traditional role in peacekeeping and other 
international development operations.123 Dorn’s assessment of Canada’s 
international role reflects the continued popular sentiment in the scholarship 
surrounding this discussion. Indeed, the linkages between popular perception 
(Canada as peacekeeper) and continuity in the way that this narrative shapes 
behaviour have practical implications for the formulation of policy.  
The popular narrative which has surrounded Canadian peacekeeping, 
while simplistic, is a key element of the Canadian consciousness when it comes 
to international conflict. In their article on the political marketing of the 
Afghanistan mission, Joseph Fletcher, Heather Bastedo and Jennifer Hove found 
that the ideal of Canada as a peacekeeping nation is thoroughly entrenched in the 
Canadian popular consciousness.124 Similarly investigating views on this topic, 
Heiki Harting and Smaro Kamboureli noted that the idea of ‘Canada as 
peacekeeper’ is often a popular lens, through which much of the academic 
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literature on the nature of Canadian international identity is viewed.125 Both of 
these articles highlight the rose-tinted lens through which many Canadians view 
their country’s apparent important influence on international affairs.126 However, 
as historian Robert Bothwell has observed along with a number of other 
academics, Canadian foreign policy, even in the halcyon days of “high 
Pearsonianism,” the reality of peacekeeping was never as simple as Canada 
exercising outsized influence interposed between the two superpowers.127 
Nonetheless, the relationship between Canada as a middle power and 
peacekeeping is deeply entrenched in the academic literature as to often be 
construed as an implicit link between the two ideas.128 This is important in that it 
reinforces the behavioural link between the narrative and behaviour and as such, 
is important in the way that Canadian foreign policy roles are constructed. This is 
also a consideration when examining Canadian policymakers who also seek 
continuity with the image of the middle power peacekeeper and thus reinforce 
these narratives through Canada’s international behaviour. In examining 
peacekeeping as part of the middle power narrative, it is often tied up with 
broader behavioural considerations despite a strong normative element which 
will be explored in the following section.  
Ultimately, the substance of the middle power narrative must be defined 
by its use in analysis and given the multitude of analyses that exist on Canada 
and its middle power identity it becomes challenging to ascribe universal 
qualities. As it relates to policymaking, it has become something of a catchall to 
characterise Canadian foreign policy behaviour as well. This does not mean that 
it has no utility, but instead this study seeks to explore how this narrative 
manifests itself in a role which informs Canadian policymakers thus ultimately 
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driving the desire for continuity with this narrative. By exploring the relevant 
scholarship surrounding the middle power narrative it provides us with insight 
into its various components but also the ways in which it is labile. Rather than 
being a static concept, the middle power narrative is instead, characterised by a 
constant dynamic between policy and practice.  
While the literature explored in this section feeds an interesting academic 
debate, this has created, in part, what has become a largely semantic discussion 
over whether Canada is a middle power, model power or something else entirely. 
The terminology has become so overused and bogged down with too many 
definitions, concepts, behaviours and hierarchical dissections that it means 
whatever authors’ need it to in order to justify their own analyses. Similarly, as 
with the broader field of Canadian foreign policy, a limited amount of theorising 
about the role of identities, narratives and ontology as it relates to Canada’s 
international behaviour whilst building on many of the concepts explored thus 
far. Writing in 2012, echoing distinctions made by John Holmes and Robert Cox 
over 20 years ago, Kim Nossal argues that the narrative remains valid as any 
definitions are fraught, though the author using the term must be clear to 
distinguish between ‘middlepowermanship,’ namely a set of behaviours and 
actions which define a middle power and ‘middlepowerhood’ referring to the 
more structural interpretation of Canada’s position relative to Great Powers and 
smaller powers.129 Despite this, the critical components of the Canadian middle 
power narrative and its relevance to policymaking are a hybrid of these different 
elements. Carrying forward Bosold’s assertion, it is important to look beyond the 
definitional aspects of Canada’s middle power narrative and look towards the 
continuity that this narrative provides and by extension, how it shapes the 
behaviour of Canada internationally.130 In articulating this, these competing 
definitions and facets of the narrative will then need to be incorporated into a 
role for Canada. However, as mentioned previously, a challenging facet of this 
narrative remains its normative component which is often regarded as part of 
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middle power behaviour but is worthy of further examination to help distinguish 
some additional characteristics.  
‘Canada as peacekeeper’ and normative confusion 
When referring to the normative component of the middle power narrative the 
focus turns to how Canadian policymakers utilise international organisations for 
the construction of regimes and is often linked with Canada’s relationship with 
the UN.131 Indeed, one of the more complex elements of the middle power 
narrative, it is often closely tied to the behavioural and structural components as 
it encompasses aspects of both, however, it does have some unique aspects 
which require greater clarity. As Holbraad observed, the international law 
component of middle powers remains difficult to ascertain as some middle 
powers have a mixed legacy when it comes to influence in this area.132 This is 
particularly important as it relates to how it shapes Canada’s policies in 
international organisations and often by extension shapes these organisations 
themselves.133 During the immediate post-Cold War era policymakers in the 
Liberal-led government often emphasised soft power capabilities when dealing 
with international security, underscored, at least until more recently, by a long-
standing commitment to United Nations-led peacekeeping forces.134 Canada’s 
instrumental role as an architect of the UN and NATO was a foundation upon 
which the government sought to continue shaping international law, both outside 
of international institutions as with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, as 
well as with the creation of new organisations such as the International Criminal 
Court.135 This was, for a time, supported by a historical commitment to foreign 
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aid and Canada positioning itself as a mid-sized Western power, largely free 
from colonial baggage capable of influencing both major and minor international 
power brokers.136 Indeed others like Hans Maull, have sought to characterise 
these types of behaviours as those of ‘civilian powers’ such as Germany and 
Japan who, despite having the capabilities of larger powers rely on soft power 
instruments and multilateralism in order to achieve foreign policy outcomes.137 
While Maull’s characterisation reflects many of the same components of the 
middle power narrative, it does not reflect the same conditions that define 
‘civilian powers’ but rather a relatively unique set of behaviours and history in 
Canada’s case. 
The Liberal government during the 1990s undertook aggressive 
promotion of the peacekeeping narrative as David Jefferess observes, further 
enshrining it in a national imaginary; concretising the elements of structural, 
behavioural and normative behaviour which defined Canadian ‘middle-ness.’138 
As has been noted already, conceptions of middle power as they related to 
Canada became intertwined with UN-led peacekeeping, multilateral diplomacy 
and good international citizenship. The normative element of this narrative found 
its expression through Canada’s steadfast commitment to the UN and 
international law. Canada had been a major contributor to UN-led international 
peacekeeping operations from the 1950s through to the 1980s and remained a 
vocal, if less active supporter of these types of stability operations into the 
1990s.139 
During this decade, despite adopting a more selective policy on UN 
peacekeeping engagement, Canadian forces participated in a number of missions, 
in conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia, the Caribbean and elsewhere. Jefferess 
examined the creation of the peacekeeping narrative during the 1990s and into 
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the present through the examination of a book by former Canadian Foreign 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy, and notes the “mythology of peacekeeping is 
complex, flexible, contingent, and, most importantly, resilient… Canada’s 
peacekeeper identity is framed through nostalgia, in that it is articulated as both a 
tradition and a longing…”140 While he does not explicitly explore 
peacekeeping’s relationship with the middle power concept, his examination of 
this narrative both emphasises Canada’s normative and implicit relationship to 
the terminology, as well as its blending with the behavioural, structural and 
normative elements of Canadian foreign policy. Jefferess also highlights and 
gives prominence to the role of the Canadian Foreign Minister during the late 
1990s, Lloyd Axworthy. Together, Axworthy and former Canadian Ambassador 
to the United Nations, Paul Heinbecker, aggressively promoted the idea of 
‘human security’ which was written as part of the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine, a normative framework which sought to enshrine the idea of the state’s 
responsibility to provide security to its citizens, superseding other considerations, 
up to and including sovereignty.141 In creating this policy, it used Canadian 
conceptions of international good citizenship and sought to establish explicit 
behavioural rules for the international community to follow. Though it has 
entered the common policy lexicon in the United Nations and elsewhere, it failed 
to take on the central international role originally envisioned.142 Regardless, the 
role of Canada as a confirmed multilateralist not only had behavioural 
connotations as it relates to the middle power narrative; it also took on deeper 
normative elements as policymakers sought to institutionalise these behaviours 
by enshrining them as vital components of Canadian foreign policy practice in 
the 1990s.143  
As has been established thus far, the term middle power is often quite 
broad in its use to define Canada’s narrative as it relates to its international 
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behaviour and as such, its normative content is often left to either the author to 
define or to use the well-established tropes as they relate to Canada. These 
traditional ideas often expressed as peacekeeping, multilateral engagement and 
what could be termed ‘good international citizenship’ have all been hallmarks in 
the popular image of Canada as a middle power.144 What is notable about this 
normative element is the general lack of exploration of how Canada has shaped 
NATO operations. This is despite an important role played by Canada in the 
creation of civilian casualty guidelines, the treatment of detainees among other 
human rights related issues in the Afghanistan mission.145 Literature concerning 
Canada’s participation in NATO tends to focus on the development of Article II 
of the North Atlantic Treaty.146 There is a focus on Canada and the UN, more so 
of late, with open criticism coming from the Foreign Minister compounded by 
the failure of Canada to obtain a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
in 2010.147 The distancing of the UN relationship also goes hand in hand with a 
deeper involvement in NATO’s kinetic peace support operations. This is 
combined with calls for a deeper, more comprehensive military approach, among 
them former Chief of Defence, General Walter Natynczyk, who seeks to give 
Canada a focused but robust international military capacity and by extension 
allowing Canada to fulfil its role as a good international citizen.148 This echoes 
many of the same debates over functionalism and Canada’s role in the UN during 
the early Cold War.149 Indeed the normative element of the middle power 
narrative as it relates to NATO remains difficult to effectively define due to its 
close relationship with behaviour. Canada played an important role in defining 
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the relevant legal arrangements, civilian casualty guidelines and other 
frameworks which guided NATO forces in theatre. 
As such, the normative component to the middle power narrative remains 
important as previously discussed, due to Canada’s historically close association 
with the UN and initiatives like the Responsibility to Protect as well as its deeper 
involvement in NATO operations. These factors will be important in providing 
context to Canada’s role as it relates to the Afghanistan and Libya operations. 
However, as alluded to already, there were more recent attempts by the 
government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper to reinterpret Canada’s narrative 
in order to better conform to their domestic and foreign policy priorities. A 
number of authors have started to examine the impact of Prime Minister Harper 
and the Conservative Party have had on Canadian politics and its foreign 
policy.150 Nonetheless, there has been less work done specifically on the effects 
that the Harper government has had on Canadian foreign policy as these analyses 
are usually couched in relation to the government’s effects on the domestic level. 
Some of the most relevant and comprehensive work done on foreign policy 
under the Harper government comes from John Ibbitson, however, he deals with 
foreign policy more holistically without a focus on NATO or any other 
institution and while informative, is arguably not as academically rigorous as 
could be hoped given the criticisms of Canadian foreign policy scholarship 
already outlined in this study.151 Indeed, in his latest biography of Stephen 
Harper he suggests that Canadian foreign policy has changed to reflect a more 
conservative Canada but ultimately, this new interpretation of foreign policy gets 
results internationally.152 As will be explored in this study, this re-orientation of 
Canada’s foreign policy behaviour has also had an effect on how Canada is 
perceived by its allies and thus affects Canada’s influence internationally. An 
effort to alter or redefine a national narrative can trigger a discontinuity which, as 
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discussed in the introduction, can have important subsequent effects on 
policymaking internationally. 
Changing the definition? 
Given that this study is examining how a foreign policy narrative shapes 
Canada’s foreign policy behaviour, it is important to be cognisant of some of the 
domestic considerations which shape these national narratives. As mentioned in 
the introduction, this study is concerned with a dominant middle power narrative, 
however, that is not to say that there is one, singular interpretation of this 
narrative. As explored in the preceding analysis the middle power narrative is 
highly adaptable and expansive and as such, can be used to further political 
priorities depending on the agenda of the current government. Prior to the 
election of the Conservative Party of Canada and Prime Minister Harper, there 
had been few previous efforts to shift the perceptions of Canadian international 
military action and as a result, the popular narrative supporting Canada as 
peacekeeper and middle power became deeply entrenched and not easily shifted. 
As has been established, this carried through until the present where it has come 
under increasing scrutiny, particularly since 9/11. The military actions that have 
followed in Afghanistan and elsewhere have prompted some reflection about an 
international identity that best reflects the nature of Canadian international 
engagement.153 Some of the common tropes surrounding Canada’s international 
engagement were revisited in the early 2000s following years of serious 
government cutbacks thanks to an austerity budget that Canada adopted in the 
early 1990s to address major deficit issues. Funding to the Department of 
National Defence and the DFAIT was cut dramatically as part of wider 
budgetary austerity measures. Among other reductions, this prompted a 
withdrawal of Canadian forces from NATO structures in Europe and further 
called into question Canada’s position as an effective actor in international 
security, a particularly salient issue in light of Canada’s behaviour as a middle 
power.  
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The effects of these cuts were a popular recurring thread in scholarship 
during the 2000s and into the present. Some authors, such as Andrew Cohen 
writing in the early 2000s, suggested that Canada’s international influence has 
never truly recovered from the cutbacks of the early 1990s.154 Cohen observed an 
important sentiment that grew out of these cutbacks and fed into the significant 
‘declinist’ theme in the early 2000s which saw a propagation of writing about 
Canada’s declining international influence and how to get it back. Other authors 
like Jack Granatstein and Denis Stairs urged an adoption of a Canadian foreign 
policy, which placed greater emphasis on interests over values and discarded or 
diminished the traditional focus on peacekeeping. Jack Granatstein, suggests that 
Canada should support the United Nations, NATO and others when it is in our 
interest to do so, acting more out of realpolitik than idealism.155 Writing in 
reference to the conflict in Afghanistan, Kim Nossal suggests that this policy is 
informed by idealpolitik, arguing that Canada tends to create its security policy 
based around more moralistic or idealistic grounds that inadequately represent 
our serious interests.156 This is not an isolated theme on this issue, but rather 
there are a number of commentators who have raised criticism of Canada’s 
supposedly ‘values-based’ foreign policy which was, they argue continuously 
reinforced during the tenure of the Liberal Party to the detriment of Canada’s 
international interests.  
There have been some limited attempts to reconcile the opposed factions 
in this argument, however, the view of a misguided Canadian foreign policy, 
particularly as it regards international military action has taken a firm hold in the 
discourse. Reflecting this, Denis Stairs advocates deeper introspection and 
critical thought on issues of foreign policy, particularly given the weight to 
middle power rhetoric in Canadian discourse.157 Others, like former Canadian 
Ambassador Alan Gotlieb, urge a return to functionalism in Canadian foreign 
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policy in order to best serve Canadian interests and promote the country’s 
international relevance after its supposed decline in the 1990s.158 Conversely, 
former Canadian Ambassador Paul Heinbecker argues that we should not overly 
romanticise the ‘functionalist’ era of the early Cold War and seek to create a 
broader, ambitious foreign policy that corresponds closer to Canada’s traditional 
foreign policy narratives.159 As mentioned in the earlier reviews of Canadian 
foreign policy literature, interests versus values are often central themes for the 
conduct of Canada’s foreign affairs. The implication of these authors points to a 
perceived traditional preference in Canadian foreign policy which privileges 
values over interests which, in turn, damages the projection of Canadian power 
abroad. The difficulty with this dichotomy also lies in the perception of what 
constitutes a value versus an interest as these are fundamentally subjective. 
Nonetheless, the Conservative government has been very forthright in its 
assertion that its foreign and defence policies privilege Canadian interests while 
promoting a distinct set of values.  
The declinist narrative, for its part, has also changed, thanks to Canada’s 
robust participation in the Afghanistan mission and instead has moved towards 
scepticism as it regards Canada’s participation in international institutions and 
other organisations. In this vein, whilst advocating participation in NATO, 
Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky note that some in Ottawa seem convinced that 
NATO does not serve Canadian interests quite as well as it should and as such 
are attempting to change Canadian policy priorities to reflect this.160 Conversely, 
David Haglund writing from a strategic culture perspective, suggests that the 
Alliance remains important to Canada for strategic considerations which go 
beyond the partisan concerns of Liberal and Conservatives noting that Canada’s 
serious engagement in the Alliance started under Liberal Prime Minister Jean 
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Chretien’s government.161 Following this avenue, Justin Massie suggests 
Canada’s ‘irrational’ security policy stems from three concurrent and coexistent 
security cultures: continental soft-balancing, defensive internationalism and soft-
balancing Atlanticism.162 Perhaps most importantly, Massie contends that the 
uniting factor for all of these different cultures is they ultimately predicate 
Canada’s participation in NATO on the maintenance of structures and regimes 
which make Canada’s international identity most salient and thus an avenue to 
maintain international relevance.163 As will be explored in this study, Canada’s 
relationship with NATO has nonetheless changed over the past decade and 
consequently, this could be seen to reflect wider trends in Canadian foreign 
policy.  
Indeed, the Conservative government sought to encourage a more hard 
power approach to foreign policy emphasising a more robust military and foreign 
policy as a way to distinguish itself from previous Liberal governments. As 
journalist Lawrence Martin noted in his critical exploration of Stephen Harper’s 
leadership, “foreign affairs, more than any other department, was steeped in 
Liberal tradition, with its arrogant officials assuming they should have the run of 
things, and that policy should be based on long-standing soft-power biases.”164 
The Conservative Party has been seen to have embraced the military side of 
NATO, at least until the end of Canada’s engagement in the Libya and Afghan 
combat missions in 2011 and continues to float participation in potential future 
military activities.165  At the time interviews with officials at NATO headquarters 
were conducted, Canada came across notably quieter after the end of its combat 
operations in Afghanistan.166 Furthermore, there are deep cuts to Canadian 
defence which began in 2013 aiming to shrink the military budget by five percent 
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by 2015, though with promises to increase spending again in the future.167 This 
raises questions about whether there was a serious re-definition of Canada’s 
international identity or the Harper government merely used the rhetoric as a way 
of distinguishing themselves from the previous Liberal government.   
Speaking in 2007 to the Council on Foreign Relations, Stephen Harper 
was clear that he regarded Canada as a middle power with international 
obligations and leading by example using much of the same language of the 
previous Liberal governments to advocate its foreign policy agenda.168  
However, since that speech, the Conservative government took a number of 
policy positions that have been a dramatic shift from the previous governments. 
This includes notable criticism and an almost disdainful attitude towards the 
United Nations, far more so than previous Canadian governments. Upon taking 
office in 2006, the Harper government sought to place some distance between 
Canada’s former perceived cosiness with the UN and altered the government’s 
rhetoric towards the organisation. This was coupled with more assertive policy 
stances on a number of issues that have been seen to diverge with Canada’s 
traditional UN policies. It has been noted that the Harper government’s 
unequivocal support for Israel, redirection of foreign aid, public criticism of 
China’s human rights record and a waning commitment to peacekeeping 
missions have tarnished Canada’s UN credentials.169 The Harper government’s 
policies are thought to have contributed to Canada’s failure to obtain a non-
permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2010, the first time in Canada’s 
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history it had failed to do so.170 Indeed, Adam Chapnick suggested that the 
Harper government tried to redefine Canada as an ‘anti-middle power.’171 
Returning to John Ibbitson’s recent and in-depth exploration of Harper’s 
foreign policy from 2006 through to 2014 suggests that the Conservative Party 
has been successful in shifting the core components of Canadian foreign policy 
away from the Liberal Party tradition centred on Ontario and Quebec, or as he 
terms it, the ‘Laurentian consensus.’172 Ibbitson notes that the Conservative 
Party’s has promoted “[a] new emphasis on trade, a new belligerence in the 
North, a more robust military, a new patriotism, a new skepticism toward at least 
some global institutions, a new and unqualified commitment to Israel” as core 
components of a foreign policy that is more representative of its electoral base in 
Western Canada.173 Indeed, this is a point recently emphasised by Kim Nossal 
noting that, “[p]art of the Conservative strategy is to ensure that any policy 
approach that was deeply connected to the Liberals (or even the Progressive 
Conservatives under Brian Mulroney) is discarded, replaced by policies that will 
assist in achieving the broader electoral end of future Conservative 
hegemony.”174 This subordination of Canada’s place in the world to domestic 
political concerns arguably conflicts with the traditional narrative of Canadian 
foreign policy that has been established and outlined in this chapter. Indeed, this 
highlights the importance of examining not only how policymakers shape foreign 
policy behaviour but also how their competing interpretations of Canadian 
foreign policy inform this narrative. As such it is important to examine what 
informs these interpretations and the resultant effect on behaviour.  
Despite these shifts, in seeking to differentiate itself from the previous 
Liberal government’s foreign policy, the Conservative Party failed to latch on to 
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a concrete policy issue which is amenable to a course of action reflecting a new 
identity. Gerald Schmitz suggested that these changes were “to do with the 
Harper government’s incremental reconsideration and reorientation of 
established foreign policy in directions that most strategically serve its interests 
while appealing to its electoral base.”175 Nonetheless as Schmitz also noted, 
government background documents on Canada’s Afghanistan mission, while 
steering away from language used by the Liberal government, still framed 
Canada’s commitment along humanitarian lines.176 Greater involvement in 
NATO and the ISAF mission in Afghanistan have somewhat shifted perceptions 
among Canadians about the military’s role and Canadian assertiveness abroad.177 
This conflicts with the still popular conception that the country was an honest 
broker and helpful fixer that seeks to find pragmatic solutions and maintain 
stability in a chaotic and charged international system.178 In seeking to change 
the popular narrative around Canadian identity, the government undermined a 
thread which runs deeply in Canadian international affairs.  
Broadly speaking, the overall effect of an attempted shift in foreign 
policy behaviour should be limited given the entrenched middle power narrative. 
Similarly, even increased hard power international military engagement, when 
used in the right context, reinforces traditional ideas about Canada’s identity as a 
good international citizen. Thus, in engaging with the international system as a 
middle power, Canadian policymakers have certain expectations generated by 
the need to maintain this narrative and thus adapting foreign policy behaviour to 
that end. Related to this, the behavioural and structural elements tied up in the 
middle power discussion, as it relates to Canada, are often blended making it 
hard to parse any distinct thread and fundamentally, serves as a catch all 
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depending on the writers’ or policymakers’ agenda. Therefore, while there have 
been some alterations to Canadian foreign policy behaviour, broadly speaking, 
its conduct has not varied so dramatically as to define a new role for Canada in 
the international system. However, it is important to acknowledge the domestic 
pressures that are continually reshaping challenging the dominant interpretation 
of this narrative whilst also remaining focused on the continuity in Canadian 
foreign policy.   
Part III: Conclusion 
 As this chapter has shown, Canadian foreign policy lacks extensive theoretical 
diversity and rarely possesses either granular or multidimensional focus to 
sufficiently explore the complex interplay between the different levels of 
analysis. Rather, Canadian foreign policy scholarship remains overly concerned 
with issues of place and process, including as they relate to the middle power 
narrative.179 This is present throughout the literature on ‘Canada as a satellite’ or 
internationalist. While there is some alternative theorising on the middle power 
narrative occurring in Canadian foreign policy scholarship, there has not yet been 
an in-depth empirical attempt at exploring how this narrative relates to Canada’s 
foreign policy behaviour. This study is not meant to invalidate any of these 
prevailing interpretations, be they focused on the Canada-US relationship or 
other facets of Canada’s international engagements. Rather, it aims to give depth 
and provide an innovative, alternative lens by which to interpret state behaviour 
while also exploring a number of key themes in Canadian foreign policy 
literature. Nonetheless, in exploring the middle power narrative one should be 
clear to discern a number of characteristics related to the practice and traditions 
of Canadian foreign policy; namely, a reflexive belief in multilateralism, an 
inherent support for the international order, a preference for multipronged 
solutions (diplomacy, development) without a prioritisation of military 
involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding. This is not meant to be an 
exclusive definition, but rather a broad way of describing many of the traditional 
behavioural hallmarks of the middle power narrative and by no means 
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exclusionary. It does however, offer a foundation against which can then be used 
to explore how these characteristics in relation to Canada’s foreign policy 
behaviour during the Afghanistan and Libya operations. That said, it does not 
wholly account for an emotional component to the policymaking process and as 
such these motivations need to be explored as a separate component.    
As has been demonstrated there are clear themes that recur throughout the 
middle power literature, namely, the ‘interests vs. values’ debate, Canada’s 
relationship with international organisations and the influence of the US and a 
focus on continuity with historical traditions. Representative of these themes is 
the importance given to peacekeeping and its popular association with the middle 
power narrative.  The close association between this narrative and peacekeeping 
behaviour presents an interesting avenue of exploration as to whether 
Afghanistan and Libya represent continuity in Canada’s actions as they relate to 
its foreign policy narrative. This also gives us an opportunity to explore 
interpretations of this continuity given that Conservative Party and Liberal Party 
policymakers seem to have differing visions and preferences as they relate to 
Canadian foreign policy, particularly as it relates to NATO. The Canada-NATO 
relationship is vital to the exercise of Canadian diplomacy as it has traditionally 
supported Canada’s commitment to multilateral forums as well as provided an 
opportunity for diplomatic leadership. Nonetheless, beyond the context of why 
NATO remains critical to Canada’s ability to exert its influence in the security 
and defence arena; it is important to recognise the need for a more 
comprehensive view of how this, in practice, is shaped by narratives and other 
factors. Similarly, the Canada-NATO relationship remains an underdeveloped 
area of study, particularly as it relates to Canada’s participation in more recent 
operations and offers an opportunity to develop the Canadian foreign policy 
literature. Indeed, Canada’s participation in NATO is more often couched in 
terms of Canada’s internationalism and support for multilateralism while not 
focusing specifically on this relationship. When examining the middle power 
narrative in Canadian foreign policy it is necessary to explore in greater detail the 





 Furthermore, the Conservative government’s attempts to reinterpret the 
dominant narrative offers an opportunity to examine the reflexive interaction 
between narrative and policymaking as new actions can be measured against the 
previous government’s interpretation of Canada’s narrative. To do so, it is 
necessary to go beyond simply explaining Canada’s place in the international 
system and the processes which inform this position. This study aims to 
understand how the middle power narrative relates both to the continuity of 
Canadian foreign policy as well as the way in which it interacts with and shapes 
the context of policymaking. Given the complexity of this narrative as it 
concerns structural, behavioural and normative components of Canada’s foreign 
policy, it is important to see how these elements manifest themselves in the 
expectations of Canadian and NATO policymakers at the individual level thus 
shaping the practice of Canadian policymaking in NATO.180 Additionally, it is 
necessary to explore the narrative components of the middle power tradition and 
gain greater clarity on the ways in which the behavioural components manifest 
themselves and how they do so. This leads us to the next chapter which will 
focus on how this middle power narrative articulates a behavioural role. In 
exploring this role one can then assess how it can be measured against moral, 
humanitarian, and honour-driven roles. 
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Chapter 3 - Canadian Policymakers and the Middle Power Narrative 
As has been explored thus far, there are a number of forces which influence state 
action, one of which has been identified as the policymaker’s interpretation of a 
state’s foreign policy narrative. This study’s FPA approach helps to understand 
the way in which such an interpretation translates into roles and how these roles 
relate to foreign policy behaviour. Rather than being a one-way interaction, 
however, this is a dynamic process; policymakers also respond to foreign policy 
behaviour by understanding it in relation to their national foreign policy 
narratives.1 In interpreting empirical data, it is possible to see how narratives 
surrounding states’ roles, function to both levy an expectation on policymakers at 
the national level, and to also ensure that they in turn try to conform to previous 
behaviours. This chapter looks at relevant foreign policy debates in the Canadian 
Parliament and interviews with Canadian policymakers in NATO in order to 
construct their understanding of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan and Libya 
as a way to see how the middle power narrative shapes the decisions to undertake 
interventions. In doing so, it is important to remain focused on the broader 
narratives of Canadian foreign policy, rather than specific policy initiatives or 
controversies.  
In order to elucidate the central middle power narrative, this chapter will 
examine the major debates between 2001 and 2011 on Afghanistan and Libya 
and seek to draw out each party’s narrative about Canadian involvement in these 
NATO operations. Canada pledged support to the Afghanistan mission as of 
October 8, 2001.2 It should be noted that from 2001-2002, Canadians were 
deployed as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) outside of NATO 
command. However, in 2003 Canadian forces were deployed to Kabul as part of 
NATO ISAF before taking up command of Task Force Kandahar in December 
2005 where they reverted to OEF until July 2006 when ISAF took command of 
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Southern Afghanistan.3 Canadian Forces remained under this structure through to 
the end of combat operations in 2011. The broad view of these debates should 
effectively provide a foundation on which each case study can be further 
examined and thus provides a baseline narrative against which this study can 
assess Canada’s policymaking and actions in each operation. In the interest of 
clarity and focus, it will go into depth on the debates focusing on mission 
renewal as well as challenges or limits posed to the operation by various political 
parties. Informational discussions, Senate debates and their relevant narratives 
are also examined. As will be explored in further detail in the following chapter, 
the debates also inform outside understandings of Canada’s foreign policy 
narrative and as a result, are incorporated into popular understandings of 
Canadian foreign policy narrative and behaviour. While these debates do not all 
have a direct effect on policy formulation, they still offer a clear articulation of 
competing narratives across the political spectrum. This is due to the fact that 
while narratives and roles are expressed, explicit state actions are not usually 
authorised in these circumstances; rather, policymakers are given the opportunity 
to question the Prime Minister’s policy.  
Additionally, it is necessary to note that the Parliamentary system also 
contributes to the way in which policy is formulated. Given Canada’s 
Westminster Parliamentary system, there is a significant amount of authority 
given over to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and cabinet, thus more 
influence accorded to the individuals there.4 This further enhances the 
importance of narrative in the policymaking process as individual policymakers 
play a greater role in shaping policy according to their own interpretations of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative. In a parliamentary situation, conversely, 
particularly during a minority government, there is a need to create policy which 
arguably meets with agreement from other parties in government in order to get 
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it passed.5 Discussions in the Canadian Senate will also be included, however, as 
noted earlier in this study, given the unelected nature of the Senate and the wide-
ranging brief of their responsibilities its ability to shape the foreign policy 
narrative is considerably more limited than the Parliament. Indeed, it should be 
noted that while relevant Senate contributions are added in this chapter, 
Canadian Senators rarely override the House of Commons given that they are 
unelected. Moreover, given that the Senate meets more regularly, debates tend to 
be more piecemeal rather than substantive sessions and are rarely covered by the 
media or heard by the public. Additionally, Part I of this chapter will also 
incorporate the debate over Canada’s involvement in the Iraq War as a way to 
examine how the middle power narrative is interrelated with Canada’s military 
foreign policy.  
In examining these parliamentary debates, each party’s contribution on 
Afghanistan and Libya will be scrutinised in order to examine how language is 
used to express MPs views on Canada’s conduct vis-à-vis its previous 
international behaviour. Given the intepretivist nature of this study, through each 
debate the researcher is aiming to uncover the presence, either explicit or 
otherwise, of the middle power foreign policy narrative. Additionally, this 
language will also elucidate the roles that policymakers articulate and as such, 
inform Canada’s international behaviour. While undertaking these analyses, it is 
important to recall as outlined in Chapter 2, that the middle power narrative is 
complex in that it occupies a fluid space in that it can act as both a role and a 
narrative simultaneously.  
This chapter will also examine the language of key policymakers, 
namely, the Prime Minister and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence 
respectively. In order to do so, this analysis encompasses three governments, 
namely, that of Liberal Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) and Paul 																																																								
5 Glenn Palmer, Tamar London and Patrick Regan, “What’s Stopping You?: The Sources of 
Political Constraints on International Conflict Behaviour in Parliamentary Democracies,” 
International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations, Vol. 
30, No. 1 (Jan-Mar. 2004), 1-24. This article offers an empirical examination of the constraints 
on conflict and suggests that minority governments have a lower likelihood of involvement in a 
militarised dispute. See also, Kaare Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule, (Cambridge: 




Martin (minority government 2004-2006) and Conservative Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper (minority 2006-2008, minority 2008-2011). It must also be noted 
that some domestic political shifts took place during this time, namely the merger 
of the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservative party in 2003. 
Additionally, with elections in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011 there is some electoral 
volatility and clear shifts between the different parties. Finally, it is important to 
remember that every individual’s recounting of Canadian foreign policy narrative 
is also formed by his or her own, unique experiences. However, given a wide 
enough sample it is possible to extrapolate that in their position as elites, MPs 
have greater influence over the articulation of these narratives.6  
There are a number of challenges contained in this exercise. This is 
inherently subjective as the value of MPs’ contributions to these debates are not 
always proportional to the amount of time spent debating. In this circumstance it 
is a balance between quality and quantity, however, given the interpretivist and 
hermeneutic approach this study is seeking to draw out a foreign policy narrative 
from language.7 As noted previously, this study uses a hermeneutic approach to 
examine the context and the continuity of actions without assuming that the 
observations are reducible to scientific principles or laws.8 In this regard, it must 
be acknowledged that this type of examination does not provide a quantitative 
analysis of what constitutes national narratives. Specifically, the use of language 
in the debates is often contextual depending on the party, or in some cases the 
individual’s stance on the operation in question. This chapter will break down the 
contributions by party and aim to draw together commonalities between these 
interpretations as well as highlight how each government aims to direct the 
foreign policy narrative related to these operations to reflect its own 																																																								
6 In line with what is outlined in the introduction, this paper regards MPs as ‘elites’ given their 
position as national policymakers. As noted; Susan A. Ostrander, “Surely You’re Not in This Just 
to Be Helpful: Access, Rapport and Interviews in Three Studies of Elites,” Studying Elites Using 
Qualitative Methods, Rosanna Hertz and Jonathan B. Imber, Eds., Sage Focus Edition, (London: 
Sage, 1995). 
7 As noted previously, this means that there is a degree of ambiguity in the interpretation of the 
language examined. See Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, “Hermeneutics and Critical Hermeneutics: 
Exploring Possibilities Within the Art of Interpretation,” Forum: Qualitative Social Research 
Sozialforschung, Vol. 7, No. 3, Art. 19 (May 2006) http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/145/319, accessed 20 November 2014. 





interpretation.  This is done to help establish both the context of each debate as 
well as highlight a progression from each debate to the next. This offers an 
opportunity to distinguish between the different governments and examine a 
broad progression and a finer grained analysis as to how the foreign policy 
debates become distanced from traditional middle power characteristics. Rather 
than attempting to analyse ten years of debates in one large section, one can 
instead see more detail related to each debate. Each party’s contribution to the 
debate is ordered in terms of subjective importance to the broader narrative 
discussion as well as the relevance of the contribution to the debate. Particular 
attention is given to how MPs refer to tradition and the context in which it is 
invoked.  Similarly, it will look at how MPs draw on values and interests in 
relation to Canada’s participation in Afghanistan and Libya. When taken 
together, these elements will highlight the importance of narrative in constructing 
and shaping foreign policy. Fundamentally, this overview of the key debates will 
help to highlight some of the important narrative elements which shape Canada’s 
actions when it comes to participation in NATO actions.   
Narratives in the Canadian Parliament and Links to Role Theory 
There has been some work done examining the various narratives surrounding 
Canada’s participation in the Afghanistan mission, of note Jens Ringsmose and 
Berit Kaja Børgesen’s comparative examination of strategic narratives 
surrounding the deployment of NATO in Afghanistan and Heiki Hartig and 
Smaro Kamboureli’s work on the peacekeeping narrative in the cultural 
imagination.9 Perhaps, most pertinent for this chapter, Jean-Christophe Boucher 
conducted a discourse analysis of the successive federal governments’ attempts 
to sell the Afghanistan mission to the Canadian public through the analysis of 
101 speeches by prime ministers, ministers of national defence, and ministers of 
foreign affairs and international trade.10 Boucher concludes that ultimately, 																																																								
9 Jens Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgesen, “Shaping Public Attitudes Towards the Deployment 
of Military Power: NATO, Afghanistan and the Use of Strategic Narratives,” European Security, 
Vol. 20, No. 4 (2011), 505-528; Heiki Harting and Smaro Kamboureli, “Introduction: Discourses 
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Toronto Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Spring 2009), 659-686. 
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narratives about participation in Afghanistan were confused between the 
different governments between 2001 and 2008 and as such, offered no coherent 
justification to the public.11 His analysis, while examining competing narratives, 
does not effectively bridge the gap between narrative and action. Nonetheless, 
building on his work it is possible to develop this further by examining the roles 
that flow from the different interpretations of Canada’s middle power narrative. 
Boucher offers an interesting method of categorising the ways in which different 
narratives are emphasised by different Canadian governments between 2001 and 
2008. He breaks these down along three lines, ‘us, them and we:’ narratives 
which are self-referential focusing on Canadian values and interests, narratives 
focusing on altruistic motives and finally narratives focusing on the international 
community.12 While Boucher separates these three components in his analysis, 
given what this study has explored already it is possible to view these as all as 
constitutive elements of the Self. As noted already however, this study is not 
dealing with a national Self but rather the policymaker’s interpretation of what 
that national narrative is. In referencing these different components, ultimately 
Boucher recognises that policymakers are nonetheless distinguishing Canadian 
narratives about action in Afghanistan and Libya in relation to how they relate to 
their own understandings of the Canadian foreign policy narrative.  
As noted previously it is necessary to acknowledge that the concept of a 
national Self remains somewhat problematic, namely the distinctions between a 
Self and a collective identity. However, as noted earlier, this study will instead 
look at the dominant narrative which informs a broader identity without ascribing 
a singular one to Canada. Indeed, the same anxieties, which arise from the 
tensions between Self and Other, are present within Canada, thus making 
satisfactory Canadian, or indeed state-level, identity generation a deeply 
challenging issue.13 Indeed, this study is fundamentally concerned with the 
policymaker and as such, the Self remains a vital element of this model. This 
study does not discard the Self’s centrality, but rather examines internal, 
contested and dominant narratives which constitute broader Self identities at the 																																																								
11 Ibid, 730. 
12 Ibid, 721. 




personal level which are manifest in the middle power concept. As noted already, 
deeper examination of a specific narrative requires that the focus must be on the 
individual’s conception of that state, rather than the state itself. This study 
focuses on the individual level as a way of examining these narratives, however, 
rather than ascribe a unitary state Self, it views the expression of a role as a 
reflection of the interpreted narrative articulated by policymakers. Role Theory 
thus helps to establish a stronger link between narrative and action by 
simplifying these narratives and helps make sense of the multiple Selves 
articulated by policymakers and state action.  
As explored in the previous chapter Brent Steele’s examination of 
ontological security provides a way in which it is possible to assess the different 
individual motivations which drive specific foreign policy behaviours; honour, 
humanitarian and moral.14 As noted in Chapter 1, Steele applies these to the 
state-level in order to understand how ontological security and narratives of self-
identity shape IR. However, as a research area this remains problematic.15 This 
chapter examines how Steele’s motivations link with the middle power narrative 
through Role Theory as a way of examining how these inform foreign policy 
behaviours. As noted in Chapter 1, some components of the ontological security 
research agenda have a clear resonance with the constructivist FPA approach 
undertaken in this study, as it is fundamentally concerned with the individual. 
Building on Steele’s elements it can use these motivations to categorise the ways 
in which different governments understood Canada’s foreign policy narrative. In 
distilling the language and the various interpretations of Canadian foreign policy 
history, the analysis of Canadian Parliamentary Debates on Afghanistan and 
Libya provides a window into the contested interpretations of the foreign policy 
narrative which ultimately informed Canada’s decision to participate in these two 
operations. Similarly, these also highlight that while Canada’s immediate 
physical security may not have been at stake, other motivations proved just as 
compelling. Steele builds on the work of Reinhold Niebuhr and Max Weber on 																																																								
14 Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2008), 
49. 
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the individual self to reconcile the moral, humanitarian and honour-driven 
motivations as critically important elements related to a state’s narrative that can 
shape or possibly threaten self-identity.16 It is in this way that emotions such as 
fear and shame also come into play when discussing the relationship between 
narratives and behaviour.17 Thus in analysing the debates over the Afghanistan 
and Libya operations, it is important to recognise how much these emotional 
factors shape policymakers’ narratives about state action.   
In particular, in examining these different motivations it is necessary to 
understand how they inform differing roles. In discussing honour, Steele 
suggests that “the honourable is enacted when performing an action which fulfils 
a commitment about what ‘we’ have been, who we are now and, who or what we 
wish to be in the future.”18 In doing this it establishes how an honourable 
motivation, thus articulates a role which supports this honourable end. With 
regards to humanitarian action, Steele’s explanation is more complex but remains 
founded on shame, in particular, retrospective shame in which individuals look 
back on actions (or inaction) which do not align with our perception of 
ourselves.19 This helps to understand roles rooted in humanitarian motivations as 
it suggests that policymakers are driven to align their state’s behaviour with 
actions that reflect their perception of the state and avoid shame.20 Moral 
motivations are also intertwined with the humanitarian and are also derived in 
part from shame, however, when examining issues of International Relations 
there is a strong tension between moral action (what is right) and self-
preservation (selfish action).21 Moreover, there is an anxiety over whether the 
actions undertaken in foreign policy can be reconciled with the broader 
conceptions of morality held by the individual policymaker.22 This study 
distinguishes these morally defined roles as ones that are articulated in clear 																																																								
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terms of right and wrong with less of a concern over how these actions are 
perceived by others. Instead policymakers articulating these roles are more 
concerned with how these actions fulfill and reflect their own internally held 
ideas about who they are and the principles for which they stand.  
Building on these elements, one can see that MPs, in part, articulate the 
state’s internal conception of itself and its associated roles forming a component 
in the creation of foreign policy preferences. Some work has been done analysing 
Parliamentary speeches in order to try and identify National Role Conceptions 
(NRC); of note, is Marijke Breuning’s examination of foreign assistance rhetoric 
and behaviour though it sought to quantify how these contested roles emerge.23 
Kai Opperman has also examined the way in which a changing NRC can affect 
the interactions with other nations and thus change expectations of international 
behaviour.24 Along similar lines is Amy Catinlac’s article examining the 
Japanese government’s responses to the Gulf Wars in 1991 and 2003 and how 
these resulted in different foreign policy outcomes.25 From these previous 
analyses it is possible to establish an important link between narratives and roles 
and how these shape interactions. Indeed, as Jennifer Mitzen established when 
writing about ontological security, role identity is a vital part of foreign policy as 
“[r]ole identities are formed and sustained relationally; they depend on others to 
be realized.”26 Building on this, Roland Paris has also attempted to use Role 
Theory to explore Canadian foreign policy examining the relationship between 
public opinion and foreign policy under the Harper government.27 Paris focuses 
his attention on how narratives about national roles are viewed by the Canadian 
public rather than by policymakers. This points to the importance of the 
articulation of these roles by policymakers, both in the House of Commons as 																																																								
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well as in the Senate and their relationship with foreign policy narratives. 
Through careful readings of the key debates over Canada’s foreign policy related 
to the Afghanistan and Libya operations by MPs it is possible to identify the 
crucial language relevant to this study. While Lisbeth Aggestam focuses more 
broadly on national identity, she notes that,  
[f]oreign policy speeches often reveal subjective we-feelings of a 
cultural group that are related to specific customs, institutions, 
territory, myths, and rituals. These expressions of identity indicate 
how foreign policy-makers view past history, the present, and the 
future political choices they face.28  
Aggestam’s point is applicable in the case of narratives as these direct the ways 
in which foreign policy is publicly articulated and thus conform to roles. By 
looking at the language used by MPs in debating Canada’s foreign policy in 
Afghanistan and Libya it is possible to see how narratives surrounding Canada’s 
past behaviour inform the creation of new policies and the pressures that these 
exert on future operations.29  
This also helps us to situate the Role Theory component of this analysis 
and helps to establish that in essence, NRCs are not entities in their own right but 
rather the product of individuals. In contesting these different NRCs, 
policymakers are more broadly negotiating and renegotiating their own visions 
of a country’s narrative in order to make sense of their actions.30 Using this as a 
foundation, this chapter will seek to establish competing interpretations of the 
middle power narrative expressed in Canadian Parliamentary Debates on 
Afghanistan and Libya as a way to establish how the roles articulated ultimately 
shape and define foreign policy behaviour. This study seeks to build on this 
further using a number of interviews from NATO headquarters to help 																																																								
28 Lisbeth Aggestam, “Role Conceptions and the Politics of Foreign Policy,” ARENA Working 
Paper, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1999), http://www.deutsche-
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understand how the middle power narrative articulated in the parliamentary 
debate manifests in policymaking behaviour.  
Ultimately, it is the expression of how the understanding of the middle 
power narrative and attendant roles, relate to state actions that most concerns this 
study. As such, it is not vital to find explicit mention in the Parliamentary 
Debates of the words middle power in relation to Canada, but rather, the 
objective of this chapter is to identify and draw out the narratives which inform 
and shape the roles and by extension, the course of action policymakers envision 
for Canada; what Lisbeth Aggestam suggests is a ‘role set.’31 It is necessary to 
distinguish between the different kinds of roles that are articulated, namely what 
kinds of behaviours do they express; do they reflect the preferences of the 
policymaker? Or, are they rooted in capability-focused considerations? In 
examining which is privileged here, one can gain insight into the relationship 
between narratives and behaviour. Moreover, as Trine Flockhart suggests, these 
‘role sets’ constitute, “a collection of specific functional tasks that are perceived 
to be in keeping with, and supportive of, the self-identity.”32 Thus each 
interpretation of a narrative carries with it a set of attendant behaviours, i.e. a 
policymaker who sees a country’s foreign policy narrative as primarily 
humanitarian expresses a desire to see more development work along with the 
associated development programmes. Additionally, it is important to distinguish 
how different roles interact and thus affect policy. Michael Barnett offers an 
interesting distinction here suggesting that “when examining how roles affect 
state behaviour, and particularly so for preference roles, the state’s understanding 
of and the meaning it attaches to its role must be incorporated.”33 While Barnett 
remains concerned with the state level of action, this conceit can be adapted in 
order to examine the roles articulated by policymakers. In doing so, this provides 																																																								
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some insight into how policymakers regard the Canadian foreign policy 
narrative, through the language they use, both in terms of actions and also how 
they regard Canada’s position in the international system. Barnett also 
differentiates roles in terms of preference roles and position roles, each of which 
has a different effect on policymaking options; preference roles are more flexible 
if unstable while position roles are more restrictive and less interpretive.34 Given 
the prevalence of the middle power narrative in Canadian scholarship and in the 
formation of foreign policy, this potentially has ramifications for policymaking. 
Indeed, in articulating what appears to be an overt position role, this arguably 
limits the formulation of foreign policy options. Going beyond this, the following 
analysis will aim to identify how these roles and narratives are linked and how 
this is connected to Mintz and Kreps’ hypotheses explored in the introductory 
chapter. Specifically, Mintz suggests that the ‘essence of decision’ lies in 
domestic politics, specifically; leaders will not take foreign policy decisions 
which pose a high political cost.35 This study builds on this with Sarah Kreps’ 
suggestion that elites, as they related to Canada and the Afghanistan mission, 
were insulated from political costs related to participation in the mission due to 
consensus between major parties over the issue.36  
There is an important interaction between the leadership, in this case the 
various Prime Ministers, their Cabinets and the Parliament, the dynamics 
between which, while important do not necessarily give insight into foreign 
policy narratives.37 Instead, this chapter examines the ways in which the different 
political parties describe competing interpretations of the middle power narrative 
in relation to Canada’s previous foreign policy behaviours. While it is already 
clear what the foreign policy behaviours were, this study is more concerned with 
understanding the narratives driving Canadian involvement in Afghanistan and 																																																								
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Libya. Fundamentally, this helps to interpret the reflexive process between the 
policymakers and how they assign meaning to the foreign policy narrative.38 
Similarly, this also gives some additional clarity to the process of foreign policy 
change.39  
Taken altogether, it is possible to assess how the middle power narrative 
ultimately provides an understanding as to how certain preferences are formed 
through the exploration of narratives and roles. As outlined previously in this 
study, these narratives when drawn together feed into the perception of Canada 
as a middle power and during parliamentary debate this lens is created through 
the invocation of this narrative. It is important to note that in the case of each 
operation, both debates on these operations begin prior to their integration into 
the NATO command structure. As will be demonstrated, this is important to the 
concept of multilateralism and its relationship to narratives around Canada’s 
international behaviour. Nonetheless, the bulk of each operation takes place 
within this structure and the process of policymaking at the systemic level also 
provides an opportunity to assess the impact of the middle power narrative.  
This chapter will start with the parliamentary debate following the attacks 
on September 11, 2001 and follow through to debates nearing the conclusion of 
the Libya air campaign in October 2011. It will then incorporate interview 
material taken from discussions with Canadian policymakers in NATO between 
2012 and 2014. These policymakers represent the link between foreign policy 
narratives and behaviour and moreover, are the ones who are affected by 
differing interpretations of the foreign policy narrative. This also helps in 
triangulating the effects of changing foreign policy narratives and how this 
shapes related behaviours. As Canadian foreign policy changed between the 
Liberal and Conservative governments, there were clear consequences for 																																																								
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Canada’s role in NATO as well as how Canada’s allies reacted. In speaking with 
Canadians in NATO it is clearer how this behaviour manifests itself out of 
Canada’s changing foreign policy narrative. 
Part I: Parliamentary Debates 
September 17, 2001 - House of Commons Debate, 9/11 and Afghanistan  
This initial debate saw all the parties united in their desire for a response to the 
9/11 attacks. Canada played an important role in NATO’s invocation of Article 
V of the North Atlantic Treaty and as such, was binding on members of the 
Alliance to respond to any act of aggression against a fellow member. The long, 
wide-ranging debate covered many of Canada’s security concerns as well as 
information about the immediate responses the government was undertaking 
against terrorism. Most of the remarks made in the House of Commons 
expressed the shock, sadness and outrage at the attacks as well as a significant 
amount of reflection on both security practices but also on the open, democratic 
societies that had been violated. Fundamentally, there was not as much of a 
conflict in the House of Commons over narrative due to the immediacy of the 
attack. Nonetheless, 9/11 represented a serious disruption of the international 
routines which had governed foreign policy behaviour for the decade prior and 
set in motion a dynamic process which would alter Canada’s foreign policy 
behaviour and reshape its relationship with NATO.  
Liberal Party 
As discussed previously, the Liberal Party of Canada has a strong association 
with many of the policies associated with the middle power narrative. Indeed, the 
leadership of Prime Minister Lester Pearson helped to define many of the central 
tenets of the middle power narrative. Following governments took up the 
hallmarks of this foreign policy, though whether this authentically reflects a 
universal attribute of Canadian foreign policy remains disputed.40 Nonetheless, 
this narrative ostensibly continued through to the government of Prime Minister 
Jean Chrétien under the custodianship of Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. As 																																																								




noted previously, Axworthy sought to further underline many of the core 
components of a distinct, Liberal, Canadian foreign policy.41 As it relates to 
Canada’s initial involvement in Afghanistan the parliamentary debate in 
September 2001 reflected the Liberal Party’s inherent ownership of the 
peacekeeping narrative with then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien noting, 
“Canadians do not dwell often on thoughts of war. We are thankful for having 
enjoyed a long season of peace. When we consider our role in the world, we are 
more likely to think of Canadians keeping peace than waging war.”42 
Nonetheless, during the course of the debate, Foreign Minister John Manley was 
very clear that whilst rooted in values and principle43 Canada’s foreign policy 
and international actions would need to respond through multilateral avenues to 
the action of 9/11.44 Similarly, then-Minister of National Defence Art Eggleton 
also highlighted Canada’s commitment to NATO Allies.45 
Canadian Alliance (CA) 
As the official opposition, the CA while supportive of the Liberal government’s 
response also had some criticism of government policy. Indeed, MP Brian 
Pallister suggested Canada was on the sidelines due to years of defence cuts and 
that the lack of capability had eroded its global reputation.46 Party leader 
Stockwell Day noted that this was “a genuine war…which can only be won, as 
Sir Winston Churchill said of another long struggle, with blood, toil and tears.”47 
He also noted that Canadians were more likely to view Canada’s role in the 
world as keeping peace than waging war.48 Nonetheless, CA MPs were keen to 
press the government on a lack of defence spending and security infrastructure.49 
Progressive Conservatives (PC) 																																																								
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Leader of the PC Party, Joe Clark, stated that, “Canada’s role in the world has 
been to ensure that freedom and order prevail and prevail together…We have 
earned a reputation as a nation that stands on the frontline of defending and 
advancing free societies.”50 Other PC MPs also urged extra funding for the 
military, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Secret 
Intelligence Services.51  
New Democratic Party (NDP) 
Leader of the NDP Alexa McDonough counseled a search for a peaceful solution 
and invoked the memory of Lester Pearson.52  Additionally, she also advocated 
an independent Canadian foreign policy based on multilateralism and not 
overshadowed or directed by the United States.53 MP Bill Blaikie also 
emphasised the importance of international law and wanted to ensure that 
Canada was respecting its international commitments.54 Similar to this MP Svend 
Robinson noted that a multilateral response, not just in the framework of NATO, 
but more generally must be committed to international law.55   
Bloc Québécois (BQ) 
Leader of the BQ, Gilles Duceppe, stated that “we are the defenders of freedom 
and democracy. This fact must remain at the heart of all our concerns.”56 
Duceppe went on to warn that NATO’s Article V was not carte blanche and that 
this shouldn’t turn into a civilisational or religious war.57 There was a push for a 
responsible decision about future action not motivated by vengeance.58 
Moreover, MP Paul Crête also invoked the memory of Lester Pearson and urged 
the government to take inspiration from its past actions.59  
Analysis 																																																								
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As noted, in this first debate there is a frequent repetition of themes both 
condemning the attacks of 9/11 and supporting an internationally coordinated 
response. In examining Afghanistan’s effect on Canadian foreign policy it is 
important to see the conflict both as triggering and enabling a disruption with 
Canada’s previous foreign policy narrative. It is no understatement to 
characterise the attacks as triggering anxiety at a fundamental level amongst 
policymakers.60 When confronted with such a radical and catastrophic 
disjuncture, policymakers thus fall back on routines and pre-existing narratives 
as a way in which to understand and react to events. As such, in this first debate 
Lester Pearson’s legacy and Canada’s international reputation were invoked by 
policymakers across a number of parties indicating certain commonalities in the 
interpretation of Canada’s international role. This consistency was ensured 
through the articulation of Canada’s role as a guarantor of peace and stability, 
largely through the support of multilateral institutions.  
This connects with Steele’s articulation of honour, which refers to both 
internal and external drives to perform actions which reinforce an agent’s sense 
of who they are and what they stand for.61 It is possible to fundamentally 
distinguish this from the other motivations outlined by Steele – humanitarian and 
morality driven responses. Both of these remain rooted in shame, or as Steele 
suggests, “when agents of states express discursive remorse for something in 
their nation’s past.”62 While the case can also be made that there is a moral 
component to Canada’s immediate response to 9/11, it is important to recognise 
that honour has an intrinsic moral component which cannot entirely be 
disaggregated. Honour inherently contains a conception of right and wrong, thus 
the policymaker enacts an internal vision not only seeking to maintain standing 
and reputation, but also places a judgment upon the social actions of others in 
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relation to their interpretations of those actions.63 One can distinguish between 
the two in that morality emphasises the right and wrong of the actions 
themselves, though in large part, as Reinhold Niebuhr contends, it is up to the 
individual actor to assess whether the action undertaken is in the actor’s self-
interest and then judge those actions.64  Honour, however, is more relational (i.e. 
is concerned with standing, credibility and reputation) and thus concerned with 
one’s response to actions both internally and externally. 
This also builds on Barry O’Neill’s contention that honour is a crucial 
component in the maintenance of a sense of self which can require a violent 
response particularly when challenged.65 In relation to Role Theory as explored 
in the previous chapter, it is possible to see the articulation of a role preference 
by policymakers, one that is constructed out of a self-generated narrative.66 In 
this sense, self-generated refers to the sense that each policymaker largely draws 
on a number of preconceived or familiar narratives that are not inherently static, 
but as Catarina Kinnvall posited, constantly negotiated between actors.67 In this 
case, policymakers were driven to respond to 9/11 through a recognition that 
Canada should play a role in responding to the attacks, both out of kinship with 
the United States but also to send a message to other actors. In this way it both 
satisfied internal and external conceptions of honour allowing policymakers to 
feel that they were both responding to a crisis while also taking actions vis-à-vis 
Canada’s allies.  
Broadly speaking, there was little deviation in the various positions, 
though the CA were perhaps most vocal in seeking to push a harder line in the 
response to 9/11. Nonetheless, this first debate, despite the parties moderating 
their criticism and tone, evokes a particular narrative about Canadian foreign 																																																								
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policy that would continue to crop up throughout the next decade and sets the 
stage for a significant reinterpretation of the narrative of Canadian foreign 
policy. The narrative and the attendant roles that were articulated in the ensuing 
parliamentary debates provides a way in which to assess how the middle power 
narrative influenced the Canadian decision to take part in the Afghanistan 
campaign. Ultimately, the leadership of the Liberal Party agreed to deploy forces 
in support of the United States as a way of demonstrating solidarity and in 
particular demonstrated an honour-driven response to the attacks of September 
11th. This initial involvement of Canadian Special Forces in Afghanistan initiated 
a ten-year commitment to the conflict.  
Indeed, the war in Afghanistan forced the Liberal government to 
reinterpret its views of Canadian foreign policy and ultimately gave way to a new 
narrative emphasised by the Conservative government elected in 2006.   
January 28, 2002 - House of Commons Take Note Debate on Afghanistan 
This was one of the earliest opportunities for the House to discuss at length, 
Canada’s involvement in the Afghanistan operation. Canadian Forces had been 
committed as of October 2001 and had been operating in theatre. A number of 
MPs were not comfortable with the deployment of combat troops without debate 
or the consent of Parliament. All parties referenced Canada’s peacekeeping 
tradition though with slightly different interpretations as to the narratives 
relevance to operations in Afghanistan. The release of images in a major national 
newspaper showing Canadian Special Forces transferring hooded and shackled 
detainees to US forces in theatre brought significant criticism from the BQ and 
the NDP against the Chrétien government concerning its and by extensions 
Canada’s commitment to human rights.68 Nonetheless, there were attempts by all 
the opposition parties to interrogate the Liberal Party approach to the conflict. 
Each party sought to convey the role it saw Canada playing in Afghanistan while 
also criticising the Liberal government who had overseen a decade of serious 
defence cuts to the Canadian military.  																																																								
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Defence Minister Art Eggleton was clear in his remarks that while it was a 
multinational operation, this was not a peacekeeping mission.69 He also noted 
that “Canada has earned the excellent reputation it enjoys throughout the world 
in large part because of our unwaivering[sic] respect for human rights and 
international law.”70 The debate became heated at points as the Minister was 
forced to defend the assessment of the Canadian Chief of Defence and the 
mission parameters in Afghanistan, particularly in relation to the operations of 
Canadian Special Forces unit, JTF-2.71 
Canadian Alliance  
A significant amount of the criticism by the CA centered on what they 
characterised as the Liberal government’s chronic underinvestment in the 
military.72 MP Brian Pallister noted that Canada was, “moving away from being 
a mid-Atlantic, multilateralist middle power into the realm of United States 
influence.”73 He went on to note the importance of peacekeeping in the Canadian 
popular consciousness and the changing nature of undertaking this type of task 
and urged the government to provide more resources to the relevant military 
components necessary to support this mission.74 
Progressive Conservatives (PCs) 
The PCs supported the criticisms of the CA in relation to the lack of spending.75   
BQ 
The BQ focused its criticisms on the treatment of prisoners, as it emerged that 
Canadian forces were handing over prisoners to the US with no guarantees about 
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respect for the Geneva Conventions.76 Additional concerns were raised about the 
lack of a vote on the mission given the US leadership and not under the UN.77 
Indeed, MP Antoine Dubé noted that “this supposed peacekeeping mission does 
not fall entirely within the tradition to which we have become accustomed under 
various Canadian governments, starting with Lester B. Pearson.”78 
NDP 
The NDP had previously been critical of a military intervention and leader Alexa 
McDonough stated that the party would support the mission only if it was under 
humanitarian and peacekeeping auspices with the UN in charge and after a 
House of Commons vote.79  
Analysis 
As a first real debate on Canada’s mission in Afghanistan a number of themes 
are articulated about Canadian behaviour. While the Liberal Party’s narrative 
about the conflict was largely subsumed by the defence of JTF-2 and prisoner 
transfer agreements, the wider narrative of the conflict concerned the duty to 
allies and Canada’s reputation. This interpretation links with the broader 
conceptions of honour as articulated in the aftermath of 9/11, namely, describing 
Canada’s contribution in terms of the esteem of others and by extension, 
satisfying a need for external honour.80 This, in and of itself, is not a huge 
departure from narrative about Canadian involvement overseas and indeed, there 
were serious concerns raised about the legitimacy of the mission and the role of 
the UN.81 There was also some hesitation about the extent to which the Canadian 
Forces’ could maintain respect for international law and the leadership of the 
United States. The detainee issue and the concern over human rights was a 
recurrent issue over the course of the Afghanistan operation and represented a 
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serious challenge for policymakers in defending the legitimacy of the mission.82 
This would come to colour both the Liberal and later other parties’ defence of the 
mission. Prime Minister Chrétien suggested that Canada’s deployment to Kabul 
nonetheless reflected its peacekeeping tradition and that the Martin government’s 
decision to deploy to Kandahar was ultimately misjudged.83 Indeed, 
peacekeeping and the legacy of Lester Pearson once more cast a long shadow 
over the conduct of Canadian foreign policy with differing views of how to 
interpret Canadian Forces’ actions in Afghanistan. At this stage, however, it was 
not entirely clear the scale to which Afghanistan would become such a major 
foreign policy priority for Canada.  
Nonetheless, in relation to the middle power narrative, it is possible to 
parse out slight variations in interpretation with the BQ and NDP articulating an 
idealised vision of Canada’s role; namely one with Canada as an upholder of 
international law and supporter of international regimes – fundamentally a more 
normative-related vision of foreign policy. Nonetheless, the characteristics of this 
narrative remain as core priorities in the foreign policy roles both parties 
articulated. As explored in Chapter 2, this vision of Canada was well entrenched 
though there were a number of critical views of this narrative.84 Interestingly, the 
NDP were the only ones to question, off the back of their interpretation of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative, whether Canada should be militarily involved 
in Afghanistan – a theme which characterised the NDP position throughout the 
operation. Nonetheless, the Liberal government’s response to 9/11 is firmly 
couched in a historical interpretation of its foreign policy by policymakers. As 
such, the honour-driven motivation for Canada’s participation in the mission was 
related to an interpretation of not only the right action, but also concerns over 
Canada’s standing, reputation and credibility towards its allies, particularly the 
United States.  
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At this time Canada’s Afghanistan mission did not yet fall under NATO 
purview and is not the most instructive in relation to Canada-NATO international 
narrative as it was instead, initially under the auspices of a US-led coalition of 
the willing. Nonetheless, NATO had invoked Article V of the North Atlantic 
Treaty and the UN had authorised international action in Afghanistan under 
resolutions 1368, 1378, 1383 and 1386. Despite a significant contribution and 
international authorisation most Canadian forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 
August of 2002 after a 6-month rotation. Indeed, then Chief of Defence Staff, 
General Ray Henault noted that Canada needed an operational pause to 
regenerate the forces from the operations in Afghanistan leading to the 
withdrawal of ground forces in 2002.85 From the peak of 845 Princess Patricia’s 
Canadian Light Infantry soldiers deployed to Kandahar airfield, Canadian forces 
did not return in any significant way until NATO took over command and 
coordination of the ISAF mission the following year.86 This initial entry into 
Afghanistan nonetheless set the stage for Canada’s later redeployment to Kabul 
and then on to Kandahar.  This signaled the beginning of the next decade of 
Canadian involvement in Afghanistan and would see the most extensive 
deployment of Canadian forces overseas since the Second World War.  
17 March 2003 – House of Commons Debate on Canadian Participation in the 
Invasion of Iraq 
Prior to the Canadian forces redeployment to Afghanistan under the ISAF aegis, 
the United States had made clear its intention to disarm Saddam Hussein and 
invade Iraq. Under the Chrétien government, the Canadian Parliament held an 
emergency debate on participation in the Iraq conflict. Participation in the war 
was widely opposed by the Canadian public, however, the government’s position 
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on the issue was not made clear until shortly before the invasion.87 As it related 
to the debate, a number of views from each party were expressed across a 
number of related topics. While this study does not go into great depth with 
regards to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the debate surrounding the invasion 
forms important context to the future discussions of Canada’s Afghanistan 
deployment. Similarly, it provides further clarity to Canada’s middle power 
hallmarks, namely Canada’s commitment to multilateral, legally founded 
international action. As such, it is possible to extract different interpretations of 
the foreign policy narrative from the statements made reflecting a narrative about 
Canada and its role in the world along with the importance of multilateral 
institutions. In the lead up to debate, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien noted that he 
saw Canada playing the role of ‘honest broker’ between members of the UN in 
securing a resolution on Iraq.88 Indeed, there are distinct, discernable views about 
Canada’s middle power narrative which illustrate its importance in parliamentary 
debate. By applying the lenses outlined earlier in this study this offers a check 
into how policymakers articulate roles in keeping with a narrative. As with the 
other segments of this chapter, this will break down along party lines.  
BQ 
Having initially called for the debate, members of the Bloc Québécois were very 
clear in their condemnation as to actions they regarded as “illegitimate or 
immoral, based on the criteria reflecting public opinion around the world.”89 
Indeed, the BQ was particular in its opposition to the conflict viewing the 
circumvention of the UN as illegal and called on the government to ensure there 
was no Canadian support for action. 90 
NDP 
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Similar to the BQ, the NDP was vocal in its opposition to the war in Iraq, both as 
an illegal action, but also in calling for a peace process.91 It was highly critical of 
the Liberal government’s attempts to broker a last minute settlement at the UN 
which might have legitimised US action.92 Along a similar line, the NDP 
robustly advocated for the protection of civilians and avoiding the use of 
depleted uranium weapons as well as cluster munitions and land mines.93  
CA 
The CA was much more forthright casting the conflict in terms of good and 
evil.94 The language used also suggested that joining the coalition in Iraq was in 
Canada’s interests, and failing both its allies and to share the burden of 
international action would diminish Canada’s role in the world.95 Indeed, 
remarks tended to focus on maintaining Canada’s credibility rather than 
expressly advocating Canadian military action in the Gulf.96 
PC 
Similar to the CA the PC focused on Canada’s role as a transatlantic bridge and 
by refusing to take part the Liberal government was damaging its reputation and 
ultimately rendering Canada irrelevant.97 Similarly, there is the view that the 
government had failed the UN and had squandered Canada’s ability to affect 
diplomatic change and by extension, these actions were against its national 
interest.98 
Liberal  
The Liberal party was very clear about its support for the United Nations and 
noted that traditionally, multilateralism had served Canadian values and 
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interests.99 Representatives were also clear in invoking Prime Minister Lester 
Pearson, the peacekeeping tradition and unique capabilities that Canada could 
offer in this regard.100 The party was keen to promote the narrative of Canada’s 
support for peace and security and the tradition of ‘soft diplomacy’ and the 
promotion of dialogue as a central value.101  
Analysis 
The Iraq debate remains unique in this study as it falls outside the general 
NATO-related purview. However, it remains valuable in its contextual 
relationship to other Canadian action taking place simultaneously in Afghanistan. 
Worthy of note, the debate was undercut by a charged strain of anti-American 
sentiment in the Canadian public and as such, rhetoric on this issue was often 
framed vis-à-vis the US.102 Given that it is concurrent with Canada’s action in 
Afghanistan and the Iraq debate’s proximity to the Afghanistan operations it 
provides a window into the Chrétien government’s attitude towards conflict post-
9/11. Thus in parsing the comments made during this debate it is possible to gain 
some additional clarity into the Afghanistan debates as well as the Libya debates 
which followed in 2011. Indeed, there are a few distinct views reflected between 
the different political parties throughout this debate. Members of both of the 
conservative parties (CA and PC) were keen to stress Canada’s traditional 
position as a loyal ally and oriented their discussion in terms of Canada’s 
national interest. Indeed, Stephen Harper and Stockwell Day had an editorial in 
the Wall Street Journal on 23 March noting that despite the government’s desire 
to stay out of the war, the CA supported the US stance against ‘evil.’103 As will 
become increasingly apparent, the conservative parties in Parliament sought to 
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describe much of Canada’s international action in moral terms, rather than the 
honour and humanitarian motivated language of the other parties.   
On the opposing side, the Liberal and BQ members sought to place 
Canada’s participation in differing terms, in this case, respect for the UN and 
international law and maintaining continuity with Canadian support for 
multilateralism and peacekeeping. This links back with some of the observations 
from the 17 September, 2001 debate and the themes resonate with the same 
parties. Both the BQ and Liberal Parties were clear during this debate about their 
views on the importance of the UN as a legal foundation for international action, 
overriding Canada’s closeness with the US. Similarly, the NDP members were 
far more unforgiving of the US disregard for the UN and invoked Canada’s 
traditional commitment to the organisation, urging a harsher response to US 
actions. Ultimately, these slightly divergent views reflect competing 
interpretations of Canada’s tradition in foreign policy but at the same time are 
not mutually exclusive of each other. There is a clear recognition by both sides 
with regards to Canada’s respect for international law and its role acting amongst 
nations, be that standing with allies or supporting international institutions. The 
Liberal government, defending its decision not to go to war stressed the narrative 
which arguably resonated best with the Canadian public. That being said, Canada 
was not completely uninvolved either; while expressing his disappointment in 
the government’s decision, then Ambassador Paul Cellucci noted that Canada 
was already providing more indirect support through its support of 
counterterrorist operations in the Persian Gulf (Combined Task Force 150), than 
most other coalition partners.104 In his examination of Canada-US relations, Paul 
Lennox observed that Canada’s contribution to these operations in the Persian 
Gulf/Arabian Sea made Canada the fourth largest contributor behind the US, UK 
and Australia.105 This is not to say that there were also not pragmatic 
considerations informing Canada’s decision not to participate. Indeed, as former 
PC Leader Joe Clark highlighted during the debate, “by sending our scant troops 
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to Afghanistan, we made it impossible to participate in any conflict in Iraq.”106 
Clark sought to use this as a criticism against a lack of government spending on 
defence but it pointed to practical considerations related to Canada’s role. 
Moreover, Clark’s criticism reflects the distinction between role preference and 
role position in that even if the Liberal government had articulated a role for 
Canada in Iraq, the capabilities to hand would have made deployment difficult.107 
That being said, in his memoirs, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stated that to 
support the invasion of Iraq on those grounds would have been “politically and 
intellectually dishonest.”108 Moreover, he noted that “[a]s a matter of principle, 
we didn’t approve of his actions because he hadn’t convinced the United Nations 
of the urgent need to invade Iraq.”109 
In expressing each party’s view, the MPs in this debate articulated their 
vision of Canada’s role(s) in the world and situated these within the context of 
Canada’s foreign policy tradition. Indeed, there is a strong pressure exerted by 
the weight of Canada’s historical choices, particularly when it comes to the UN 
and military coalition operations. This reflects Mintz’ assertion with regards to 
poliheuristics; namely that policymakers will discard unacceptable options and 
choose from those which maximise benefits and minimise risks.110 In practice, 
MPs seek to preserve their interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy narrative 
and as such, limit their policy options accordingly. Ostensibly, informed by 
practical capabilities as well as foreign policy narrative they articulate a role 
position (as opposed to a preference) which they envision best categorises and 
facilitates Canadian action internationally and, in turn, remains consistent with 
their understanding of its narrative.111 As noted earlier, the desire for consistency 
overrides or at least inhibits alternative options for action. Indeed, provoking a 
discontinuity with Canada’s foreign policy narrative would have potentially 
levied considerable electoral costs on the Liberal Party, not to mention the 																																																								
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additional costs in blood and treasure. On the opposing side of this, the 
conservative parties, particularly the CA articulated a stance in moral terms with 
its leader Stephen Harper decrying the “moral nihilism” of the Canadian Left 
following this debate on Iraq.112 In describing this conflict in Manichaean, good 
vs. evil, terms the CA thus renders foreign policy decisions moral and immoral, 
right and wrong. As a result they transcend simple national interest or Canadian 
aims and thus reduce their complexity. Placing foreign policy in moral terms also 
reduces nuance and thus presents a much narrower range of options.113 This 
approach is developed more fully once Stephen Harper is elected but already at 
this stage, it suggests that at its fundamental level, the interpretation of foreign 
policy by a policymaker, when described in terms such as morality, can take on 
significantly different characteristics and by extension, alter state behaviour. 
The Iraq debate also represents one of the last major foreign policy crises 
of the Liberal government under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. He resigned in 
November 2003 with leadership of the party then going to MP Paul Martin. 
Elections were called in early 2004, however, the Liberals only managed to 
capture minority control of the House of Commons. It was during Prime Minister 
Martin’s tenure that the decision to deploy Canadian troops to Kandahar was 
taken alongside a foreign policy review, the first in a decade. While the 
mechanics behind the decision to send soldiers to Kandahar had been set in 
motion years before, it was Paul Martin who ultimately authorised the 
deployment, though he saw it as an obligation he had to follow through on.114 
The decision to do so was taken at cabinet level and not debated in the House of 
Commons making it difficult to examine the individual motivations for doing so. 
Nonetheless, this process has been chronicled and this study is not as interested 																																																								
112 Stephen Harper, “Rediscovering the Right Agenda,” Christian Coalition International, June 
2003, found on http://www.cannabisculture.com/articles/4629.html as cited previously by Paul 
Wells, ‘Harper on Process vs. Policy,’ Maclean’s, 30 March 2011. 
113 This hearkens back to Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) in which the rational actor model notes that individuals 
prefer simplicity when considering foreign policy options. This adds credence with regards to 
Steele et al’s contention that ‘morality’ framed in terms of the national interest is rational; Brent 
J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2008), 38. 
114 Bill Schiller, “The Road to Kandahar,” Toronto Star, 8 September, 2006, 
http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2006/09/road-kandahar, accessed 20 February, 2014; Matthew 
Willis, “Canada in Regional Command South: Alliance Dynamics and National Imperatives,” 
Whitehall Papers, Vol. 77, No. 1, 49-67; Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected 




in the detailed mechanics of the Kandahar II deployment.115 Rather the focus is 
on the broader motivations behind the Afghanistan and Libya operations within 
the NATO framework and how these actions relate to the broader narrative of 
Canadian foreign policy. That said, one can still chart the dynamics of change 
within narrative of Canadian foreign policy between the Liberal governments as 
in the 2005 take note debate on Afghanistan.   
November 15, 2005 – House of Commons take note Debate on Afghanistan 
This was meant as a take note debate and an opportunity for other parties to raise 
their concerns or queries about the mission. This debate offers some glimpse into 
Canadian foreign policy during the brief tenure of Prime Minister Paul Martin 
who governed a minority Liberal government between 2004 and 2006 but also 
presided over a major expansion of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan into 
Kandahar. Notable by omission is the lack of any major discussion of 
Afghanistan in 2004, reflecting the Martin government’s prioritisation of other 
missions. Additionally, it also marks the appearance of the Conservative Party of 
Canada (CPC) created at the end of 2003 through the merger of the Canadian 
Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives. This party presented a serious 
challenge to the historic Liberal Party dominance of Parliament. 
Liberal Party 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Pettigrew, placed the mission in terms of the 
party’s international policy statement issued in 2004 as well as the country’s 
strategic interests.116 He also outlined the central elements of the ‘3D approach’ 
(Development, Diplomacy and Defence) and how these fit with Canada’s 
approach to the mission.117 Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham, was also 
keen to stress the multilateral nature of the mission, NATO’s role and UN 																																																								
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authorisation.118 Graham went on to elaborate that this mission was not 
peacekeeping in the traditional mode, but rather, a stabilisation effort.119 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, Keith Martin, 
sought to cast traditional peacekeeping as a “war by another name.”120 
Expanding on this, MP Larry Bagnell noted that peacekeeping was part of the 
three-block war method but that nonetheless, combat operations were necessary 
to allow aid organisations to operate.121 He was also very clear in casting the 
mission as in keeping with Canada’s previous contributions to peacekeeping 
around the world.122 Expanding on the softer side of the operation, MP Maria 
Minna noted that the mission would also ensure that “constitutional and human 
rights norms were implemented throughout the country.”123 It was also noted that 
the Liberal government had ensured that Responsibility to Protect was brought 
into the UN highlighted its importance as part of the government’s international 
policy statement.124  
Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) 
The CPC was very clear that this was not a peacekeeping mission but rather a 
combat mission. MP Gordon O’Connor sought to cast the mission as both a 
defence of Canada’s national interest and its values.125 Furthermore, O’Connor 
was clear that Canada had been provoked into the conflict and should embrace its 
combat role.126 While supportive of the mission, criticism focused on a lack of 
criteria for success as well as concerns over the adequate supplies to Canadian 
forces.127 Indeed the CPC was clear that this mission was separate from Canada’s 
previous peacekeeping missions and tried to establish that peacemaking was a 
different type of mission.128 Additionally, MP Stockwell Day reminded the 
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House that a Conservative government would provide consistent leadership on 
Responsibility to Protect regardless of the UN or intervening variables.129 
NDP 
The NDP was skeptical of the mission in Afghanistan and criticism focused on 
how this operation was not in keeping with Canada’s peacekeeping tradition and 
historic international roles despite the government’s efforts to portray it as 
such.130  MP Bill Blaikie also noted the importance of international norms that 
Canada had helped to establish and questioned whether Canadian actions in 
Afghanistan reflected national values.131 Indeed, Canada’s reputation was a 
central focus of the NDP’s concern and how Canadian forces were distinguishing 
themselves as opposed to their allies in theatre.132 
BQ 
The BQ voiced its support for the mission while acknowledging that it was not 
peacekeeping.133 MP Claude Bachand noted that while it was a stabilisation 
mission rather than a peacekeeping mission, the conflict remained legitimate in 
the eyes of the UN and NATO.134  
Analysis 
While this debate did not represent actual policy formulation it helps to illustrate 
some of the interpretations of the foreign policy narrative as conveyed by the 
different parties. The Liberal Party, governing as a minority, largely reflects the 
policies of the previous Liberal government. Nonetheless, the efforts made by the 
Liberal Party to link the mission in Afghanistan with the peacekeeping narrative 
that runs through Canadian foreign policy points towards a specific conception of 
a role founded in a particular interpretation of Canada’s wider foreign policy 
narrative. That being said, Adam Chapnick suggests that there is a distinctly 
more muscular approach to Canada’s role in Afghanistan, moving away from the 																																																								
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human security side of the spectrum.135 This was reflected in the Foreign Policy 
Review undertaken by the Martin government which was meant to raise Canada 
to a place of “pride and influence.”136 Indeed, Boucher’s observations regarding 
the Martin government noted that there was greater emphasis on Canadian 
“values,” though these remain ill-defined by the various governments.137 
Similarly, the deployment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to 
Kandahar reflected the mixed priorities of the Martin government seeking to 
combine the humanitarian and military components of its foreign policy.138 Paul 
Martin stated in his memoirs, that he felt Africa needed to be a priority in 
Canadian foreign policy, in particular Canada needed to exercise leadership in 
addressing Darfur.139 As a result, the Martin government in its short tenure 
sought to refocus Canadian foreign policy in such a way to address a number of 
issues.  
As explored in the previous chapter, during the early 2000s there was a 
strain of declinism or backlash against the Axworthy years in Canadian foreign 
policy literature. Indeed, as an example of this Denis Stairs had noted that 
Canada was increasingly complacent about its foreign policy emphasising words 
over action and that at a foundational level required a more critical 
interrogation.140 As Paul Martin suggested in his memoirs, “[e]ven if at one time 
there had been some truth in the idea of a middle power…it was looking 
increasingly dubious in an era where the Bush administration had adopted a 
‘with us or against us’ unilateralism.”141 As such, the Martin government’s 
foreign policy review gives greater clarity to the disjuncture with the previous 
Canadian foreign policy narrative. In the review, when discussing a Canadian 																																																								
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approach it aims to discard the middle power concept, noting that “[o]ur old 
middle power identity imposes an unnecessary ceiling on what we can do and be 
in the world.”142 The challenge then presented was identifying an alternative way 
of describing or identifying an alternative narrative or set of behaviours that 
resonated. This accounts for the tepid reception that the foreign policy review 
received in the press upon its release.143 Moreover, the 2005 foreign policy 
review only found limited purchase given the election of Stephen Harper and the 
Conservative Party of Canada in 2006 who had their own interpretation of 
Canada’s foreign policy priorities and as a result, discarded many of the review’s 
recommendations.   
Offering an alternative to the Liberal foreign policy narrative is the 
NDP’s interpretation of Canada’s historical role internationally which focuses 
much more on ‘soft’ aspects of diplomacy. Nonetheless members stress Canada’s 
peacekeeping heritage though with less criticism of the legitimacy due to the 
benediction offered by the UN and NATO. Outside of this exchange the CPC 
remained vocal on the importance of the military. The BQ also voiced reserved 
support for the mission as long as it was in keeping with traditional Canadian and 
Québécois values, focusing on multilateralism, UN legitimacy and shared effort. 
Ultimately, the decision to deploy to Kandahar had been undertaken by this 
point, though as the then (Canadian International Development Agency) CIDA 
head of aid and reconstruction in the region noted, the decision to deploy was 
taken with a minimum of consultation.144 Nonetheless, even if Kandahar was not 
a top priority, the Martin government oversaw a massive increase in defence 
spending, pledging $13 billion (CAD) over the next five years; a trend that was 
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ultimately taken up by the succeeding Conservative governments under Stephen 
Harper.145  
As noted previously, there are specific understandings about Canada’s 
role in the world revolving around multilateralism, UN legitimacy and an 
important peacekeeping tradition. Together, these components frequently factor 
heavily into MPs articulation of Canada’s foreign policy behaviour. As the 
Canadian Forces headed into the most challenging phase of the Afghanistan 
deployment how then does this align with Canada’s middle power narrative? 
Perhaps most evidently, after the Iraq debate, members of the CPC had attempted 
to position their party as the inheritors of Canada’s moral tradition in foreign 
policy. Interestingly, the Martin government showed that while it clearly sought 
to maintain a level of continuity with Canadian foreign policy, the shift towards a 
more robust military solution was evident. In this way it undercut CPC criticism 
that it was soft on defence while also reinforcing Canada’s military commitment 
to the Afghanistan mission. This arguably helped to offset the refusal to take part 
in Iraq, while further maintaining Canada’s commitments to its NATO Allies and 
maintaining continuity with its previous actions in Afghanistan for as others such 
as Andrew Richter, Joel Sokolsky and Joseph Jockel suggested were sentimental 
or intuitive reasons.146 Rather these emotional responses are linked back to 
policymakers’ interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy narrative.  
 In this circumstance, one can see that in continually debating and 
renegotiating the narrative of Canada’s international involvement in Parliament 
this induces change in the narrative itself as different individuals put forward 
their own interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy narrative. Although many of 
the same themes that were explored in Chapter 2 remain present, there is a clear 
attempt to try and break from the past government’s foreign policy, while still 
seeking to create a sense of continuity. Fundamentally, it is in the brief Martin 																																																								
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government that there is a serious reconsideration of foreign policy. Even though 
the foreign policy review may not have had the same impact as the 1995 Canada 
in the World review, it nonetheless opened the door for alternative interpretations 
of the Canadian foreign policy narrative to come to the fore. 
 April 10, 2006 - House of Commons Debate take note debate on Afghanistan   
While only a take note debate, this represented the new Conservative 
government’s first opportunity to discuss their vision of Canada’s mission in 
Afghanistan.  The debate provided a window into the narrative each party was 
seeking to articulate. Given that the Liberal Party had originally committed 
forces to Afghanistan and moved them south to Kandahar the debate focused less 
on whether Canada should take part in the mission, but rather, on the role CPC 
members thought Canada should play in it.  
Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) 
Following the amalgamated Conservative Party of Canada’s victory in the 2006 
election, the party quickly sought to establish its credentials on Afghanistan. In 
his remarks to the House of Commons, the new Defence Minister Gordon 
O’Connor, echoed by the new Foreign Minister, Peter MacKay, sought to 
establish the key tenets of the Party’s foreign policy on this operation. This is 
broadly termed the ‘Canada First’ approach and sought to elevate and guarantee 
Canadian interests abroad, in this case, by preventing terrorism overseas though 
it would not be fully articulated as policy until 2008.147 Despite this language of 
interests, his remarks centered mainly on maintaining Canada’s alliances abroad, 
humanitarianism and its responsibility to the international community.148 Indeed, 
Minister for International Cooperation, Josée Verner, characterised the 
government’s policy as one which would, “promote and defend the Canadian 
values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights.”149 Similarly, 																																																								
147 Gordon O’Connor, Minister of National Defence, House of Commons Debate, 39th Parl, 
1st Sess, Vol. 141, No. 6, (10 April 2006), 1815, pg. 275; All subsequent citations for this date are 
from this session unless otherwise noted. 
Peter MacKay, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2025, pg. 292; see Government of Canada, Canada 
First Defence Strategy, 2008, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-
strategy.page, accessed 13 October 2014. 
148 Gordon O’Connor, 1820, pg. 275. 




Peter Van Loan, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
explicitly stated this as “broadly defined national interest” and noted Canada’s 
position on the front lines was leadership and an obligation.150  
Party members also stressed Canada’s commitment to coalition 
operations and the country’s tradition of support for certain military actions.151 
Indeed, during this period Canada had reverted to Operation Enduring Freedom, 
outside of the NATO structure, though NATO was slated to take command of 
Southern Afghanistan operations in mid-2006. Critically however, there was a 
distinct effort to avoid casting this as a peacekeeping role with one member 
noting that, “[p]eacekeeping is a wonderful Canadian tradition that I suggest has 
gone the way of traditions; perhaps some day it will come back.”152 Nonetheless, 
the peacekeeping tradition was again invoked as a way to establish the 
Afghanistan operation as continuity within Canada’s foreign policy.153 
Liberal Party  
With the Liberal Party as the official opposition for the first time since 1993, 
party members were placed in the position of debating an operation that they 
themselves had implemented and supported. As such, debate between the CPC 
and Liberal Party tended to focus on minor interpretations of the Afghanistan 
mission between the two sides and often linked in with wider issues of interests 
versus values and mission priorities rather than whether the Afghanistan mission 
had merit.154 Indeed, interim leader of the opposition, Bill Graham, stressed a 
continued ‘Canadian’ approach to the mission.155 Elaborating on this, MP Ujjal 
Dosanjh noted that this comprised a 3D (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) 
approach with a commitment to reconstruction whilst also recognising that it was 
not a traditional peacekeeping mission in the post-Cold War mode.156 This was 
echoed by MP Michael Ignatieff who expressed that Canada’s role had changed 																																																								
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and moved away from peacekeeping, though with some reservations about 
unlimited, indefinite, counterinsurgency actions in Afghanistan.157 Nonetheless, 
the traditional peacekeeping narrative remains present with MP Irwin Cotler 
expressing the need for human security to underpin the core of Canada’s 
involvement in Afghanistan and in the wider international community.158 
Similarly, MP Robert Thibault noted that the reputation as peacekeepers needed 
to be preserved, despite the nature of the mission.159  
NDP 
The NDP expressed concern over the Afghanistan mission’s continued existence 
as part of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). NATO did not take 
command of the six southern provinces of Afghanistan until July 2006.160 As a 
result, the NDP were concerned about the extent of US influence over the 
Canadian contribution to the mission and the rules of engagement and 
maintenance of Canada’s peacekeeping traditions.161 Indeed, there was 
considerable concern that Canada would be operating under US rules of 
engagement as well as concern about the role in the broader counterinsurgency 
mission.162 The blending of military action with what the government touted as 
part of a 3D approach raised some concerns among members and who noted that 
this would potentially endanger those doing aid work.163 Similarly, there was 
serious concern over the transfer of detainees and prisoners to the US or Afghan 
government due to fear of abuse.164 
Bloc Québécois 
The BQ, while broadly supportive of the mission, also raised concerns over the 
use of land mines and the treatment of prisoners.165 Nonetheless, members of the 
BQ voiced their support for a comprehensive mission as part of a broader 																																																								
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international coalition, though with some frustration about the OEF command 
structure.166 
Analysis 
This debate is important in that it represents the CPC’s desire to both maintain 
continuity with Canadian foreign policy traditions while also attempting to 
articulate a distinct vision for Canadian foreign policy. It is in this debate that 
there is a clear attempt to break from what would be considered traditional 
Liberal foreign policy tropes like peacekeeping, while nonetheless attempting to 
promote an alternative interpretation of foreign policy tradition. Adam Chapnick 
suggests that this was due to a number of linked factors, specifically, 
“inexperience managing foreign relations invited greater emphasis on ideological 
thinking. And [the Conservatives’] suspicions of a bureaucracy that had been 
serving Liberal governments for 13 consecutive years made them hesitant to 
listen to public sector advice.” 167 Fundamentally, there was minimal variation 
between the positions of the Liberal Party and the CPC, which can be attributed 
to the articulation of a much clearer role position which had become present in 
Canadian foreign policy. This had emerged out of Canada’s continued presence 
in Afghanistan and a desire on the part of the previous Liberal minority 
government under Paul Martin to move away from the Chrétien legacy. Indeed, 
the personal animosity which existed between Paul Martin and his predecessor 
was well documented.168 David Bercuson, Jack Granatstein and Nancy Mackie 
suggest that on his election Martin sought to distance himself from Chrétien by 
de-prioritising the Afghanistan mission.169 While the Martin government 
implemented some structural changes to the conduct of Canadian foreign policy 
with the release of its foreign policy review, in practice it did not considerably 																																																								
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change the calculus in regards to Afghanistan. As Matthew Willis notes, at this 
point the wheels had been set in motion with regards to the Kandahar II 
deployment and though not inevitable, could not easily be derailed.170 The 
decision to deploy to Kandahar was undertaken by the Martin government, and 
was, in many ways in line with the position Canada was expected to play within 
NATO, though as one Senior NATO Operations official suggested, was arguably 
misjudged.171 This links into what Barnett observed about roles, “position roles 
better define and limit state behaviour, they are better able to standardize 
expectations, avoid misunderstandings, and increase stability.”172 Namely, 
Canadian policymakers acted in a way which was both predictable and in 
keeping with their conceived narrative about Canadian foreign policy while also 
fulfilling expectations amongst allies. The comparative rigidity of this role 
position helps to reconcile competing or alternative narratives and thus maintains 
a stable or routinised set of behaviours that helps to facilitate interactions with its 
NATO Allies.173 As noted earlier in this chapter, the middle power concept 
incorporates what can be seen as positional and preferential behaviours due to, as 
Paul Gecelovsky observed, the terminology’s ingrained and varied use in 
Canadian foreign policy discourse and literature.174 Thus the CPC in adopting a 
more militaristic tone could continue to claim continuity with Canada’s foreign 
policy traditions without triggering any serious discontinuity. Furthermore, as 
regards the Afghanistan mission, Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party of 
Canada later made it a foreign policy priority. As Duane Bratt observed, Stephen 
Harper’s first international trip as Prime Minister was to visit the Canadian 
Forces in Afghanistan and thus link himself in the eyes of the media and the 
public with the mission in Kandahar.175 Thus the groundwork was in place 
whereby the Conservative Party of Canada could emphasise its interpretation of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative whilst avoiding the need to make any 																																																								
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additional commitments to the Afghanistan mission. Not only does this balance 
the domestic considerations, it blunts the potential repercussions related to a 
disruption in the foreign policy narrative. Moreover, it also ensures that allies can 
expect a relative level of continuity in Canadian foreign policy interactions.  
 17 May 2006 - House of Commons Debate on Afghanistan mission extension 
In early 2006, the newly elected Conservative government called a debate to 
extend the mission in Afghanistan through until 2009. This proved to be 
somewhat controversial largely due to the short notice with which it occurred. 
MPs were given roughly 36 hours to prepare and the debate focused as much on 
the Parliamentary procedure as the actual policy. At this stage the mission was 
occurring as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) under the command of 
the US, though NATO ISAF was slated to take over responsibility for the 
Regional Command South RC(S). This also provoked some issues during the 
following debate due to inherent concerns over US leadership.176 Nonetheless, in 
discussing an extension to the mission MPs invoked foreign policy traditions 
which have been explored and noted already. Ultimately, the vote barely passed 
with 149 supporting to 145 against.  
CPC 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper led off this debate reminding MPs of their 
commitment to NATO and their allies and the broader multilateral effort.177 
While he invoked Canada’s tradition as a responsible member of the 
international community, he did not explicitly refer to peacekeeping.178 These 
sentiments were echoed by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter MacKay, who 
referenced the strong commitment to Canada’s allies as well as the defence and 
support of Canadian values in Afghanistan.179  Additionally, MacKay was very 
clear that this was not a traditional peacekeeping mission and military support 
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remained vital.180 In his remarks, Defence Minister, Gordon O’Connor, reminded 
MPs of the Conservatives policy of ‘Canada First’ in terms of national interest as 
well as Canada’s traditional role as a good ally.181 O’Connor also sought to cast 
this as a potential leadership role for Canada in theatre, with the possibility of 
creating a greater leadership role for Canada globally.182 Similarly, the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deepak Obhrai, noted 
that Canada’s participation in the mission ensured that there was an equal voice 
in NATO.183 Of interest as well, was the CPC aversion to using peacekeeping or 
drawing on the peacekeeping tradition. Indeed both the Minister for International 
Cooperation, Josée Verner and her Parliamentary Secretary, Ted Menzies, were 
very careful when discussing Canada’s development projects in Afghanistan and 
sought to link them clearly with the military-focused narrative promoted by the 
government.184 Indeed, even when mentioning Canada’s military presence in 
Cyprus as part of a peacekeeping mission, the term is not mentioned, but rather 
subordinated to the narrative of Canada as a staunch military ally.185  
Liberal Party 
As the official opposition the Liberal Party found itself in the position of again 
debating the government on the operation it had initiated. Interim leader Bill 
Graham noted that while the Liberals supported the mission, there were concerns 
over the open-ended nature of the commitment.186 MP Michael Ignatieff 
explicitly supported the extension, “because it is the moment where we have to 
test the shift from one paradigm, the peacekeeping paradigm, to a peace 
enforcement paradigm that combines military, reconstruction and humanitarian 
effort.”187 Nonetheless, there were still some questions related to this shift, as MP 
Bonnie Brown noted, that while participating in Afghanistan, Canada had only 
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59 personnel taking part in UN operations.188 Similarly, in discussing support for 
the mission, MP Stephen Owen noted that Canada’s contribution to the norms of 
humanitarian intervention were important elements informing the mission’s 
extension.189 MP Ruby Dhalla also invoked Canada’s tradition and reputation as 
a champion of human rights, in particular under Liberal leadership.190 
NDP 
The NDP raised concerns over the nature of the mission, specifically whether it 
would operate under OEF as a combat mission.191 Leader of the NDP, MP Jack 
Layton explicitly articulated Canada’s role as a middle power, specifically, “a 
country renowned for our pursuit of peace. We are a nation of facilitators, not 
occupiers. We are a people committed to the ideals of building bridges, not 
burning them down.”192 Layton further accused the government of diminishing 
Canada’s role as peacekeepers and undermining its ability to offer contributions 
to other missions around the world.193 Indeed, party members were clear on the 
ideas about Canada’s traditional role, specifically, MP Bill Siksay noted that, 
“[t]his is not how Canadians do peacekeeping” and that this is not the Canadian 
way to do development work.194  
BQ 
The BQ were clear that while they broadly supported the mission in Afghanistan, 
they were intent on extracting some concrete information about the mission 
extension.195 Duceppe was straightforward about a defined military role for 
Canada, particularly in relation to the mission’s peacekeeping angle.196 There 
were additional concerns that the blending of a humanitarian mission with a 
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military one would present serious challenges for both NGOs and for Canadian 
forces in theatre.197 
Analysis 
Taken altogether, this debate reflected two distinct sides to the Canadian 
narrative. The CPC was very clear about distancing itself from the previous 
Liberal governments’ emphasis on traditional roles such as peacekeeping, while 
nonetheless stressing the operation’s multilateral nature and consequent 
legitimacy. The emphasis on Canada’s military role and as a good ally represents 
a shift away from previous interpretations of the middle power narrative. 
Boucher noted that the rationale of Canada fulfilling its international obligations 
was particularly salient under the Harper government.198 While not a dramatic 
change from the previous Liberal government, it demonstrated a subtly differing 
view of the utility of military force to do what is right, rather than merely 
necessary to satisfy internal and external recognition. In this way it transitions 
from an honour-driven motivation towards a moral one.  
On the other side, the Liberals, the NDP and the BQ were all keen to 
emphasise the UN and Canada’s previous role as a peacekeeper and peace 
builder in conflict zones. The roles articulated here are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive but they do reflect competing conceptions of Canada’s traditions in 
foreign policy. Importantly, this debate casts the CPC in the role of defenders of 
Canada’s mission in Afghanistan whereas before the Liberals, the architects of 
Canada’s involvement in the mission, had borne the brunt of the criticism. As 
noted previously, the increasing tempo of operations in Afghanistan and the 
prioritisation of the conflict by the Harper government made this, to quote 
Michael Byers, “Stephen Harper’s war.”199 The CPC were clear not to denigrate 
Canada’s past participation in peacekeeping missions, nor were they keen to 																																																								
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characterise the Afghanistan mission as such, but rather this operation 
represented continuity in Canada’s military tradition stretching back to the First 
World War. Indeed, at the time of the debate Canadian Forces in Kandahar were 
involved with Operation Mountain Thrust, a major combat operation and the 
largest coalition operation since the beginning of the conflict in 2001, aimed at 
disrupting the Taliban throughout Southern Afghanistan.200 This also helps to 
explain the urgency of the debate as it is likely significant Canadian casualties 
during the operation might have condemned the mission extension altogether. 
Similarly, it also links to the CPC’s aversion to the peacekeeping narrative as its 
invocation ahead of major combat operations would have triggered a notable 
disjunction between the foreign policy action and the historical foreign policy 
narrative. This then suggests the pressure that narratives exert in the 
policymaking process. Moreover, other dynamics at play are visible, namely 
Mintz’s assertion that the ‘essence of decision’ lies in domestic politics.201 The 
CPC as a minority party needed Parliamentary support for the mission as a way 
to potentially mitigate fall out over Canadian casualties while also legitimising 
their narrative for the future mission in Afghanistan. Furthermore, in doing so, 
this helped to cement an elite consensus over the mission – namely it established 
that a (near) majority supported the mission and thus insulated the CPC 
somewhat from potential electoral costs.202  
Nonetheless, this highlights the importance of narratives for policymakers 
in that by undertaking behaviours which conflict with the dominant foreign 
policy narratives, there are potentially important electoral consequences. This is 
not to say that this debate was held in isolation and indeed, the full scale of the 
mission or the future casualties were still unclear. It should also be noted that 
from the beginning of 2006, Canada had only suffered 16 casualties in 
Afghanistan, eight of which had occurred since taking over the command of 																																																								
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Kandahar.203 In total, this represented only about 10% of the total casualties 
suffered to the end of 2011 and did not account for the increased tempo of 
operations associated with Operation Mountain Thrust and subsequent operations 
in the Afghanistan theatre.  
Taken together, it is possible to see the different interpretations of the 
foreign policy narrative offered by each side in this debate. The BQ and Liberal 
Parties were keen to stress the mission’s links with Canada’s peacekeeping and 
development traditions. The NDP was the most vocal about its opposition to a 
US-led combat operation instead seeing Canada’s traditional role as one focused 
on development and reconstruction. Nonetheless, the Harper government’s 
efforts to link the operation with previous conceptions of honour; standing with 
allies and honouring treaty commitments, highlighting the external (allies) and 
internal (values) forms of honour, were also promoted alongside the importance 
of doing the right thing. While ensuring continuity with previous justifications 
for the Afghanistan mission the CPC also laid the groundwork for a moral 
approach to foreign policy.204 This would take on greater importance as the 
mission wore on; additionally, there was some reference to humanitarian motives 
related to the development projects and PRT in Kandahar, though these were 
deemphasised in the 3D approach. Broadly speaking, the narrative espoused by 
the Harper government while still couched in moral language nonetheless sought 
to link the mission with Canada’s international standing within NATO and the 
broader international stage.  
19 April 2007 – House of Commons Debate to conclude Afghanistan combat 
mission in 2009 
Following the mission extension in 2006, the Liberal Party introduced a motion 
to conclude Canada’s combat mission in southern Afghanistan by the end of 
2009. This was done to provide a concrete end date to Canada’s combat mission 
amidst growing discontent in the House of Commons over the continuing 																																																								
203 iCasualties.org, “OEF: Afghanistan, Canada” http://icasualties.org/OEF/Fatalities.aspx.  
204 A number of academics have observed the “moral” characteristic of Harper’s foreign policy; 
see; Roland Paris, “Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public 
Opinion in the Harper Era,” International Journal, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Sep. 2014), 274-307; Adam 
Chapnick, “A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-2011,” 




operation and mounting casualties. While many MPs sympathised with the 
motion, the NDP ultimately sided with the CPC in defeating it. The CPC refused 
to support it on the grounds that placing an end date on the mission could signal 
weakness to allies and the Taliban while the NDP felt the motion did not go far 
enough and were keen on an immediate withdrawal. The motion failed and while 
the NDP introduced a motion a week later demanding the immediate withdrawal 
of Canada’s combat forces in southern Afghanistan the divisions between the 
parties meant that ultimately, Canada would stay in Regional Command South 
until the end of 2011. The analysis for both of these debates will be done 
together as a way to highlight how these different interpretations of the middle 
power narrative were utilised to justify each party’s approach to Canada’s 
foreign policy behaviour in Afghanistan.  
Liberal Party 
Members of the Liberal Party, whilst still supporting the mission sought to give a 
clear end date alongside greater clarity to Canada’s role, particularly with respect 
to development and ensuring Canada’s values were upheld.205 Newly chosen 
Liberal Party leader, Stéphane Dion, made it clear that the motion was about 
accountability and determining what exactly the government sought to achieve in 
Afghanistan.206 Indeed, the Liberal Party sought additional support from NATO 
Allies as well as a greater focus on the other ‘2Ds,’ diplomacy and 
development.207 Similarly, other members noted that Canada’s continued 
participation in military operations in southern Afghanistan precluded its 
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The NDP remained skeptical of the mission’s continuation and expressed its 
disappointment with the similarity between the Liberal and CPC viewpoints.209 
Additionally, members of the NDP began advocating for a change towards a 
peace mission with a negotiated solution.210  Further to this, MP Jack Layton 
noted that Canada’s continued participation in a combat mission undermined its 
ability to act according to “[its] own inherent and globally recognised skills at 
peacemaking, at developing negotiation and mediation and at bringing sides 
together.”211  
BQ 
The BQ voiced their support for a multilateral NATO mission with a UN 
mandate but nonetheless remained concerned over the combat focus of the 
mission.212 Furthermore, the BQ invoked Canada’s tradition as a peacekeeping 
nation as a counterpoint to the ‘American-style’ operation underway in 
Afghanistan and what the party perceived as undue US influence over Canada’s 
objectives in the country.213 Concerns were focused on mission creep and BQ 
representatives urged Canadian forces to focus on a humanitarian and 
peacekeeping role.214 
CPC 
The CPC was aggressive in its defence of the mission, going so far as to suggest 
that members opposite were “siding with the terrorists and the Taliban.”215 In 
invoking Canadian tradition Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for 
International Cooperation, Ted Menzies, was careful only to mention Canada’s 
participation in conflicts and the fight for democratic freedoms.216 Indeed, there 
was a careful effort to equate the mission in Afghanistan to Canada’s efforts in 																																																								
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the First and Second World Wars.217 Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of 
National Defence, Russ Heibert, went further and noted that not only was this 
action in Canada’s national interest, it was also necessary not to shirk its duty to 
its NATO Allies.218 The government suggested that Canadian participation in the 
Afghanistan operation and the successful completion of the mission was critical 
to maintaining the credibility of NATO.219  
April 26, 2007 - House of Commons Debate to conclude Afghanistan combat 
mission immediately 
Following the previous week’s debate on the Afghanistan mission, one can see 
that a number of issues arose in Parliament concerning Canada’s continued 
participation in the mission. In this discussion, the NDP, led by MP Jack Layton 
introduced a motion to immediately withdraw Canadian forces from the counter-
insurgency mission in Afghanistan. The motion stated that counter-insurgency 
was not the right mission for Canada but rather, the mission should be focused on 
reconstruction and development. The motion followed a Liberal motion put 
forward on 19 April that would have continued the combat mission through to 
2009 with Canadian forces transitioning to a different, non-combat role. This 
motion, while similar, dictated an immediate end to Canada’s participation in 
combat operations but was defeated in the ensuing vote.  
NDP 
Layton warned that the combat mission did not fit with Canada’s traditions and 
sought to move towards reconstruction, development and peace negotiations.220 
Indeed, Layton was opposed to an open-ended mission and saw a role for Canada 
as a mediator and leader in creating a ceasefire and initiating peace negotiations 
with the Taliban.221 MP Bill Siksay stated that Canadians were heavily invested 
in the idea of Canada playing a peacekeeping role and had specialised expertise 
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and experience in that type of operation.222 Echoing this, MP Dawn Black stated 
that Canada’s role in Afghanistan was a break with the history of Canada’s 
foreign policy noting that, “Canada invented peacekeeping and peacemaking.”223 
Other MPs such as Peggy Nash suggested that Canada’s sacrifice was 
disproportionate and that Canada had moved away from its peacekeeping 
tradition.224 The NDP sought to articulate a specific role for Canada, namely as 
“a leader for strategic diplomacy, international law, reversing the arms race, 
conflict prevention and eradicating world poverty.”225  
CPC 
The CPC noted that the NDP’s policies would break Canada’s UN and NATO 
obligations and ultimately undermine Canadian values.226 Indeed, they stated that 
defecting from a NATO and UN mandated mission would deeply affect 
Canada’s credibility.227 MP Pierre Lemieux aimed to link the mission in 
Afghanistan to Canada’s national interest and its tradition of helping others.228 
Similarly, to rebut the accusation of an overly militaristic operation, there were 
efforts to recast Canada’s role not as counterinsurgency but instead as 
stabilisation. 229  
Liberal Party 
Members of the Liberal Party echoed some of the CPC criticisms stating that an 
immediate end to the operation would “break its word to Afghanistan, and to [its] 
NATO partners.”230 Liberal Party members emphasised the importance of burden 
sharing with NATO Allies and noted that full engagement in southern 
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Afghanistan meant engaging in combat operations and doing reconstruction work 
simultaneously.231  
BQ 
The BQ noted its support for the mission and the importance of NATO solidarity 
with some reservations, particularly with regards to burden sharing.232 MP 
Francine Lalonde explained this further stating that Canada should make clear its 
intention to withdraw from combat operations in southern Afghanistan with other 
NATO nations taking over responsibility.233 Furthermore, MP Vivan Barbot was 
clear that while not keen on a military operation the BQ would support an 
operation grounded in international law and conducted in conjunction with 
allies.234 
Analysis of both debates 
In these debates, many of the same issues were raised in both sessions. The NDP 
again demonstrated its view that Canada’s traditions support the adoption of a 
peacekeeping role in Afghanistan. These debates took place against the backdrop 
of Operation Achilles which saw ISAF and Afghan National Army forces 
undertake major operations in the Kandahar-Helmand area to dislodge the 
Taliban.235 Casualties had been in the Canadian news with the worst single-day 
loss of life for the Canadian forces in Afghanistan with six soldiers killed by an 
improvised explosive device and a further three soon thereafter.236 The steady 
stream of Canadian casualties since the renewal vote in 2006 attracted 
international media attention and reflected the increasingly conflicted narrative 
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about Canadian participation in the operation.237 In the first debate introduced by 
the Liberal Party, the aim was to curtail Canada’s mission and bring it back in 
line with a more humanitarian motivation, though this interpretation did not go 
far enough for the NDP members.  
Party members from both the Liberals and NDP invoked many of the key 
behavioural middle power peacekeeper attributes which, while they had popular 
resonance, arguably did not reflect the reality of the Afghanistan mission. 
Indeed, the move by the NDP to advocate for talks with the Taliban earned the 
late leader of the party, Jack Layton, the nickname ‘Taliban Jack’ from the 
political right.238 Fundamentally, the NDP were so driven by their interpretation 
of Canada’s foreign policy narrative that they could not accept a Liberal 
compromise motion regarding the Afghanistan mission. Members had a distinct 
focus on humanitarian behaviours which do not immediately mesh so neatly with 
motivations for state actions. In keeping with the broader framework, the NDP 
can be characterised as driven by shame over what members believed to be a 
disruption from its Canada’s foreign policy narrative. Namely, members of the 
NDP saw Canada’s foreign policy behaviour under the stewardship of both 
Liberal and CPC leadership as conflicting with their own internal narrative of 
how Canada should act internationally. Thus, they outline roles whose 
behaviours better conform to these conceived narrative which focused on 
diplomacy and explicit non-military ends.239 Steele uses shame as a way to 
explain the motivations underlying NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and thus by 
extension, participation in collective action.240 While the context in this instance 
is slightly different, the NDP are nonetheless seeking to rectify Canada’s future 																																																								
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policy actions to bring them back in line with the individuals’ perceived 
narrative.241 In this case, the classic middle power behavioural roles as a 
multilateralist honest broker are prioritised as a way of getting back to traditional 
Canadian diplomacy. The Liberals, CPC and BQ countered this by insisting that 
this was not a traditional peacekeeping mission, but rather, an evolution of 
Canada’s longstanding commitment to the international community. These 
parties sought to establish a continuity in Canada’s foreign policy between its 
actions in Afghanistan and its previous international actions, be they Pearsonian 
peacekeeping or participation in major international conflicts like the First World 
War, Second World War or Korea. The roles here were more reactive, dictated 
by Canada’s actions in the field and less by the preferences of the policymakers. 
As such, a distinction can be drawn between the visions of Canada’s foreign 
policy narrative as it relates to foreign policy roles and by extension, behaviours.  
The CPC were the most vehement not only in their defence of the 
mission, but also in equating criticism to a lack of support for the Canadian 
forces.242 This fits with the clear dichotomy and larger moral narrative that the 
Conservatives had sought to cultivate as a way to distinguish their foreign policy 
from their Liberal Party predecessors. The difficulty with this then becomes how 
one recognises this as a moral narrative. As mentioned previously in the Iraq 
War debate, Stephen Harper had argued that participation in that conflict as a 
moral one. In October of 2007 he reminded Canadians that Canada had a moral 
responsibility to remain in Afghanistan.243 Again, the challenge in ascribing 
moral characteristics to a foreign policy narrative then becomes: in what way 
does this action serve the agent’s self-interest? In this case, the CPC claimed that 
its foreign policy would best serve Canada’s national interest, however, vague 
that interest may be as a way to maintain Canadian participation in the 
mission.244 Nonetheless, the articulation of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan as 																																																								
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part of the national interest in this way thus also reinforces the narrative of 
Canadian values as a supporter of freedom, democracy and thus right; consistent, 
at least to members of the CPC.  
25 February 2008 – 13 March 2008 - House of Commons debate on Afghanistan 
mission extension  
Following the votes to conclude the Afghanistan mission in 2007 the Harper 
government commissioned an independent, non-partisan panel led by former 
Liberal Foreign Minister, John Manley to examine Canada’s mission in 
Afghanistan and offer recommendations about its future role. Following the 
presentation of the Manley Report the Conservative government introduced a 
confidence motion in order to extend the Canada presence in Kandahar through 
to the end of 2011, instead of the previous mission extension date of 2009.245 The 
Harper government offered an ultimatum to NATO Allies in January requesting 
an additional 1,000 troops to reinforce Canadian Forces in Kandahar.246 Based on 
the recommendations of the panel, the CPC and the Liberal Party supported the 
motion over the objections of the BQ and NDP and the vote passed 198-77.247 
The vision articulated in the report saw a continuing presence for Canada to 
guarantee that the gains made during the Canadian forces deployment were 
upheld and to ensure an orderly transition to Afghan-led security in southern 
Afghanistan.248 The ensuing debate centered on the role Canada was playing in 
Afghanistan, not only in terms of its effectiveness, but also its ability to 
successfully complete the mission and, more critically, what success would look 
like. This debate demonstrated a clear expression of the narrative surrounding 
Canada’s involvement in the Afghanistan mission.  
CPC 
The Conservative government made the case for a mission extension from 2009 
to the end of 2011. Defence Minister Peter MacKay noted that Canada was 
promoting its values and interests and more importantly, “the UN wants us there, 																																																								
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NATO needs us there.”249 While avoiding using the term ‘peacekeeping,’ he 
further maintained that Canada’s reputation, built on Responsibility to Protect 
and the sacrifice of Canadians “in the service of peace” would be at stake if 
Canada didn’t extend its mission.250 Minister of International Cooperation, Bev 
Oda, cautioned that this was not the regular kind of aid mission and required a 
robust military engagement.251 During the course of the debate, the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence, Laurie Hawn, invoked the 
tradition of Lester Pearson noting that he recognised the “combination of 
strength and national resolve in cooperation with like-minded allies.”252 Hawn 
went further to emphasise the morality of the mission stating that, “Canada is the 
kind of country that continues to do the right thing because it is simply the right 
thing to do and that is who we are.”253 Indeed, there was a clear effort on the part 
of the CPC to try and link Canada’s historical military narrative to the mission in 
Afghanistan, as opposed to its peacekeeping heritage.254 The CPC invoked 
tradition a number of times to demonstrate how Canada had to remain committed 
in Afghanistan. MP Brian Storseth argued that while Canada had created a 
peacekeeping paradigm, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine required Canada 
to remain active in the Afghanistan operation.255 Indeed, to close the debate MP 
Bruce Stanton invoked Lester Pearson’s commitment to collective security and 
suggested that it was, “a mission that is every bit as just, noble and meaningful as 
those of the nearly 100,000 Canadians, men and women, who gave their lives 
over the last century to protect and defend our security, indeed, the collective 
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The Liberal Party remained supportive of the mission though it sought greater 
clarity on the limits of the mission.257 Leader of the Liberal Party, Stéphane 
Dion, stated that Canada could not be expected to carry the burden in southern 
Afghanistan indefinitely and urged the government to bring in other NATO 
Allies to replace Canadian forces.258 MP Michael Ignatieff went further stating 
that Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan was not a ‘blank check’ and the 
mission must end in 2011 to allow Afghan forces to support themselves.259 Party 
members noted that while Canada went to Afghanistan in its own self-interest, 
the sustained success of the mission required commitment by the government to 
development and reconstruction.260 Others like MP Maria Minna, insisted that 
Canada must be out of Kandahar by 2009 and that the government should inform 
NATO as such in order to mobilise other allies.261 
BQ 
The BQ sought to distance itself from the mission and noted that Quebeckers 
were keen to see the mission end in 2009.262 Similarly, the BQ aimed to move 
away from the combat mission towards development assistance.263 In particular, 
the BQ wanted to promote Canada’s traditional, “achievements in human rights 
and for our values of reconciliation and diplomacy. We should now be able to 
play this role fully and let others fight in the most dangerous areas.”264 Similarly, 
MP Claude Bachand stated that Canada’s expertise lay in peace missions and 
Afghanistan represented the opposite of this tradition.265 Indeed, the BQ also 
invoked Lester Pearson, peacekeeping forces and peace missions as well as 
Canada’s role as a mediator.266 
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The NDP took issue with the mission extension and sought a serious redefinition 
of the operation. Most significantly, the NDP wanted the UN to take the lead in 
the mission rather than NATO with a political approach as the key to a lasting 
solution.267 Leader of the NDP, MP Jack Layton, stated that NATO lacked the 
capabilities for a complex operation that included peacebuilding and 
reconstruction; areas where Canada could provide expertise and leadership.268 
MP Dawn Black also noted the UN peace building Commission was headed by a 
Canadian and could create a forum for negotiations.269  
Analysis 
This debate represented another clear expression of the CPC and Liberal Party’s 
vision of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan while also demonstrating the 
difficulties in parsing a singular, unified narrative about Canadian international 
action. The reflexive interaction between the narrative and behaviour as 
interpreted by policymakers has shaped the understanding of Canada’s 
international action as the various components of the middle power narrative are 
constantly renegotiated. While the debates were focused on Canada’s action in 
Afghanistan, these were rooted in policymakers’ understandings of the broader 
Canadian foreign policy narrative. As such, Canada’s international action is 
always being compared to their understanding of what Canada should do 
internationally. This creates routines founded in this narrative which can be 
subject to disruption, depending on the policies adopted by the government in 
power. Steele characterises this as an action which ‘disembeds’ agents from 
routines and thus creates the conditions which force the state to confront its 
current actions in relation to previous actions.270 That said, the elite consensus 
between the CPC and the Liberal opposition in that support for the mission was 
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no longer split clearly along explicitly partisan lines.271 Indeed, this stands in 
marked contrast to the debates held in 2006 and 2007 which had sought to curtail 
the mission. Fundamentally, the various justifications for continued action in 
theatre were once again dependent on each party’s view of how Canada should 
act internationally, rather than reflecting the reality of action on the ground. 
Nonetheless, this debate placed a clear end date on Canada’s involvement in 
Afghanistan slated for 2011 – a move that eventually proved controversial 
among NATO Allies as will be explored further in this chapter and the next. 
As discussed already, the differing conceptions of Canada’s foreign 
policy narrative helped generate differing conceptions of roles. The CPC, in 
emphasising what has been termed a moral approach to foreign policy sought to 
place Canadian Forces as upholders and defenders of the good through military 
force.272 Furthermore, given that the government had put this issue to a 
confidence vote it was vital that it retained support from other parties or else it 
would trigger an election. However, as mentioned already with the presence of a 
bipartisan elite consensus between the Liberal Party and the CPC there was less 
concern that there would be a domestic cost to the Harper government.273 Both of 
these parties worked together in crafting the mission extension and as a result, 
the language used in the debate is tempered for both parties, both of which were 
more careful about overt disagreement. It was in the interest of the CPC 
government as well as the opposition Liberal Party to express the successes of 
the Afghanistan mission as much as it was in the NDP and the BQ’s to highlight 
the weaknesses.  
Nonetheless, each party sought to push the implementation of policies it 
thought best represented the narrative of Canada’s international action abroad.  
Each party shaped its narrative about the mission to conform to its conceived 
narrative about the Afghanistan mission and by extension, Canada’s relationship 																																																								
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to the international community. Each of these interpretations of the foreign 
policy narrative found expression as a role envisioned for Canada. In this case, 
policymakers in the NDP and BQ were again, more explicitly expressing a role 
preference and by extension sought to create continuity with their interpretation 
of Canada’s past international behaviour. Perhaps most clearly articulated was 
the NDP vision for Canada as a UN leader and champion of international norms 
surrounding peace building, mediation and human rights. The party’s concern 
with the military mission and more critically, the inability to define the mission’s 
success linked the country’s actions with a failure to remain linked to Canadian 
tradition.  
Vitally, this debate marks a clear distinction from the Liberal Party of the 
1990s to the Liberals of the late 2000s in that the reflexive support of the UN, 
while still present, is not prioritised. Rather, the Liberal Party rhetoric recognised 
that Afghanistan was borne out of primarily national self-interest, namely 
creating an Afghanistan that would no longer be a safe haven for terrorists who 
could threaten Canada, rather than as a part of the wider international community 
effort.274 While this is not mutually exclusive of other interpretations, it offers a 
view of the ways in which the traditional middle power roles had been moved 
aside in favour of a more capabilities focused discussion – a recognition of 
Canada’s role position, rather than preference. In doing so, there is a clear move 
away or ‘disembedding’ from the defining narratives of the Canadian middle 
power and peacekeeping mythologies from the two largest parties in Parliament.    
The CPC for its part continued to try and distance itself from the 
peacekeeping narrative of the past while nonetheless invoking the tradition, 
emphasising the military component of the mission. The government was keen to 
ensure the passage of a mission extension and steered away from the overt 
partisan language relating to Canada’s moral mission in Afghanistan in part to 
avoid alienating Liberal MPs who supported the mission extension. With the 
clear articulation of the mission end date the CPC had room to explore ways in 
which to reinforce their interpretation of the mission, whilst also allowing the 
party to avoid an open-ended commitment to the conflict.  																																																								




March 26, 2009 - House of Commons take note debate on Afghanistan 
This take note debate took place against the backdrop of the International 
Conference on Afghanistan in The Hague. This debate was contextually 
important for Canada as it took place around the time that Canadian combat 
troops had been scheduled to draw down before the extension that had taken 
place in 2008. It was in this debate that the opposition parties began showing 
fatigue with the tempo of the mission, particularly Canada’s continued presence 
in Kandahar.  By this time Canada had taken 116 casualties in Afghanistan and 
with elections slated for later in the year there was hope that this would distract 
attention from Canadian losses and highlight the progress being made.275  
CPC 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, noted that in the preceding year, 
Canada had expanded its diplomatic presence in Kandahar, in line with the 
Manley report recommendations.276 Moreover, he welcomed the beginning of the 
US troop ‘surge’ into Afghanistan, a move which would help take pressure off 
Canadian Forces in Kandahar.277 Given the mandate that had authorised the 
continued mission in 2008, the CPC was less pressed to defend Canada’s action 
in theatre and instead sought to reinforce that the mission was proceeding well. 
Responding to criticism that the mission needed more examination, MP Deepak 
Obhrai emphasised the UN mandate and noted that the Parliament had supported 
an extension to that very mission a year prior.278 MP Laurie Hawn, in his 
capacity as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Defence also 
emphasised the role of the Canadian military in earning the esteem of the 
international community.279   
Liberal Party 
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The Liberal Party, having supported the mission extension a year prior was not 
overly critical but sought clarification on a number of issues. Notably, MP Denis 
Coderre expressed concern over the effort expended between NATO Allies, 
particularly the differences in the Canadian mission as compared to the German 
or Turkish missions and sought a more equal distribution of tasks among 
allies.280  Nonetheless, the new party leader, Michael Ignatieff had supported the 
mission extension in 2008 along with much of the Liberal caucus and as such, 
while the interpretation of the foreign policy narrative that they prioritised may 
have differed somewhat, both the Liberals and the Conservatives were in 
agreement over the importance of the mission. Coderre also emphasised 
Canada’s duty to intervene in Afghanistan “as a country, as a citizen of the 
world”281 MP David McGuinty expressed some concern that the US was 
dictating too much of what would guide Canadian policy.282 
BQ 
The BQ were much harsher in their criticism of the government with accusations 
that the CPC were more responsive to American preferences.283 Similar to the 
Liberals however, the BQ urged a rotation of the Canadian forces out of 
Southern Afghanistan or at least some form of redistributive burden sharing.284 
MP Johanne Deschamps also noted that the CPC and Liberals initiative to 
enhance the mission’s development and diplomatic components had been 
suggested by the BQ in 2007.285 
NDP 
The members of the NDP were still keen to wind up Canada’s combat role in 
Afghanistan but also sought a realistic plan for post-2011 engagement. MP Paul 
Dewar suggested that Canada could help spearhead a UN initiative for regional 
peace building and stressed the need for a multilateral diplomatic solution.286 MP 
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Niki Ashton also noted that while the government had made a number of pledges 
regarding its commitment to development and diplomacy, “We are seeing a 
change from the way things have been done in the past.”287 
Analysis 
In this debate, regarding Canada’s role in Afghanistan the Liberals and CPC 
emphasised a UN mandate and Canada’s traditional global citizen narrative. 
Interestingly, the CPC directly mentioned the esteem of Canada, though it 
diverges slightly from the morality-infused language that had characterised 
previous CPC statements. In this case, the need to reinforce Canada’s 
international esteem also over-rode domestic opposition concerns about the 
continued mission. Ned Lebow suggests that, “when actors seek self-esteem 
through honour, standing or autonomy, they are often willing to risk, even 
sacrifice, themselves or their political units in pursuit of these goals.”288 Indeed, 
Lebow categorises Canada’s foreign policy behaviour as one which relies on 
honour founded in its domestic institutions in order to exert influence in its 
international relations.289 In this case, the government was willing to tie its 
political future to the mission in Afghanistan with the possibility, albeit remote at 
that time, that the public could revoke its support for both. The CPC were the 
clearest in not only promoting a link between Canada’s foreign policy and 
international esteem as well as previously established, wider conceptions of 
morality. This was important for the government in that with rising casualties 
and public attention, Stephen Harper’s government had become closely 
associated with the conflict.290 As a result, the CPC were resolute in expressing 
Canada’s support for the Afghanistan mission despite climbing casualties, costs 
and criticism. That being said, members of the Liberal Party were also supportive 
of the contribution to the mission.   
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Since the Harper government had effectively prioritised the mission in 
2006 casualties had continued to mount and while Canada was still slated to 
leave Kandahar in 2011, as the CBC reported, there was increasing opposition 
among voters towards Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.291 Furthermore, the 
Afghan elections, which took place later in the year, highlighted the lack of 
progress in many ways with allegations of widespread fraud and low voter 
turnout.292 However, with the CPC previously describing Canadian participation 
in the Afghanistan mission in moral terms, they had not only linked the mission 
with national self-interest, but also made it a reflection of Canada’s foreign 
policy narrative.293 Thus, in order to maintain the mission in the face of growing 
domestic unpopularity, the CPC were forced to again, re-orient their description 
of Canada’s participation and how the mission links with Canada’s participation 
in NATO. Indeed, by once again linking honour to Canada’s mission it becomes 
as Steele characterises it in the case of Belgium in the Second World War, “a 
painful, costly, and tragic, but also emancipatory, action.”294 In this way it gave 
further freedom of action for the government to define what the ‘successful’ 
conditions for Canadian withdrawal would be in 2011, regardless of the facts on 
the ground. Thus, honour not yet satisfied, morality still to be defended, the CPC 
could make the case that Canada needed to remain in Afghanistan both for the 
sake of its allies and its national interest.  
In contrast, the NDP and BQ offered a number of criticisms, namely that 
Canada’s autonomy and standing were no longer benefiting from the 
continuation of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. The NDP was even more 
explicit in underlining how the mission did not in fact reflect its interpretation of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative. Altogether, the CPC foreign policy narrative 
in this circumstance has moved in order to maintain consistency with its previous 																																																								
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conceptions of Canada’s foreign policy whilst also justifying its current role 
position in the conflict.   
November 25, 2010 - House of Commons Debate on Afghanistan mission 
This debate outlined Canada’s transition away from a combat role into a training 
support mission that would last from 2011 through to 2014. The Conservative 
government unilaterally decided this mission prompting the debate in the House 
of Commons.295 There was context to this discussion as the Harper government 
had previously prorogued Parliament in February, a move which was seen to 
have killed an inquiry into the treatment of Afghan detainees.296 Indeed, the 
ongoing investigation had threatened to find the CPC government in contempt of 
Parliament, with opposition parties demanding information on the treatment of 
detainees the Harper government refused to release.297 Perhaps linked to this, the 
government did not put forward any more votes on the future of the Afghanistan 
mission. The BQ called on a statement from 6 January 2010 that noted that the 
Afghanistan mission would be strictly civilian from 2011 onwards. As such they 
introduced a motion condemning the government’s decision to extend the 
mission. Whilst this debate did not directly affect Canada’s participation in the 
operation it nonetheless highlights the narrative employed by the Conservative 
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MP Claude Bachand argued that the Conservative government had broken its 
word with regards to the deployment of troops and stated that the power to do so 
must be shared with the House of Commons.298 Additionally, he noted that 
Canadian forces had paid a heavy toll in comparison to NATO Allies and urged a 
return to peacekeeping.299 
CPC 
In response to the BQ’s criticism, MP Deepak Obhrai underscored Canada’s 
commitment to NATO.300 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, tried 
to draw a deeper link noting, “Canada is in Afghanistan for one very clear 
reason: Canada’s national security.”301 This defined the issue as one of domestic 
security and linked the stability of Afghanistan directly to the security of Canada. 
This once again underlined that the nebulous conditions for the successful 
completion of the mission rested with the government. He further clarified that 
Canada’s forces would be in a non-combat role in keeping with the needs 
expressed by NATO.302 Minister of National Defence, Peter MacKay also 
reflected on Canada’s combat mission and admitted that there would always be 
requests for Canadian soldiers to deploy.303 MacKay went further to emphasise 
that considerable support for the mission still existed in the House and that since 
it was not a combat mission, no vote was needed to extend the mission.304 MP 
Jim Abbott then later characterised the continued mission as peacekeeping and 
reflected Canadian empathy and morality.305  
Liberal Party  
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The Liberal Party did not offer much criticism of the plan for Canadian trainers 
to remain in Afghanistan, rather, MP Bob Rae cautioned that Canada had made 
an obligation to the UN and NATO to stay until the job is done.306 Rae also 
questioned whether peacekeeping could occur in a conflict zone without conflict, 
noting that this mission went beyond partisanship and reflected the national 
interest.307 Nonetheless, Rae still invoked the legacy of Lester Pearson in 
response to the BQ calls for a peacekeeping role, though in this circumstance 
described as the need to respond to aggression with some degree of force.308  
NDP 
The NDP was much more critical of the government and the other opposition 
parties. MP Chris Charlton insisted that the NDP opposed the extension of the 
Canadian mission altogether and that the troops should be brought home 
immediately.309 Accusations of collusion between the Liberals and the CPC were 
put forward.310 MP Paul Dewar also sought clarification on where funding for 
this mission was going, particularly with regards to diplomatic spending.311 
Leader of the NDP, Jack Layton, accused the Harper government of putting 
emphasis on the military solution to Afghanistan and thus jeopardising civilian-
led development programmes.312   
Analysis 
As the last House of Commons debate of the Afghanistan mission to be 
examined in this study, the presence of a number of interpretations of the 
Canadian foreign policy narrative remain evident. The BQ were clear about their 
conception of Canada as a peacekeeping nation, much along the same lines as the 
NDP who had long voiced its opposition to combat operations more generally. 
That said, the confluence of the Liberal and CPC positions provides an 
interesting view of how the importance of the mission in the minds of 
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policymakers overrode the desire to remain consistent with the traditional 
conceptions of Canadian foreign policy. The Liberal Party, under the leadership 
of Michael Ignatieff had, to a certain degree, also moved the party away from its 
previous views on peacekeeping though the pull of the Liberal Party tradition 
still exerted influence.313 Indeed, Ignatieff as a public intellectual, had previously 
supported the invasion of Iraq and on entering public life, felt compelled to issue 
an apologia recanting his previous stance on the war.314  Nonetheless, both 
parties called on this previous narrative with the CPC referring to the future 
mission as peacekeeping and the Liberals invoking Lester Pearson as ways to 
reflect the continuity with broader Canadian foreign policy. It reflects the desire 
of policymakers to maintain their interpretations of this foreign policy narrative 
and in doing so preserves and promotes it as a persistent narrative of Canada’s 
foreign policy.  
Turning attention to specific policies, rather than the broad sweep of the 
foreign policy narrative, the Afghan detainee scandal had been progressing on 
slow course throughout the duration of Canada’s deployment to Afghanistan. 
This had first appeared as a controversial issue under the Liberal Prime Minister 
Jean Chrétien and had continued through until the end of Canada’s operation in 
Afghanistan. As noted previously, there had been criticism of the practice of 
turning Afghan prisoners over to US and Afghan custody without sufficient 
oversight on human rights practices. While Canadian diplomats in NATO had 
been forward leaning on issues relating to detainee treatment and oversight, the 
issue remained an important part of the discussion in Parliament in that it was a 
reflection of the ways in which Canada had ‘lost its way.’315 Fundamentally, this 
specific policy issue, among others, reflected the ways in which the 
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reinterpretation of narrative of Canadian foreign policy and the process of change 
had disrupted the routines of Canadian diplomats in NATO. 
Indeed, given that there was a desire on the part of the Liberals and the 
CPC to pull away from the previous associations between Canada and 
‘peacekeeping’ it is interesting that members of all the major parties still felt the 
need to continue to hearken back to it. The CPC may have sought to cast this in 
relation to a morality-driven narrative but as will be explored further, previous 
interpretations of the Canadian foreign policy narrative both in the media and 
among policymakers, continue to exert pressure on the preferred roles that 
Canada is envisioned as playing. As with the Afghanistan debate in 2009, the 
different characterisation of Canada’s national self-interest, argued either in 
moral terms or relation to honour required a re-orientation of what Canada’s 
international role should be in relation to NATO.  Ultimately, the reinterpretation 
of Canada’s role coming out of the Afghanistan experience will be explored 
further through discussions with policymakers in NATO headquarters.  
With regards to Canada’s future participation in NATO, the debates 
surrounding the Libya mission are worth examining. The CPC interpretation of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative had, to this point, placed emphasis on morality 
and the Canadian national interest, a theme which carries over into the Libya 
campaign. However, the mission held a number of commonalities with the 
previous Canadian foreign policy narrative given its UN mandate, NATO 
support, and emphasis on the Responsibility to Protect.  The desire to maintain 
the perceived continuity of a foreign policy narrative thus represents an 
important force informing Canada’s decision to participate in the Libya mission, 
despite the increasingly bitter aftertaste of Afghanistan.  
21 March, 2011 - House of Commons Debate on the UN Resolution 1973 on 
Libya  
This take note debate surrounded the House of Commons approval and support 
of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorising the protection of 
civilians in Libya adopted on 17 March. Canada had already deployed the 
frigate, HMCS Charlottetown to the region to assist with the evacuation of 




implementation of UNSCR 1970 placing sanctions on Gaddafi’s government.316 
Similarly, the Prime Minister preempted this debate by deploying 6 CF-18 
fighter aircraft and necessary personnel to support Operation Odyssey Dawn, the 
American-led coalition enforcing the no fly zone and arms embargo.317 This was 
the last debate with the CPC leading a minority government. The Conservative 
government was found in contempt of Parliament due to withholding information 
related to military procurement and subsequently lost a vote of non-confidence 
leading to an election that spring.   
CPC 
Defence Minister Peter MacKay explained that Canada was compelled to act, 
“both in a moral duty and by duty of NATO and the United Nations, which as 
members would know, are two institutions we helped found.”318 Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deepak Obhrai, was adamant in 
invoking the importance of supporting core Canadian values in the region.319  He 
also cautioned that Canada was not a superpower and as such, could only act in 
the region with a UN resolution and the support of allies; moreover, the 
operation did not involve an invasion of Libya.320 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Lawrence Cannon, noted the government’s support for the involvement of the 
International Criminal Court in investigating crimes against humanity and 
emphasised Canada’s support for Charter VII of the UN Charter for the 
restoration of international peace and security.321 Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Minister of National Defence, Laurie Hawn among other CPC members, 
maintained that the government’s support for the military had enabled Canada to 
act quickly to provide aircraft and naval support to the operation in this 
circumstance. 322 At the end of the debate, Parliamentary Secretary to the 																																																								
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Minister of International Cooperation, Lois Brown, stated the importance of 
Responsibility to Protect and how Canada and its allies had stepped up to the 
plate in order to implement and reinforce this norm.323   
Liberal Party  
 The Liberal Party supported this mission as well, noting Canada’s duty to 
participate in the mission.324 Members of the party sought clarity as to the 
mission objectives, such as whether this was meant as regime change or as a 
humanitarian protection as well as urging a clear duration for the mission.325 MP 
Paul Szabo asked the government directly, “whether we are peacekeepers or 
peacemakers, and whether or not there is a proper balance when it comes to 
humanitarian needs.”326 Other Liberal Party MPs, such as Bob Rae were very 
clear about the mission’s links to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, while 
acknowledging that it had not been universally implemented.327 MP Paul 
Karygiannis also noted the importance of the UN and Responsibility to Protect as 
the legitimising factor for Canada’s participation in the mission.328 A number of 
members also raised the importance of capitalising on Responsibility to Protect’s 
implementation and emphasised the importance of ensuring its implementation in 
the future.329  
NDP 
The NDP while supportive of the mission went further in seeking clarity of 
Canada’s role in the operation and the nature of its activities in Libya. NDP 
Foreign Affairs Critic, Paul Dewar, insisted that Canada must be part of a 
humanitarian and diplomatic solution coordinated through the UN.330  
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Additionally, Dewar was clear that the NDP wanted an explicit time frame and 
military limits for Canadian action.331  
BQ 
The BQ also supported the mission, as it was a multilateral effort to protect 
civilians with a UN mandate.332  
Analysis 
In keeping with the CPC’s interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy narrative 
members once again couched motivation and involvement in the Libya mission 
in terms of ‘moral duty.’333 As Andrew Cooper and Bessma Momani suggest, the 
Harper government emphasised a values-based approach in order to ‘sell’ the 
Libya mission and what they argue resembled a normative approach similar to 
their Liberal predecessors.334 While the CPC interpretation of the mission 
reflected its view of Canadian foreign policy narrative, there was again little 
question of whether Canada should be involved in this mission from any of the 
other parties. Given the support for the mission expressed by a number of MPs it 
suggests that the Libya operation, in broad terms, fits well enough so as not to 
trigger a discontinuity in the view of policymakers. Moreover, this debate had no 
real effect on the policymaking process as the Prime Minister had set Canada’s 
military participation in motion already. In comparison to the debates over 
Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, Libya appears comparatively 
uncontroversial. After examining the different interpretations of Canada’s 
narrative surrounding Afghanistan, it is likely that the fact that the mission fit 
more closely with more traditional conceptions of the Canadian foreign policy 
narrative (multilateral operation, UN mandates, NATO support, clear grounding 
in humanitarian norms, i.e. Responsibility to Protect) helped to facilitate the 
Canadian participation. Moreover, the contribution to the mission did not require 
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Canadian Forces on the ground, instead the contribution of naval and aerial 
assets presented a much lower risk of casualties and costs.  
June 14, 2011 - House of Commons, Mission renewal debate on Libya  
This was the first debate after the 2011 election with the NDP, led by Jack 
Layton as the official opposition to the Conservative government, again led by 
Stephen Harper. Following the election the Liberal Party had been reduced to a 
shadow of its former self, winning only 34 seats and the Bloc Québécois falling 
below the twelve seats needed for official party status in the Canadian House of 
Commons. The leaders of both parties, Michael Ignatieff and Gilles Duceppe 
also resigned in the wake of their respective party’s poor electoral performances. 
As a result, both parties were under interim leadership during this debate which 
also saw the participation of the leader of the Green Party of Canada, Elizabeth 
May. The debate ultimately proved relatively straightforward but nonetheless, 
highlighted the various parties’ interpretations of how Canada should participate 
in the Libya operation.  
CPC 
Foreign Minister, John Baird, started the debate outlining the successes in the 
mission to that point and emphasising Canada’s strong support for the UN, 
human rights and the need for a continued commitment to the operation.335 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deepak Obhrai was 
also clear that Canada would continue to act in support of a multilateral 
organisation.336 While not explicitly referencing peacekeeping, he used oblique 
language to refer to Canada’s historical preference in this regard, explaining, 
“this government understands the genuine concerns of Canadians who oppose 
the use of lethal force and of turning to military action to resolve the problems of 
the international community. I believe this is an instinct that all Canadians share 
and is a credit to us all.”337 Baird went on to note that Canada was ‘punching 
above its weight’ as the NATO mission was commanded by Lieutenant General 																																																								
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Charles Bouchard.338 MP Laurie Hawn also sought to draw a continuum with 
regards to Canada’s international actions in support of Responsibility to Protect 
suggesting that Libya was akin to Canada’s role in the First World War, Second 
World War, Korea, Afghanistan and its other peacekeeping missions.339 Minister 
of National Defence, Peter MacKay, was equally clear that the mission was in 
keeping with Canadian values of freedom, democracy and human rights as well 
as demonstrating leadership and commitment to NATO Allies.340 Of particular 
note were the substantial remarks by Minister for the Status of Women, Rona 
Ambrose, who lauded Canada’s leadership in the implementation of UNSCR 
1325 focusing on mitigating the impact of conflict on women.341  
NDP 
The NDP, in its role as official opposition, raised concerns about the military 
nature of the operation.342 Foreign Affairs critic, MP Paul Dewar warned that the 
UN needed to lead the mission and it should be solved by diplomatic and 
humanitarian means.343 The NDP were also less enthusiastic about NATO’s role 
in the operation, particularly without UN support.344 The party also reinforced 
the importance of Responsibility to Protect, particularly with regards to the 
protection of civilians noting that “humanitarian aid is a little more than a third 
of what we have spent on the military effort.”345 MP Jack Harris stated that while 
this intervention was founded in Responsibility to Protect, Canada would not 
play a more military role internationally stating that it is not in Canada’s tradition 
to use “our military as an aim in foreign policy and building ourselves up in the 
world through that means.”346 Indeed, the NDP was clear in its support for a 
diplomatic solution which would provide an architecture to avoid haphazard 
interventions.347 
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Liberal Party  
The Liberal Party was broadly supportive of the mission extension. Nonetheless, 
the party sought clarity in terms of Canada’s aid to Libya and any planning that 
had occurred for a post-Gaddafi state.348 Interim Party Leader, Bob Rae, 
demanded that Canada’s role should not be restricted to a military mission but 
should also include a more substantial plan for development and diplomacy.349 
MP Dominic LeBlanc urged a broader role for Canada in developing state 
institutions and expanding the role of CIDA.350 Liberal Party MPs referred to the 
vital work of Lloyd Axworthy in developing the Responsibility to Protect and its 
importance in relation to this mission.351 Similarly, the Liberals were keen to 
invoke the legacy of Lester B. Pearson.352 Moreover, Canada’s reputation as a 
‘peace-loving’ and ‘non-imperialist’ country needed to be protected through 
careful application of these norms.353 MP Denis Coderre categorised it as a 
peacekeeping mission in support of the Libyan people based around defence, 
diplomacy and development.354  
Green Party 
As the only representative of her party, Green Party Leader Elizabeth May 
voiced her discontent with the mission. She was most adamant about Canada’s 
role as a peacekeeper, urging an end to the military mission and to work with the 
UN for a negotiated solution.355  
Analysis 
As it relates to the traditional Canadian foreign policy narrative, the Libya 
mission reflected many of the roles that had been emphasised under the previous 
Liberal governments along with the attendant foreign policy behaviours. The 
Libya intervention was a multilateral, UN-mandated operation with clear 																																																								
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prohibitions on the use of ground forces and on a humanitarian basis; all 
elements that linked well with the previously articulated middle power narrative. 
Despite the invocation of Responsibility to Protect and peacekeeping, there was 
less of an explicit effort on the part of the government to link this mission with 
Canada’s foreign policy during the 1990s. That said, members of the NDP, 
Liberals and to a lesser extent the Green Party invoked the peacekeeping 
tradition and expressed some concern over a major military role for Canada in 
the mission. Despite this, Canada provided a notable military contribution as one 
of twelve NATO nations providing maritime assets and one of eleven NATO 
nations providing aircraft to enforce UNSCR 1973. As will be explored further, 
despite Canadian involvement, some policymakers in NATO were ultimately 
unaware of the Canadian contribution to the mission aside from Lieutenant 
General Charles Bouchard, deployed as staff from JFC Naples for the mission.356 
Given the departure from the traditionally recognised narrative, policymakers no 
longer expected a routine interaction from the Canadian delegation and as such, 
informally diminished the importance of Canada within the NATO Alliance.  
This mission bore the hallmarks of many of the key tenets of Canadian 
foreign policy in the 1990s and prior; however, it does not resonate or conflict 
with the broader foreign policy narrative in the ways that the Afghanistan 
mission did. Despite its broadly humanitarian nature, multilateral participation 
and robust legal legitimacy through the UN and NATO, Libya more resembled a 
coalition of the willing. Indeed, the fact that this operation, despite its success, 
has had limited follow through also suggests that this was not only a problem on 
the Canadian side, but also a broader issue within the Alliance.357 This then 
presents the challenge of identifying whether this signifies a re-interpretation of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative and the implications of such, particularly as it 
proves difficult to identify the presence of any kind of reflexivity aiming to 
correct it. There was comparatively little debate over this mission suggesting, in 
part, that given its reflection of Canada’s traditional narrative of international 
action it was more palatable. NATO’s Libya operation suggests that while 
Canadian policymakers certainly felt a duty to participate, drawing on their past 																																																								
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actions as referent points, it is less clear how this has been incorporated into a 
broader interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy narrative that have since been 
promoted under the Harper government.  
Senate Debates 
In examining the ways in which Canada’s foreign policy narrative is contested 
within the policymaking process it is also useful to look briefly at the Canadian 
Senate. As the upper house of the Canadian legislature, the Senate as an 
unelected body is meant to represent a less partisan place of ‘sober second 
thought’ to carefully examine decisions made by their elected counterparts in 
Parliament. Senators are nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the 
Governor General, generally on the merit of their contributions to Canadian life 
over their respective careers and are allowed to serve until the age of 75. This 
presents a challenge for this analysis as the Senate has a number of different 
rules making the examination of narrative contestation a more challenging issue. 
Namely, Senators in practice are generally unwilling to significantly shape 
government policy given that they are unelected. Additionally, there are rarely 
back and forth exchanges as Senators are unable to speak more than once on the 
same question during a debate. In practice, if the Senate does send something 
back to the House of Commons it generally offers small amendments to the bills 
presented rather than rejecting them outright. In the period that this study 
examines (2001-2011), the Senate refused Royal Assent to over 60 pieces of 
legislation, none of which directly related to Canada’s operations in Afghanistan 
or Libya.358 Debates in the Senate generally tend to be less issue specific given 
that its schedule is more flexible than Parliament and debates are only held if 
enough Senators are present to fulfill a quorum.  
With that in mind, this section will examine the way in which Senators 
discuss Canada’s participation in Afghanistan and Libya and in doing so will try 
to draw out the previously identified middle power narrative characteristics. As 
with the Parliamentary debates this examination is concerned with the ways in 																																																								
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which Canadian foreign policy is described and how this links with the roles and 
by extension, foreign policy behaviours.  
As with the Parliamentary debates this will proceed chronologically, 
however, analysis will follow at the end of this section.  
2001 
Reflecting the debate in Parliament, the Senate expressed both condolences and 
solidarity with the United States. Much like his Parliamentary conservative 
counterparts, the Leader of the Senate Opposition, Progressive Conservative 
John Lynch-Staunton, noted that years of defence cuts had limited Canada’s 
capabilities but it was nonetheless building on its tradition of peacekeeping, it 
had a duty to stand with its allies.359  
2002 
There were a number of discussions on Afghanistan over the course of 2002 and 
the contours of Canada’s mission there. In particular, Senator Douglas Roche, a 
Progressive Conservative Senator and founding Chairman of the Middle Powers 
Initiative urged serious caution in Canada’s course of action stating clearly that 
Canadian values were “support and trust of the United Nations as the guarantor 
of international peace and security, multilateralism and working through 
international consensus; compassion and humanitarianism; the rule of law; and 
sustainable development to achieve common security.”360 In opposition to this, a 
fellow Progressive Conservative Senator, Michael Meighen, opined that Canada 
had a responsibility to contribute to international peace and security and that its 
allies and neighbours expected Canada to do its part.361 In May, Liberal Senator 
Pierre De Bané gave a lengthy speech on the challenges to Canadian foreign 
policy noting that it reflected the Pearsonian values of idealism, humanism and 
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solidarity.362 Most importantly, he noted that Canada had an important role in 
relation to the US and its allies, acting not only as an honest broker, but restoring 
American confidence in multilateral solutions in the wake of 9/11.363 
While not strictly a debate, the Senate often hosted notable figures from Canada 
and elsewhere and invited them to speak about their experiences in order to 
better inform decision making in the Upper Chamber. In this case, the invitees 
were the Lieutenant Colonel Pat Stogran who had commanded Canadian Forces 
in Afghanistan and Major General Michel Gauthier who had commanded the 
Canadian Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. In his remarks, Lt. Col Stogran 
acknowledged the open-endedness of this mission but nonetheless was prepared 
to serve the country with honour and the Canadian Forces commitment to 
international stability and collective security.364 Most of the Senate inquiries 
focused on the Tarnak Farm friendly fire incident and the overall level of 
readiness of the Canadian Forces to undertake this mission.365  
2003 
There was limited discussion of Afghanistan in the Senate though there was 
continued concern over the invasion of Iraq. As Senators Douglas Roche and 
Sharon Carstairs noted, Canada’s deployment to Afghanistan was characterised 
as a peacekeeping mission which was positive and in keeping with Canadian 
traditions.366 This was by no means an accepted way of characterising Canada’s 
mission in Afghanistan. Indeed, in an exchange later in the year, when the leader 
of the Liberal Senate Caucus, Sharon Carstairs, discussed Afghanistan as a 
peacekeeping mission, there was considerable pushback from one of her 
Progressive Conservative colleagues, Senator Michael Forrestall who stated that 
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since the conflict had not formally ended, this was not a peacekeeping 
mission.367   
2004 
In 2004, attention turned towards the ongoing conflict in Sudan, with the Senate 
devoting a considerable amount of time to discussing the deteriorating 
humanitarian situation there. There were some discussions related to 
Afghanistan, but they focused more on the logistic elements of the mission rather 
than the broader narratives informing it.368 In particular, Conservative Senator 
Raynell Andreychuk invoked the memory of inaction in Rwanda and was 
forthright in urging the government to take action.369  
2005 
In light of the July 7 attacks in London, the Senate convened in order to discuss 
the threats to Canada emanating from its participation in the Afghanistan 
operation. Echoing remarks in the House of Commons, there was some concern 
over the blunt language used by the new Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick 
Hillier, in which he stated that Canada should prepare for casualties.370 Senator 
Jack Austin, speaking as the leader of the Liberal caucus in the Senate stated that 
a political decision by the Government of Canada had been made to put 
Canadian troops in harm’s way.371  
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Reflecting the House of Commons debate on the extension of the Canadian 
mission in Kandahar on 17 May, the question was raised as to whether the Senate 
should also debate this issue.372 Liberal Senator Roméo Dallaire, criticised the 
Conservative government for both the short notice period ahead of the debate as 
well as the insinuation that if one should disagree with the mission extension it 
might appear they are in opposition to the mission overall.373 In a separate 
session, Conservative Party Senator Consiglio di Nino spoke at length about 
Canada’s commitment to the mission noting that it was there not only for the 
gratitude of its allies but because it was also about helping others.374   
Later in the year, President Hamid Karzai addressed both the House of 
Commons and the Senate thanking Canada for its sacrifice and invoking 
Canada’s pluralistic, bilingual traditions as models to be emulated by 
Afghanistan.375 This sparked further discussion later in the year with Senator 
Roméo Dallaire questioning the government’s commitment to delivering 
development aid as a part of an integrated military approach.376 The leader of the 
Conservative Party in the Senate, Marjory LeBreton, countered this arguing that 
Canada was in Kandahar due to the dithering of Prime Minister Paul Martin.377  
In this same debate session, Senator Dallaire invoked Canada’s status as a 
middle power in order to support humanitarian laws and continue fighting for 
others to enjoy those rights.378 Indeed, the next day, Senator Dallaire again 
recalled this tradition noting that while the Pearsonian peacekeeping era ended 
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with the Cold War, the Government of Canada still sought to play the role of a 
leading middle power.379 
2007 
This year saw a review of Canada’s Afghanistan mission where Liberal Senator 
Jane Cordy raised the possibility of a 2009 end date for Canada’s deployment the 
issue of relief for Canadian troops in Kandahar given the caveats placed on 
deployment by other NATO Allies.380 Indeed, the issue of Canada’s end date 
came up repeatedly reflecting the debates in the House of Commons. As Liberal 
Senator Frank Mahovlich observed, the government seemed to be avoiding 
setting a definite end date on the Afghanistan mission.381  
Interestingly, later that year, there was a debate over Canada’s middle 
power status between Liberal and Conservative Senators. This was in specific 
reference to Canada’s failure to act in Darfur, Sudan. Conservative Senator 
Consiglio di Nino opined that Canada, “Canada has shown principled leadership 
in the world and punched above its weight.”382 Similarly, one of his Liberal 
colleagues invoked Canada’s lack of colonial history as a potential factor 
strengthening its ability to persuade African countries to act in the UN.383 
Carrying this point further, Liberal Senator Jim Munson invoked Canada’s 
middle power tradition alongside its deployment to Afghanistan when discussing 
its role in supporting UN resolutions.384  
Giving some insight into the way Canada’s traditions were invoked 
during a debate on creating a national peacekeeper’s day, Senator Dallaire stated 
that “[t]he term ‘peacekeeping’ can either be considered history, that it does not 
exist anymore, or recognized as an all-encompassing capability in which we 																																																								
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provide conflict resolution that ultimately ends up with a peace agreement and 
monitoring as we do nation building.”385 His comments were reflective, in part, 
of how the discussion of Canada’s traditional behaviours had shifted since the 
deployment to Afghanistan. Indeed, Senator Dallaire, while quick to describe 
Canada as a middle power was also clear that this was not a static label or set of 
behaviours. 
2008  
Compared to the previous year, there was less mention of Afghanistan and 
consequently less debate over the mission. Conservative Senator Gerry St. 
Germain gave a statement comparing Canada’s Kandahar mission to Canadian 
battles in the First and Second World Wars as well as Korea.386 Nonetheless, 
Senator Dallaire stated that Canada as a middle power in the world needed to do 
more to support human rights internationally while reminding his colleagues on 
the anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda.387 Moreover, there was also a push to 
support a National Peacekeepers’ Day recognising Canada’s historical 
contribution to international peacebuilding.388   
2009 
Debates during the course of the year saw the middle power narrative continue to 
be invoked in Senate discussions, though not always linked directly with 
Canada’s Afghanistan mission or NATO more generally. As Conservative 
Senator Hugh Segal suggested, Canada’s middle power tradition allowed it a 
degree of independence from the US and advanced the country’s ability to 
pursue its own trade and geopolitical interests.389 Later in the year, Independent 
Senator Marcel Prud’homme gave a farewell speech in the Senate on Canada’s 
foreign policy stating, “[w]e have a reputation, a way of doing things, that 																																																								
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focuses firmly on respect for human rights, and we are known as a middle power 
that is respected and well regarded in all regions of the world.”390 He went on to 
note that during his tenure in the Senate he had seen Canada’s influence in the 
world decline as it moved away from its traditions.391 
2010 
As Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan drew towards a close, discussion 
shifted as to what the next step would be in theatre. Conservative Senator Pamela 
Wallin presented a report on Canada’s post-2011 engagement noting that 
Canadians “have heart in our mission both as war-fighters and humanitarians.”392 
The report urged the continued presence of Canadian military trainers in 
Afghanistan and sought to emphasise the positive outcomes of the mission. In 
discussing Canada’s continuing training mission later in the year, Senator Wallin 
went on to praise Prime Minister Harper’s decision to keep trainers in 
Afghanistan as the “right thing.”393  
2011 
Much like in the House of Commons, there was little opposition to Canada’s 
involvement in the Libya campaign. Liberal Senator Romeo Dallaire questioned 
whether Canada was there under the auspices of Responsibility to Protect, since 
the government had given indications that this was not why Canada was taking 
part in the Libya operation.394 Conservative Senator Raynell Andreychuk stated 
that since nations in the UN had not effectively codified what Responsibility to 
Protect means, it was not applicable in this case.395 This was coupled with an 
increase in overtly partisan language, between the Liberal and Conservative 
Senate members who loudly praised the actions of Prime Minister Stephen 																																																								
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Harper. Indeed, Conservative Senators such as Doug Finley sought to actively 
downplay the Liberal foreign policy legacy opining that “in the 1990s, Canada 
surrendered its role as an active leader in the world. We seemed content to go 
with the flow at the UN and settled for currying favour and approbation from 
abusive dictators and despots, rather than taking a principled, forceful, Canadian 
stand for human rights.”396 This type of language was coupled with actions such 
as announcing the closure of the Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping 
Centre in the name of budget cuts.397  
In a separate 2011 debate, during an exchange focused on Canada’s 
‘innate modesty’ Conservative Senator Stephen Greene rejected Canada’s middle 
power traditions at length, stating “I refer to the ‘honest broker.’ This is an ideal 
policy for the innately modest because with that policy what Canadians want 
does not matter. All you engage in is moral relativism.”398 As he went on to say, 
“[u]nder the Liberals we were indeed a middle power and very content to hide 
our light under a bushel. Under successive Liberal governments we sacrificed 
our military.”399 This represented a wholesale rejection of the middle power 
narrative in Canadian foreign policy and the Conservative government’s attempts 
to redefine their legacy.  
Analysis of Senate Debates 
Overall, the Senators in these debates reflect many of the sentiments expressed 
by their House of Commons colleagues. As noted previously, Canadian 
Senators’ actual ability to shape foreign policy behaviour is heavily 
circumscribed given their position as unelected officials. Given that this is the 
case, they are not subject to Mintz and DeRouen’s poliheuristic decision-making 
model and ostensibly, could articulate completely alternative views of Canada’s 
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foreign policy narrative given that they cannot be electorally vulnerable.400  That 
said, it is evident that the middle power narrative informs many of their 
understandings of Canada’s foreign policy tradition. In addition to this, it is also 
possible to observe the rise of overtly partisan language in the Senate after the 
election of Stephen Harper.   
Much like their counterparts in the House of Commons the roles that 
Senators articulated were founded in the Canadian middle power narrative. In 
particular, Senator Roméo Dallaire, a former Canadian general who had 
commanded UN peacekeepers in Rwanda frequently invoked the middle power 
label when discussing the role that Canada should play in the world.401 This 
reflects the duality of the label in that Dallaire invokes the middle power 
narrative both as tradition and as role, however, with a closer reading, it becomes 
clearer that this is not one single role but rather a collection of roles that Canada 
is seen to have historically played. In this case, reflecting this study’s definition: 
a reflexive belief in multilateralism, an inherent support for the international 
order, a preference for multipronged solutions (diplomacy, development) without 
a prioritisation of military involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding. 
 Similarly Senators were quick to categorise Canada’s participation in 
Afghanistan either as peacekeeping or at the very least in relation to 
peacekeeping though as the mission dragged on, this became less evident. 
Nonetheless, the roles articulated through the majority of debates remain rooted 
in the middle power narrative and as charted in this chapter, Senators were much 
quicker than their House of Commons counterparts to refer to this when 
discussing Canadian foreign policy. Similarly, it is interesting to note that 
Senators reflected much of the elite consensus that shaped much of the 
discussion of Canadian foreign policy.402 Senators from both Liberal and 
Conservative Parties spoke out in support of Afghanistan and Libya and 																																																								
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demonstrated a shared understanding of Canada’s foreign policy rooted in its 
middle power narrative, regardless of whether they supported or rejected it. 
Perhaps most illuminating was Conservative Senator Stephen Greene’s 
argument against Canada’s middle power tradition and the founding of his 
criticism in the Conservative Party’s moral motivations. In particular, the 
categorisation of Canada’s middle power tradition as moral relativism as well as 
its role as honest broker clearly reflects the differing interpretations of the 
foreign policy narrative.403 Senator Greene’s criticisms remain rooted in the 
popular understanding of the foreign policy narrative underlining the explicit 
attempts to re-orient Canadian foreign policy away from its Liberal Party 
tradition. Indeed, this categorisation of moral action that disregards external 
preferences or how these actions are received by other actors focuses exclusively 
on fulfilling a self-conception.404 This fits within with the ontological security 
analysis that this study uses and indeed, also further emphasises that link 
between narratives and behaviour.    
Despite their comparatively limited ability to significantly shape policy, 
the debates in the Senate mirrored the House of Commons. Debates under the 
Liberal governments of Chrétien and Martin were generally discussed either in 
terms of Canada’s behaviour vis-à-vis its allies and the ways in which its actions 
were interpreted (honour-seeking behaviours) or Canada’s inaction on certain 
issues, such as Sudan (humanitarian). This is unsurprising given that the Senate 
generally reflects the debates in Parliament but the motivations as identified in 
the House of Commons debates were somewhat less pronounced. The exception 
to this is the moral motivations that come to the fore under the Harper 
government which are highly evident. In this case, the roles that are articulated 
are preferences more than positional.405 Specifically, Canada’s role in 
Afghanistan and Libya was that of a principled actor and founded in moral 
conviction. This again reflects that Senators were in a position to speak more 																																																								
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abstractly about Canadian foreign policy in relation to its foreign policy narrative 
without worrying specifically about more capabilities-driven considerations. 
However, given that this is the case, it becomes clear that the middle power 
narrative continues to exert a powerful influence on the practice and debates over 
Canadian foreign policy in the Senate and Senators sought to maintain continuity 
with this understanding. As will be explored further in the next chapter, this 
narrative also permeates the popular understanding of Canadian foreign policy as 
expressed in the media.   
Part II: NATO Headquarters and Canadian policymakers  
Through interviews in NATO headquarters with a number of Canadian staff, 
both members of the International Staff as well as in the Canadian Joint 
Delegation, it is possible to begin to construct their understanding of the middle 
power narrative and whether this shapes Canadian behaviour in NATO and then 
compare this to the foreign policy narrative articulated by parliamentarians and 
the attendant roles that accompany it. As noted in the introduction, the majority 
of these interviewees opted for anonymity so as to encourage a frank exchange of 
views as well as protect their professional reputations.  
In discussing Canada’s participation in NATO, particularly with regards to 
Afghanistan and Libya, there were frequent references to a number of terms 
related to Canada’s foreign policy narrative. Indeed, the term honest broker was 
frequently invoked in relation to Canada’s role in NATO, though in discussions 
with Canadians working in the headquarters, this was largely used in the past 
tense.406 The policymakers that were interviewed also noted interesting changes 
in Canadian foreign policy during the various governments. As one Canadian 
NATO Staff Officer explained that while the Chrétien and Martin eras had been 
marked by notable engagement and leadership in NATO, the Harper government 
had seen an “increasing view, both in, I don’t know, in sense and in deed, that 
Canada’s also pulling away from its multilateral approach and its willingness to 
participate.”407 This Staff Officer had noted that the changes in Canadian foreign 																																																								
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policy did not sit well with his identity as a Canadian.408 Similarly in relation to 
Afghanistan it was not entirely clear as to what Canada’s purpose in remaining in 
Afghanistan was inside or outside the delegation.409 The lack of overarching 
strategy was articulated as such by one Canadian Senior NATO Official who 
stated, 
[w]e’ve damaged our image as a middle power, maybe I’m too 
much from the Trudeau era. I think that we’ve done a lot of damage 
to the role that we could play internationally and when I say that I 
look at a collectivity of things. I look at, I guess I think of too much 
in terms of the Conservative government or Mr. Harper has really 
wanted to create a new mold for Canada and I fear that he may have 
chosen the wrong moment410   
Another Canadian member of the international staff explained that there was an 
expectation of a Canadian role in NATO and that the government had both 
muzzled the communications from the Canadian delegation and de-emphasised 
the narrative relating to NATO, thus making the organisation less important in 
the eyes of the Canadian public.411 This also manifested in the delegation with 
the loss of clarity as to Canada’s place in NATO’s operations and what it was 
meant to do.   
Moreover, there was a distinct view that the Conservative government 
had an alternative approach to the organisation. Another Canadian Senior NATO 
Official noted that the Harper government had taken a much more transactional 
view of the Alliance and did not have previous governments’ reflexive belief in 
multilateralism.412 By the same token however, the greater desire for freedom 
from the constraints created by multilateral structures helped to create flexibility 
of action for Canada.413 Furthermore he added that, while previous Canadian 
governments saw the rules-based functioning and the execution of foreign policy 
through multilateral structures as fundamentally in Canadian interest the 
Conservative government did not.414 When this point was raised with a senior 																																																								
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member of Canada’s defence delegation in headquarters, it was suggested that 
while perhaps transactional was too harsh, the Harper government saw the 
relationship as instrumental; a tool to achieve certain ends.415 Indeed, it was 
suggested that the foreign policy portfolio had shrunk in importance with a focus 
being placed on ‘retail politics’ and an emphasis on ‘principle.’416 This reflects 
some of the criticism noted in the Parliamentary Hansard concerning the 
Conservative’s approach to Afghanistan and foreign policy more generally – 
namely that Canadian foreign policy was being redefined along partisan CPC 
principles in order to win domestic electoral support.  
Taken together, the Harper government had made it clear that it was 
seeking to distance itself from the previous Canadian foreign policy narrative 
defined, in large part, under Liberal governments. This included the use of the 
middle power narrative, which was referred to as “a hackneyed Cold War 
expression” by one interviewee.417 Speaking to a similar point about Canadian 
foreign policy, another Canadian serving in a senior position in NATO noted that 
“we used to have an image of a good international player, someone you could 
depend on, I see that shrinking; I see us losing some of that good will which, 
there will come a time, things being cyclical, we will wish we didn’t, hadn’t lost 
it or we will be wanting to rebuild it.”418 Indeed, in conversation with another 
Canadian diplomat serving in Geneva, it was noted that the pressures placed on 
Canadian diplomats to adhere to the government’s foreign policy were damaging 
the department, likely necessitating a decade of internal rebuilding.419  
These comments from Canadian diplomats all point towards an 
overarching narrative surrounding not only Canada’s role in NATO, but 
Canada’s foreign policy behaviour more broadly. The responses reflect not only 
a deep concern over the conduct of foreign policy under the Harper government, 
but also a concern over the clear disjuncture with previous foreign policy 
continuity. In keeping with this study’s interpretative approach, it is possible to 
discern a narrative within the institutions that conduct Canadian foreign policy, 																																																								
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one which is multilateral, constructive, progressive and capable; in many ways 
reflecting the key characteristics of a middle power. In departing from the 
established narrative related to Canada’s foreign policy, the Harper government 
thus challenged the perception of the foreign policy narrative held by Canadian 
policymakers. As one senior Canadian official explained, that some naïveté 
about foreign policy had been lost through Canada’s experience in Afghanistan. 
However, concurrent to this, the Conservative government had developed an 
allergy to multilateral institutions.420 This statement reflects the process of 
disruption in action; with the Conservative government changing the narrative 
around Canadian foreign policy coming out of Afghanistan, there were clear 
behavioural changes that came with it. Canadian officials also confirmed this in 
saying that there was a new set of ‘principles’ governing Canadian foreign policy 
which, while making Canada more assertive had in turn harmed its image within 
NATO.421 However, as noted already, it was not clear what exactly the 
alternative narrative entailed.  
In speaking to the Canadian delegation members, there was no clear 
overarching theme to Canadian foreign policy akin to Canada’s ownership of the 
human security agenda.422 While there were mentions of maternal health 
initiatives, the Arctic, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights and 
Israel, there was no unifying theme to the various areas of emphasis.423 
Moreover, that is not to say that in these instances there was disagreement with 
the policies. The interviewees, while noting their discomfort with the new 
direction of Canadian foreign policy, were not entirely clear as to what the 
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Harper government’s new policy was. The actions taken by the Conservative 
government with regards to NATO do not necessarily reflect a clear, cohesive 
narrative. Indeed, as shown in the Parliamentary record, the government was 
staunchly committed to supporting the mission through until 2009, when it was 
clear that the combat mission would end in 2011. However, as a member of the 
delegation noted, members of the government complained publicly about our 
allies’ caveats in Afghanistan up until it was clear that Canadian forces would be 
withdrawing.424 Moreover, Canada also announced its withdrawal from the 
Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) and Airborne Warning And Command 
System (AWACS), the latter of which it had staunchly supported for years past. 
As a Canadian senior official noted, Canada also unilaterally cut its share of 
NATO’s common funding, the pooled assets which fund NATO’s various 
programmes.425 The withdrawal from these programmes was seen as indicative 
of the government’s new attitude towards NATO and as one Canadian staff 
officer put it, “had a fairly loud thud as it hit the ground.”426   
These actions, all taken together, may not necessarily reflect a new 
foreign policy narrative, however, they are certainly sufficient to disrupt the 
routines of the Canadian policymakers working in NATO. As a senior Canadian 
official noted, politicians are the ones who prioritise what happens when and the 
current government has a certain view of foreign policy that impacts the way that 
Canada acts.427 Indeed, it was recognised that by moving away from the 
traditional foreign policy narrative, there was a real impact for Canada’s foreign 
policy behaviour, particularly with regards to Canadian policymaker’s ability to 
shape policy in NATO committees. As will be explored in the next chapter, it is 
also important to see how this narrative is transmitted, in this case through the 
media, and how it is interpreted. Disrupting the routines of Canadian 
policymakers as well as other national policymakers’ interpretations of Canada’s 																																																								
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foreign policy narrative, changed expectations about the role that Canada could 
play in the Alliance. Moreover, there is a dynamic process by which the narrative 
of Canadian foreign policy travels back and forth between policymakers in 
Ottawa and those who execute its associated behaviour in Brussels. This also 
gives some clarity to the process by which narratives shape behaviours – in that 
behaviours dictated from Ottawa which conflict with the established Canadian 
foreign policy narrative, then trigger a disjuncture in policymakers’ routines and 
thus Canada’s foreign policy behaviour.     
Part III: Conclusions 
In seeking to draw out interpretations of the Canadian foreign policy narrative 
through the parliamentary debates there is a gradual but nonetheless clear shift 
away from traditional conceptions of Canada’s middle power peacekeeping role. 
Indeed, the explicit middle power label carries little weight with Canadian 
policymakers in Parliament or in NATO. That being said, the constituent 
components of this narrative still exert a magnetic pull in terms of structuring the 
discussions about Canada’s foreign policy actions. While the preferences of 
policymakers shifted, these are still compared against the peacekeeping tradition 
and justified in relation to Canada’s past foreign policy behaviour. It is possible 
to discern the ways in which the middle power characteristics mentioned 
previously; a reflexive belief in multilateralism, an inherent support for the 
international order, a preference for multipronged solutions (diplomacy, 
development) without a prioritisation of military involvement and a desire to 
promote peacebuilding, all have a definite presence during the discussions of 
Canada’s participation in the operations. Moreover, there was little question 
related to whether or not Canada should take part in these interventions. Indeed, 
regardless of public opinion, both main parties were largely agreed on taking part 
in the mission reflecting the elite consensus between the two.428 Rather, it was 
largely accepted that Canada had a role to play in both Afghanistan and Libya, 
even if the parties could not agree on the nature of that involvement. As Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien articulated, “[w]hen NATO sent forces in Bosnia, 																																																								
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Kosovo, and Afghanistan, we were expected to be there…Most times, however, 
Canadians wanted to participate in multilateral peacekeeping missions. They 
were practically a Canadian invention”429 These traditional elements of Canadian 
diplomacy continue to exert pressure, however, the specific behaviours and 
emotional elements linked with a foreign policy narrative affect policymakers 
remains variable. This suggests that the narrative of Canadian foreign policy 
exerts a clear pressure in driving foreign policy behaviour, even if the 
characteristics or details of that behaviour are contested. Given Canada’s foreign 
policy history it would have effectively been unconscionable for Canadian 
policymakers to oppose any kind of involvement in Afghanistan in response to 
9/11 or by the same token, in Libya. Indeed, the drive for policymakers to 
maintain a narrative of Canadian foreign policy then informed and helped justify 
the decision to become involved in both operations.  
Integrating the findings from the preceding chapter, this concluding 
section will first interpret the motivations behind the various governments’ 
foreign policy decisions, then examine the links between narrative and role 
through Role Theory, before establishing how this shapes foreign policy 
behaviour.  
Motivations  
Building on Steele’s ontological security related motivations for actions, 
policymakers evinced many of the same drives depending on their interpretation 
of the national foreign policy narrative.430 Liberal Party MPs, on initially 
involving Canada in Afghanistan, saw this as somewhere where Canada should 
be and drew on different kinds of language to justify this case. Nonetheless, 
involvement in Afghanistan was initially focused on duty, not moral duty, but 
rather a broader duty to allies and itself, or as noted before, honour. Liberal 
policymakers were driven to get involved in Afghanistan as a way to maintain 
their standing with the US and in NATO, fulfill commitments towards their allies 																																																								
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as well as support the broader cause of international security but most 
importantly, to have Canada’s contribution recognised as important by its allies. 
This reinforced both internal and external honour which as Lebow notes, are 
separate components, but still related.431 Different reflections of this honour were 
present both in deterring actions that did not mesh with policymakers’ vision of 
Canadian foreign policy and also shaped how they interpreted the actions of 
other states. These different visions of honour justified Canadian policymakers’ 
decision to sit out of Iraq while also creating an expectation that other NATO 
Allies would have a similar level of commitment (i.e. burden-sharing) in 
Afghanistan.432 When examining the commitments to Afghanistan through the 
concept of honour, it helps us to understand Canadian considerations vis-à-vis 
the United States and NATO Allies, but also how it reflects not only external 
recognition but also how this relates to internal considerations of international 
behaviour.433 There was a recognition amongst all parties, narrative aside, of the 
heavy burden that Canada bore in these respective operations, which, as will be 
explored further on, had important implications for Canada-NATO relations. 
However, throughout these debates though Canada’s past foreign policy 
behaviour influences the interpretation through reflexive examination of current 
and future actions, there is a clear move away from peacekeeping as the 
dominant behavioural expression of Canadian foreign policy.  
The Liberal focus later shifted more towards a humanitarian aim in 
Afghanistan which reflected the narrative confusion which Boucher observed.434 
With the Martin government’s focus on activities beyond Afghanistan, the 
interpretation of the middle power narrative became more attuned to shame over 
failures in previous foreign policy initiatives, particularly in Africa. With regards 
to the Afghanistan campaign, Martin, through his ministers, sought an 
arrangement with the International Committee for the Red Cross for oversight on 
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detainee treatment, however, this was eventually seen as insufficient.435 
Contemporary to the Martin government there was increasing focus on the 
ongoing atrocities in Darfur, Sudan and the government offered support for the 
African Union mission there (AMISOM) providing funding, training and 
equipment.436 As mentioned previously, Steele characterises humanitarian 
motives as arising from shame over disjunctions in a country’s foreign policy 
narrative, in this case Canada’s neglect of Africa and more specifically, the 
alleged genocide in Darfur, Sudan as noted in the Martin government’s 
international policy statement.437 Martin himself also stated clearly in his 
memoirs that he sought to create a leadership role for Canada in Africa through 
UN and regional initiatives.438 As such, this prompted Martin’s reorientation of 
the Canadian foreign policy narrative to emphasise the importance of foreign aid 
and cooperation with relevant non-governmental organisations.439  
As many observers have since noted, in contrast to the Liberal 
governments there is a clear moral narrative to the Harper government’s 
approach to foreign policy.440 On taking power in its respective minority 																																																								
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governments and then as a majority, the CPC retained a distinct narrative rooted 
in moral language; Canada’s duty to Afghanistan went beyond honour, but was 
rather a moral duty to support the good and do what is right, argued vaguely in 
this case, as defending Canadian values. In terms of its relationship with NATO, 
at least from 2005 to 2008, one NATO staff officer noted, there were no major 
changes in Canada’s approach to the Alliance.441  Moreover, when it came to 
actual foreign policy behaviour, the CPC conceived of Canada’s foreign policy 
narrative slightly differently with an emphasis on principle and moral action, 
supporting causes which promoted values and defended interests. Foreign 
Minister John Baird, while neglecting any mention of peacekeeping, stated in his 
2011 address to the United Nations General Assembly, “Canada does not just ‘go 
along’ in order to ‘get along.’ We will ‘go along,’ only if we ‘go’ in a direction 
that advances Canada’s values: freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law.”442 As seen in this chapter, the CPC’s efforts to try and reorient Canadian 
foreign policy were met with resistance and in some cases bewilderment, as it 
was such a clear departure from traditional or what could be termed Liberal Party 
foreign policy priorities. Fundamentally, the CPC foreign policy reflected more 
of the internal moral considerations of the policymaker. As noted in Chapter 1, 
ontological security posits that this is done in order to maintain consistency with 
one’s self-narrative. However, it does not suitably explain why this is the case on 
the individual level.443 Paul Gecelovsky suggests that Prime Minister Harper’s 
foreign policy is rooted in religious conviction from his upbringing.444 
Ultimately, this goes beyond the scope of what this analysis seeks to accomplish 
but nonetheless points to the importance of exploring the motivations driving 
foreign policy roles. 
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The Libya campaign, finally, highlighted how far the discussion of the 
Canadian foreign policy narrative had shifted from the Axworthy years with 
regards to the ‘human security agenda.’ Not because it represented a radical 
departure from a traditional narrative, but rather, as it highlights the ambiguity 
present in the Canadian foreign policy narrative after years of effectively 
attempting to ‘unfix’ it from the middle power peacekeeping image. Rather than 
linking the mission to these traditional narratives or the humanitarian narrative of 
Canadian foreign policy, the Harper government initially described this action 
along moral lines and emphasised its support for Canadian values; notable given 
the party’s previous criticism of the Liberals for their emphasis on the same 
thing.445 However, in this circumstance it becomes clear that the motivations, 
particularly those founded in honour and moral understandings defined Canadian 
policymakers’ contributions to Afghanistan and Libya and thus required a robust 
contribution to these operations to fulfill their linkage with the Canadian foreign 
policy narrative. Nonetheless, it is important to recognise the importance of 
shame in shaping the ways in which interviewees responded to questions. Indeed, 
the deviation away from what was seen as Canada’s traditional diplomacy had 
real implications for Canada’s influence within NATO. As Steele suggests, 
shame is vitally important when observing a disconnect between action and 
narrative as it shapes how actors interact and understand each other.446 In 
particular, in conversation with Canadian policymakers in NATO there was a 
sense that they were adrift as the Conservative government sought to break from 
the traditional components of the middle power narrative. Policymakers within 
NATO are then left to construct a new understanding of Canadian participation 
in the Alliance and what this means for Canadian diplomacy.  
Narrative and Role Theoretical Analysis 
The invocation of Canada’s foreign policy narrative and its attendant roles 
provide a window into both preferred action (role preference) and action borne 
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out of circumstance (role position).447 Nonetheless, while distinguishing between 
the two, it is through their expression that narrative then becomes linked with 
foreign policy behaviour. This chapter also highlights the role contestation that 
occurs on the domestic level with different actors articulating different roles. 
Their desire for consistency and the behaviours which flow out of this conform 
to how they understand their respective nations’ role in the international system. 
This process has been explored by a number of authors aiming to explore the 
relationship between National Role Conceptions (NRCs) and the domestic 
level.448 While the NRC literature offers some insight into this process, as 
explored in this chapter, agent-specific, but nonetheless multidimensional 
components of narratives become more apparent.  
 Initially, the Liberal Party conceived of Canada as a dutiful ally who, in 
a legitimate, authorised (UN and NATO), multilateral setting would play its part 
to support a specific cause. Ideally these foreign policy actions would reinforce 
Canada’s position as a supporter of international justice and development whilst 
simultaneously buttressing the existing international order. In many ways, 
however, this Liberal-defined role set and its attendant narrative was taken up by 
policymakers within NATO as it reflected their interpretation and understanding 
of Canada’s foreign policy narrative. Indeed, the narrative present within 
DFATD and the DND was, in large part, defined by many of the Liberal Party 
tenets of foreign policy. This can be attributed to the notable Liberal dominance 
of federal government, holding power for 75 of the 114 years between 1900 and 
2014.  
As a result the influence the party then exerted in shaping the outlook and 
character of Canadian foreign policy has resulted in a close association with the 
Department of Foreign Affairs’ institutional narrative. Indeed, the memory of 
Lester Pearson is as much a part of the fabric of the Liberal Party as it is in the 
Foreign Service, certainly evident given that the Canadian Department of 																																																								
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Foreign Affairs and Trade is headquartered in the Lester B. Pearson Building. As 
such, this can be interpreted as the reflexivity that occurs as part of the 
construction of a narrative by relevant policymakers.449 Moreover, this narrative 
then becomes institutionally ingrained as consecutive policymakers continually 
reinforce it, thus shaping a tradition.450 In this case, it forms a relatively unique 
narrative within the Canadian foreign policy community, informing the roles and 
policymakers’ understandings of Canada’s place in the world and how it acts 
within it. The Liberals under Martin and the subsequent CPC governments 
sought to create some distance from the traditional middle power role set through 
a greater emphasis on the military. Instead of articulating the traditional 
Canadian roles as peacekeeper, these governments echoed the functional roles of 
the past, still rooted in the same values, but altogether more concerned with 
Canada playing a role where it could, not because it should.451 In doing so, this 
suggests a greater concern with the role position, as opposed to the role 
preference which could be characterised as the dominant tradition in the 1990s.  
Carrying forward this tradition however, CPC policymakers articulated a 
role that cast Canada as vocal and at times enthusiastic supporter of causes that 
aligned with a moral interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy. While still rooted 
in practical, capability related considerations, this meant that Canada’s 
international role fundamentally seeks to defend causes which reflect what CPC 
policymakers saw as right. This reinforced their interpretation of Canada’s 
foreign policy tradition and to do so Canada’s participation in Afghanistan and to 
a lesser extent Libya, couched in language that linked them with other morally 
right foreign policy actions like the First and Second World Wars.452 In doing so 
however, this also had a clear effect on the how Canadian foreign policy was 
conducted in NATO.     
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What this chapter highlights at its most fundamental level is that a foreign policy 
narrative nonetheless defines and shapes the basis for potential behaviours. 
Canadian policymakers were driven to take action in response to 9/11, something 
which they were not inherently forced or coerced to do. While Article V, 
NATO’s collective defence component was invoked this did not automatically 
necessitate a military response.453 Furthermore, the US did not build its initial 
coalition to invade Afghanistan around Article V, thus there was no binding legal 
basis informing Canada’s decision to take part in the initial phases of the 
operation. Similarly, with the humanitarian motivations coming to the fore under 
the Martin government, the deployment of the PRT to Kandahar reflected the 
role that the government had sought to promote. However, as seen in this 
chapter, the influence of reinterpreting Canada’s foreign policy narrative was 
more profound at the policymaker level and in the practice of policymaking 
inside NATO.  
The dynamic process of negotiating Canada’s foreign policy narrative 
between the Liberal and Conservative governments thus points to the wider 
disruption of the middle power peacekeeping narrative, beyond only what 
occurred under the successive Harper governments. With the CPC victory in 
2006 the opportunity was presented in which to try and redefine the institutional 
culture within the civil and foreign service. The prioritisation of these 
components eschewed the traditional behaviours associated with the middle 
power role set – peacekeeping, commitments to multilateral solutions and 
diplomacy-led initiatives. Instead, Baird placed his emphasis on the elevation of 
principle in the Canadian foreign policy, criticising the UN for its increasing 
irrelevance and lack of effectiveness particularly in its pursuit of consensus.454 
This was also reflected in Canada’s strained relationship with the organisation.455  																																																								
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Taken together the change in foreign policy behaviour altered the routines to 
which allies had become accustomed. Routinisation forms a foundation of social 
interaction and as a result, within NATO, when Canada’s allies can no longer 
predict how it will react to certain events, it changes the dynamics of the 
relationship, both between Canadian policymakers inside and outside of Canada, 
as well as between Canada and NATO.456 Moreover, in preferring a morality-
focused role for Canada internationally that emphasised a commitment to what is 
right and less concern over multilateralism or diplomacy, the Conservative 
government disrupted routines within NATO. 
In discussing the Canada-NATO relationship a number of interviewees, 
Canadian and otherwise, noted that the relationship changed on the back of 
Afghanistan, in part due to the deployment of NATO AWACS.457 The approval 
for NATO AWACS deployment was given in 2009, however, they did not arrive 
in theatre until 2011.458 In this case, Canada, who had been a major contributor to 
the NATO AWACS programme, requested their deployment to support 
Canadian Forces in Southern Afghanistan, however, this was held up in 
committee due to concerns related to funding their deployment outside of 
Europe.459 When combined with the rising Canadian casualties, continued 
concerns over allies’ caveats on their forces and a more instrumental view of 
diplomacy from the Conservative government, there was a clear shift in the 
attitude towards NATO. As a result, the narrative surrounding Canada’s 
deployment was influenced through events on the ground, the influence of 
policymakers in NATO as well as in Parliament. It is here that one can see a way 
in which policymakers attempt to reconcile the current mission realities to the 
broader historical narrative about Canadian foreign policy. Nonetheless, as seen 
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in the Afghanistan debates, this became increasingly harder to do as the 
requirements and focus of the mission continually changed.460  
What is striking about so much of this action however, is the actual role 
of Canadian MPs outside of the PMO as policymakers in the process, both in the 
Liberal and Conservative governments. While MPs sought to express their views 
on Canada’s foreign policy, the number of votes in which they could actively 
shape the participation in the mission proved quite limited in the end. Thus while 
interpretations of the foreign policy narrative in a Parliamentary setting are 
contested, negotiated and renegotiated through debate, the actual agency of 
policymakers in this setting is limited. Moreover, it fulfils the conditions laid out 
earlier through the combination of Mintz and Kreps’ hypotheses; Canada’s 
political leadership was largely insulated from electoral punishment due to the 
lack of voting that occurred and a degree of consensus among Parliamentarians 
about the importance of the Afghanistan and Libya missions and as a result, there 
were limited political costs to supporting the operations.461 This suggests that 
when greater agency resides in fewer policymakers their individual internal 
conceptions of the Canadian foreign policy narrative carries greater weight.  
In relation to NATO, policymakers’ ability to shape Canadian foreign 
policy behaviour was also somewhat circumscribed. Members of the Canadian 
delegation noted the tight control exerted over messaging under the Harper 
government and suggested that this also made the shifting narrative that much 
more dramatic.462 Additionally, as a Canadian defence official noted, in the 
discussions about Afghanistan, NATO was not really a major factor but instead it 
was much more about Canada in Afghanistan than the Alliance.463 In their 
examination of Canadian strategic narratives, Ringsmose and Børgesen found 
that the Canadian strategic narrative towards Afghanistan was weak and 
inconsistent, however, their research was more concerned with how public 																																																								
460 Ibid, 13 November 2013.  
461 Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79; Sarah Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a 
Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led 
Operations in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 6 (2010), 191-215. 
462 Interview 23, 14 November 2013; Interview 24, 14 November 2013. 




opinion shapes foreign policy behaviour.464 While not focused on the 
policymaker specifically, Ringsmose and Børgesen’s observations about the 
importance of narratives could prompt reflection and a deeper questioning 
among policymakers of Canada’s place in NATO and by extension Canadian 
foreign policy more generally. This reinforces the interpretation that the de-
prioritisation of NATO was a function of policymakers in Ottawa and thus 
flowed directly from their interpretation of Canada’s middle power narrative and 
NATO’s place in it. Additionally, the operations in Afghanistan and Libya were 
thus defined against the narratives about Canadian foreign policy first, rather 
than against narratives about Canada in NATO. By clearly expressing the 
Canadian foreign policy in the context of domestic political priorities and linking 
them with past decisions it is possible to avoid a dramatic disruption to foreign 
policymakers’ views of Canada.  However, given that Canadian diplomats had 
clear instructions about communications from Ottawa, the differing emphasis of 
the Conservative government actually damaged Canada’s ‘brand’ within NATO 
headquarters.465 
Building on the analysis undertaken in this chapter, the next chapter will 
examine how the Canadian foreign policy narrative was transmitted and 
interpreted by examining Canadian media concerning the Afghanistan and Libya 
campaigns and then supplement that analysis with interviews with non-Canadian 
members of NATO’s International and International Military Staffs as well as 
members of other NATO delegations. Taken together it provides some clarity not 
only to the relationship between narratives and behaviour, but highlights yet 
again, the individual’s importance in interpreting a narrative of Canadian foreign 
policy. This speaks to Jeffrey Checkel’s suggestion to expand on the individual-
level impact of ontology, however, does not yet account for the multidimensional 
effects that a foreign policy narrative can have.466 Moreover, in looking at this 
Canadian narrative as seen by non-Canadians it becomes clearer as to how 																																																								
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Chapter 4 – Transmitting and Interpreting Foreign Policy Narratives: An 
‘Outside-in’ Perspective 
This chapter examines the middle power narrative in the media and among non-
Canadian policymakers through the examination of news sources discussing 
Canada’s participation in Afghanistan and Libya between 2001 and 2011 as well 
as interviews with non-Canadian policymakers in NATO. This is done in order to 
explore how the interpretation of the middle power narrative resonates and 
informs the reflexive interaction between different agents. This should also give 
further clarity to the ways in which behaviours impact the practice of 
policymaking and also prompt re-examinations of a foreign policy narrative. It is 
in this way that one can better understand how the middle power narrative shapes 
the discussion of Canada’s participation in NATO operations across multiple 
dimensions; domestic, international as well as those inside and outside. 
Narratives do not exist only in the mind of policymakers but are also negotiated 
and contested among members of the public and as this chapter explores, the 
media and agents outside of Canada. As noted in the previous chapter, the media 
reporting on detainee transfers by JTF-2 in Afghanistan forced the Minister of 
Defence to confront accusations that these practices were betraying core 
principles of Canadian foreign policy.1 That being said, the extent to which 
public opinion actually shapes foreign policy is outside the scope of this analysis 
and moreover, remains a point of contention in FPA.2  
Following the same qualitative analysis as the Hansard records, in 
reviewing news media this study will be cross cutting in its examination of 
sources from the mainstream political spectrum, whilst also remaining within a 																																																								
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manageable scope for one researcher.3 This will require an examination of major 
Canadian newspaper and magazine outlets and their coverage will be broken 
down year to year from 2001 through to 2011.4 This is not national cross section 
of news media as it is less concerned with establishing regional attitudes towards 
these operations, but rather is more interested in the wider trends across 
Canadian news outlets and by extension, how narratives reach more Canadians. 
Each year examined focuses on Canada’s participation in the Afghanistan and 
Libya operations and specifically explores articles which use the term middle 
power. From there, it will also look for linkages with certain interpretations of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative.  
As noted already, this will not examine social media sources as they were 
not available for the first part of the conflicts being examined and it is more 
useful to chart the ways in which narratives change by following specific news 
sources.5 Remaining cognisant that the media often reflect specific biases, what 
Robert Entman terms ‘content bias,’ the following analysis recognises that with 
competing narratives about Canadian foreign policy present between 
policymakers, so too does the media promote or de-emphasise various elements 
of the Canadian foreign policy narrative depending on the priorities of the 
journalist or news outlet.6 This also provides a way to examine how the 
contestation of these various narratives reinforces or dissents from the positions 
of policymakers. The narratives that the media create do not necessarily have the 
same duty as Canadian policymakers do to respond either to public opinion or 
reflect popular conceptions of foreign policy. As a result, while examining media 
sources in this chapter, it will be important to remain aware as Entman suggests, 																																																								
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of patterns of slant that support the interests of particular holders or seekers of 
power.7 Additionally, this will also include the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC) which as a government agency, possesses and disseminates a 
narrative about Canada, though it remains at arm’s length from government 
oversight.8 In looking at the descriptive terms used it is possible to ascertain what 
kinds of narratives are defined in the popular news media.  
This chapter will then turn to interviews conducted with non-Canadian 
NATO personnel and foreign diplomats as a way to help triangulate how 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative is interpreted. In speaking with NATO 
policymakers it is possible to see how they interpret this narrative as a way of 
making sense of Canada’s international behaviour. By comparing their responses 
to the Canadian media it should be clearer as to how the dynamic processes of 
narrative formation are not restricted to Canada or even between Canadian 
policymakers. As with the Canadian policymakers in NATO, the interviewees 
remain largely anonymous to encourage candid responses and elicit frank 
exchanges during interviews about Canadian foreign policy in NATO and speak 
to the question whether there had been a noticeable change in the relationship. 
Familiarity with Canadian foreign policy varied widely between interviewees 
with some expressing deep knowledge of Canadian narratives. When examined 
alongside the media, the responses from NATO policymakers help to understand 
the ways in which the middle power narrative inform how others see Canadian 
foreign policy and what they expect of it. Indeed, the interviews here, alongside 
the interviews in the previous chapter help to establish that among a notable 
cross section of NATO personnel, both Canadian and non-Canadian, there was 
an understanding of Canada’s foreign policy narrative. This outside view offers a 
critical take on how others view the way that foreign policy narratives and 
behaviour interact and how this feeds back into the process of policymaking.   
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Links with Previous Analysis and Role Theory  
The previous chapter explored the competing understandings and motivations 
behind the Canadian foreign policy narrative in Parliamentary debate and the 
attendant roles that emerge from this contested middle power narrative; it is 
necessary to then establish how these are articulated. Indeed, as Cristian Cantir 
and Juliet Kaarbo cautioned, “[o]ne actor’s assertion of a national role is not 
synonymous with national-level agreement.”9 The roles expressed by 
policymakers in the previous chapter are articulated and communicated to the 
public by the media and in doing so are then open to further contestation. As this 
chapter will highlight, this process often attempts to reinforce the continuity of 
Canadian foreign policy as a way of maintaining a coherent narrative.  As Nik 
Hynek suggested, “Canada derives its advantageous position from the fact that it 
has been repeatedly successful in (re)constructing and (re)producing its external 
identity as a middle power.”10 This chapter is meant to explore the ways in which 
this occurs and offer a deeper understanding of how this process unfolds. 
Similarly, this chapter will examine whether perlocutionary discourse plays a 
role thus allowing the media to try and urge certain courses of action by 
highlighting potential disconnects between the articulated narrative and foreign 
policy behaviour.11  
The media provides a conduit through which foreign policy is both 
communicated and interpreted.12 By doing so, the media offers a way in which to 
view the contestation of different competing narratives in public discourse, 
beyond the policymaker level and thus help establish the dynamic process 																																																								
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through which narratives are constructed at a wider, national level, although 
interpretation remains individual. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle explore 
this aspect in some detail, in their work on strategic narratives, highlighting the 
importance of informational infrastructure which ultimately mediate the ways in 
which narratives are transmitted and received.13 While their work focuses 
primarily on the way in which the state uses this in order to achieve their foreign 
policy outcomes, the way in which narratives are received and understood 
remains an important part of the way in which policy is made.  
In this case, this study is looking for the hallmarks of the middle power 
narrative such as a reflexive belief in multilateralism, an inherent support for the 
international order, a preference for multipronged solutions (diplomacy, 
development) without a prioritisation of military involvement and a desire to 
promote peacebuilding. In reflecting and reinforcing these elements of the 
middle power narrative the media help to construct a popular understanding of 
Canadian foreign policy that, in turn, shapes policymakers’ and the electorate’s 
views of Canada’s foreign policy narrative in a dynamic process. This also offers 
a degree of public input in that public opinion can still shape and affect foreign 
policy by levying potential electoral costs.14 It also gives voice to those 
interpreting the elite articulations of Canada’s foreign policy narrative, speaking 
further to the need for ‘outside-in’ perspectives.15 This reminds us to be 
cognisant of the fact that states do not have unitary ‘Selves’ and are contested 
internally with some groups actively shaping foreign policy, in this case elites, 
while there are also internal ‘Others’ who then interpret and contest these 
narratives and such dichotomies are not necessarily evident.16  
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The need to maintain an understanding of a foreign policy narrative not 
only affects Canadian policymakers but also foreign policymakers with whom 
interaction is routine. In undertaking a deeper examination, it is possible to 
examine a dynamic with the Other; the Self in this case being the constructed 
narrative of Canadian foreign policy and the Other being the non-Canadian 
policymakers in NATO who interpret this narrative. Given that this study is 
concerned with the policymaker, rather than state-level identity formation, it is 
necessary to expose both the ways in which a foreign policy narrative is 
communicated, in this case through the media, as well as how Other 
policymakers see this narrative and whether perlocutionary discourse plays a 
role.17 By examining this element of Canada’s middle power narrative, it 
provides insight into the complex ways in which narrative shapes interactions 
and how narratives are perceived and understood by others.18  This is not to 
inject another overt Self/Other dynamic but rather provides deeper interrogation 
into how the interaction between the two informs the basis of the roles that 
Canada’s Allies in NATO expect it to play.  
In the cases of Afghanistan and Libya, there was, generally speaking, an 
elite consensus over these missions between policymakers over Canada’s 
participation given that on the few opportunities to vote on these operations, they 
were supported.19 As noted earlier in this examination, the ‘essence of decision’ 
lies in domestic politics and as a result, policymakers are unlikely to make 
foreign policy decisions that impose domestic costs.20 However, only examining 
political speech does not necessarily reflect change in Canadian foreign policy 
and, as seen in the previous chapter, even with differing understandings and 
motivations, policymakers aim to draw continuity between foreign policy 
actions. While domestic considerations are important factors, the Canadian 																																																								
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governments between 2001 and 2011 were largely insulated from the electorate 
on Afghanistan and Libya. As a result, this provides an opportunity in which to 
not only examine Canada’s foreign policy narrative outside of Parliament, but 
also how Canada’s narrative changed. Rather, it is necessary to look beyond to 
help establish that it is not only public pressure that shapes foreign policy, but 
policymakers’ internal conceptions of a foreign policy narrative. As noted 
previously, there is an important element about the ways in which these 
narratives are contested outside of just the policymaking sphere.21 As such, 
media coverage remains an important component of this analysis due to its 
ability to communicate how these narrative interpretations resonate beyond 
Parliament. 
This chapter will focus on exploring the narrative and roles identified as 
helping Canadian policymakers maintain foreign policy routines between the 
different governments. Specifically, building on the analysis from the last 
chapter one can attempt to parse the motivations driving Prime Minister 
Chrétien’s involvement in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Martin’s foreign policy 
realignment and then Prime Minister Harper’s re-interpretation of Canada’s 
foreign policy narrative. This also helps to contextualise Canada’s foreign policy 
behaviour by exploring how its actions are interpreted in relation to outside 
understandings of its foreign policy narrative.  
Part I: Narratives in the Media 
2001 
As noted previously, prior to 9/11 there had been comparatively little critical 
examination in the press regarding Canada’s middle power narrative and its 
associated behaviours. Canada’s involvement in the Balkans during 1999-2000 
under what would later characterise the Responsibility to Protect, had conformed 
to previous interpretations of international behaviour. Its role as peacekeeper and 
constructive member of the international order was broadly accepted and 
unchallenged. In March of 2001, The Ottawa Citizen reported on Minister of 																																																								
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Defence Art Eggleton’s new plan for Canadian peacekeeping which emphasised 
‘early in, early out’ and noted Canada’s withdrawal from the mission in Kosovo 
and continued support to Bosnia.22 Following on from this the Ottawa Citizen 
reported on polling data indicating that Canadians were largely satisfied with the 
foreign policy status quo.23 The author, Joan Bryden, went on to explain how 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien was expected to leverage Canada’s position as a 
neutral middle power to play a more influential role in the G8.24 Reporting that 
featured the middle power narrative and peacekeeping treated the link between 
the two elements as implicit and was largely regarded uncritically.  
September 11 turned the focus on Canada’s foreign policy. In a speech 
reported by Ottawa Citizen, former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney referred to 
the country’s middle power status, declaring that “[p]eacekeeping is a Canadian 
trademark.”25 Others like former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy published an 
op-ed urging a balanced approached between capacity building and traditional 
peacekeeping.26 Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 a number of 
publications remarked on the peacekeeping tradition, though many noted that 
cuts to the Canadian Forces and its peacekeeping orientation had left Canada 
unable to offer an effective military response.27 Moreover, the seeds of the 
critical view of the prevailing Canadian foreign policy narrative were also visible 
in Andrew Cohen’s op-ed, derived from his remarks to the Standing Committee 
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on Foreign Affairs and International Trade delivered in November 2001.28 
Likewise, the Globe and Mail reported in November that while Canadian Forces 
could be deployed to Afghanistan for six months, they would likely be pulled out 
at the first sign of combat.29 It was not entirely clear as to what the nature of the 
international force would look like and, by extension, the Canadian deployment. 
However, with the Bonn agreement allowing a peacekeeping force in Kabul, 
Canadian Forces were expected as of the beginning of 2002, albeit with limited 
duties.30 Reflecting the discussions in Parliament, there was a general acceptance 
that the ‘Canada-as-peacekeeper’ narrative was, for better or worse, an accurate 
representation of Canada’s international behaviour and foreign policy narrative. 
The first signs of disruption of this narrative came with September 11 and the 
concerns raised over military spending and capabilities. Nonetheless, the 
peacekeeping deployment outlined in the Bonn agreement did not represent a 
major departure from what Canada had done in the past. As such, generally 
speaking, one can trace the continuity of this narrative in relation to the Canadian 
foreign policy tradition, despite the different interpretations that may exist in 
Parliament.  
2002 
As of 7 January Minister of Defence, Art Eggleton stated that Canada would be 
supporting the US military efforts underway as part of a coalition (Operation 
Enduring Freedom).31 News outlets, such as the Vancouver Sun noted that 
Canadian Forces were being deployed in support of a combat mission instead of 
the peacekeeping mission in Kabul and it marked a departure from Canada’s 
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traditional deployments.32 Paul Knox, writing in The Globe and Mail, argued that 
the fact that this was not classic peacekeeping was not in itself troubling, but 
rather the danger lay in the vague nature of the mission, as well as the threat to 
the “perception of Canada as a multilateralist middle power.”33 This was 
followed shortly by revelations that the Canadian Special Forces unit, JTF-2, had 
already been operating in theatre and handing over detainees to the US for 
interrogation.34 As discussed in the previous chapter, there was significant debate 
about this in Parliament and whether this reflected Canadian traditions. In his 
comment for the Toronto Star, Graham Fraser reminded readers that this case 
had parallels with Canada’s participation in the Korean War, though the 
keenness to be included and follow the US reflected a diminishing of the middle 
power status.35 Despite these questions about Canada’s foreign policy direction, 
Foreign Minister Bill Graham emphasised the human security agenda and that 
Canada remained a middle power built on a strong multilateral system, despite 
closer ties to the US.36 Indeed, on the back of the detainee issue, there was 
increasing criticism over the Canada-US relationship and what was seen as 
undue influence over the conduct of Canadian diplomacy.37 There was notable 
criticism of Canadian foreign policy from Robert Fulford in the National Post, 
who suggested that Canada’s middle power identity and peacekeeping were a 
way in which Canada asserted its difference from the United States despite 
wanting to remain onside with the Americans.38 As referenced previously in this 
examination, the current of anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in 
Canadian politics, however, it resurfaced aggressively during the Bush 
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Presidency.39 Nonetheless, there were clear, continuing concerns over Canada’s 
international behaviour and what this meant for Canadian foreign policy. 	
Perhaps the most traumatic incident of the year was the death of four 
Canadian soldiers and the wounding of eight others during a training exercise 
outside of Kandahar in the Tarnak Farm incident. In this circumstance a US Air 
Force pilot mistook Canadian Forces for Taliban and bombed their position. 
These were the first Canadian combat casualties since the Korean War and 
prompted significant response from news outlets across the country. Kevin 
Myers in the National Post lamented that this Canadian sacrifice would be 
forgotten as “Canada repeatedly does honourable things for honourable motives” 
but is rarely recognised for these acts.40 The deaths caused reflection on 
Canada’s mission but galvanised the mission going forward and saw major 
recognition with a memorial service conducted in Edmonton drawing 16,000 
people wishing to pay respects.41 This incident nonetheless cast a shadow over 
the rest of Canada’s deployment in Kandahar until the forces returned to Canada 
in August 2002.	
2003	
The beginning of 2003 was dominated by the buildup to the Iraq War and indeed 
this prompted a serious reflection on the Canada-US relationship as well as the 
way in which this reflected Canada’s foreign policy narrative. Writing in the 
National Post, Sheldon Alberts noted that President Bush naming Britain as the 
United States’ closest ally should be cause for concern and reflected Canada’s 
diminished ability to project its influence abroad, militarily or otherwise.42 On 
the other side, writing in the Toronto Star, James Travers maintained that Canada 
had recommitted forces to Afghanistan and was seeking to broker a compromise 
that would help the US avoid circumventing the UN, fulfilling many of the 
middle power hallmarks of Canadian diplomacy.43 Others sought to reinforce the 																																																								
39 Brian Bow, “Anti-Americanism in Canada: Before and After Iraq,” American Review of 
Canadian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Oct. 2008), 341-359.  
40 Kevin Myers, “Salute to a Brave and Modest Nation,” National Post, 26 April 2002, A1. 
41 Jill Mahoney, “‘We Have Brought Them Home,’ 16,000 Attend Memorials for Fallen 
Soldiers,” The Globe and Mail, 29 April 2002, A1. 
42 Sheldon Alberts, “Riding On America’s Shoulders,” National Post, 28 January 2003, A12. 




peacekeeping narrative, with the CBC covering the Governor General’s award of 
the peacekeeping service awards.44 Nonetheless a number of outlets published 
articles noting that the status quo in Canadian foreign policy had been upset and 
as a result, it needed to change.45 Also writing in the National Post, Andrew 
Coyne suggested that the Prime Minister’s decision to avoid Iraq was “the 
patriotism of fools: multilateralism, über alles.”46 Statements from the military 
leadership warning that Canada could not contribute to more peacekeeping 
missions as the Canadian Forces were spread too thinly, also underscored this.47 
Similarly, there was recognition of Canada’s fading influence in the world with a 
national television station airing a documentary on the subject, as well as a 
number of articles and books reflecting this declinist theme.48 There was 
widespread concern that Canada’s foreign policy narrative had diverged too far 
from its capabilities and as such, undermined its ability to project its influence 
abroad. This reflection did not necessarily call into question the underlying 
narrative of Canadian foreign policy but rather focused on whether Canadian 
policymakers were doing enough to actually reinforce or support it. 	
In terms of Canada’s new Afghanistan deployment, the government had 
committed 1,800 troops in support of ISAF’s Kabul mission. Speaking to the 
Canadian Press, Defence Minister John McCallum explained that this was not a 
combat mission and extensions to Canada’s future commitment would not be 
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ruled out.49 Other outlets paid homage to tradition with The Montreal Gazette 
noting that, “Canadian soldiers will return to Afghanistan, this time in their 
traditional role as peacekeepers, not as terrorist-hunting warriors.”50 Moreover, a 
Canadian was slated to take command of the ISAF mission during the transition 
to NATO control.51 Writing later in 2003, David Bercuson cautioned that the 
mission in Afghanistan would soon evolve into a more proactive operation and 
that Canadian Forces were unprepared for a more aggressive role in theatre.52 
What is perhaps most notable during the coverage of Afghanistan is that 
Canada’s participation in the mission was described more in terms of its relation 
to recognition by other allies than in terms of the wider Afghanistan mission. 	
2004	
During 2004 and the aftermath of Iraq, coverage of the challenge to Canada’s 
foreign policy narrative lessened somewhat with reporting focusing in on the 
forces in Afghanistan and the various challenges to maintaining a mission there. 
Discussion of the middle power narrative was also subordinated to coverage of 
the upcoming elections and the Liberal Party led by Paul Martin. Indeed, there 
was more commentary surrounding this narrative related to inaction in Darfur 
rather than Afghanistan.53 Marcus Gee detected Lester Pearson’s long shadow in 
foreign affairs and argued that the current Prime Minister was taking an active 
role in trying to leverage Canadian influence abroad visiting conflict zones in 
Africa, Haiti, North Africa and Asia.54 Nonetheless, there was significant 
criticism of the middle power narrative, with a number of publications focusing 
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on an article by former diplomat, Thomas Axworthy.55 Similarly, there was 
significant coverage of Jennifer Welsh’s book on Canadian foreign policy which 
argued that Canada needed to reexamine its place in the world and this spurred a 
number of related articles.56 With Martin’s election, focus again turned to the 
Afghanistan mission and Canadian perceptions of this mission highlighted by 
polling which suggested that Canadians were more willing to use a military 
solution than in the past.57 In relation to Iraq, Martin was also clear that Canada 
would not deploy troops but would seek to contribute in areas that it could make 
a substantial difference though this ultimately came to very little.58 With Paul 
Martin indicating an expanded Canadian peacekeeping role there was a planned 
expansion of the military with an additional 5,000 personnel to be recruited.59 
That said, the National Post reported Minister of Defence Bill Graham indicating 
these forces would contribute to a more muscular expeditionary role which could 
include additional Canadian casualties.60 	
Specific to the Afghanistan mission, while still characterised as 
peacekeeping, the concerns over the expansion of the mission continued to 
inform coverage. Of note, on 10 January The Globe and Mail published a 
comment from Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, a member of the board of directors of 
the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre announcing her resignation along with half of 
the board of directors over the continued focus on military operations in 
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Afghanistan.61 John Ibbitson reported that as of the end of Canada’s second 
rotation through Kabul in August, there would only be 500 personnel available 
for overseas deployment, despite increases to the Defence budget.62 Soon after 
this, however, Prime Minister Paul Martin committed these 500 soldiers to the 
ISAF peacekeeping mission in Kabul.63 Additionally, the Canadian commitment 
in the Balkans was drawn down, though overshadowed by the ongoing 
Afghanistan engagement.64 Moreover, with problems flaring in Haiti, the 
Balkans and Darfur there were frequent talks of overstretch of Canadian Forces. 	
2005	
This year saw the release of a foreign policy review, A Role of Pride and 
Influence in the World, meant to establish Canada’s foreign policy priorities and 
expressly sought to distance itself from the middle power narrative.65 Olivia 
Ward writing for the Toronto Star suggested that restoring Canada’s 
international position and reinforcing its reputation should be a priority of the 
document.66 However, with the conflicted processes leading to its release and the 
infighting between departments that had characterised its development there was 
a significant amount of coverage on the delays.67 The multiple re-writes of the 
review drew comparisons to Narcissus’ self-absorption from Mike Blanchfield 
writing in the Ottawa Citizen, who also highlighted increasing criticism of the 
process from former diplomats.68 The report’s actual release was met with tepid 
response from some outlets such as the National Post and the Vancouver Sun 
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noting that the review’s release had been overshadowed by the selection of a new 
Pope.69 	
As a result, the use of the middle power narrative in the media was 
notably diminished in the relevant reporting. Writing also in the Ottawa Citizen, 
Andrew Cohen maintained that while the foreign policy review had discarded the 
middle power slogan, the Prime Minister struggled to articulate a larger vision of 
Canada in the world.70 Nonetheless, the narrative appeared in the media during 
discussions of UN reform and the Prime Minister’s speech before the General 
Assembly.71 Moreover, the Prime Minister placed significant emphasis on 
supporting peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in Africa.72	
In relation to Afghanistan and peacekeeping, however, the middle power 
narrative was no longer as clearly linked. The press reported on the high 
possibility of Canadian casualties in Kandahar while occasionally questioning 
the deployment given the lack of debate in the Canadian Parliament.73 Reportage 
on Afghanistan often related to the need to reinvigorate the Canadian Forces and 
the appointment of General Rick Hillier to Chief of Defence attracted some 
attention, particularly given his outspoken views.74 However, General Hillier’s 
remarks later in the year about the role of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan 
drew significant press attention. After noting that the Forces were ready to take 
on a larger overseas burden after a rest, he noted that 2,000 troops would deploy 
southwards to Kandahar in early 2006 to go after “detestable murderers and 																																																								
69 Don Martin, “Martin’s Reign Of Error,” National Post, 21 May 2005, A1; Michael Campbell, 
“Canadians Are Sold On Empty Moralizing,” Vancouver Sun, 21 April 2005, D3; “Fixing 
Canadian Foreign Policy,” National Post, 20 April 2005, A20. 
70 Andrew Cohen, “Liberal Luck Is All Bad Now,” The Ottawa Citizen, 26 April 2005, A12 
71 Steven Edwards, “World Comes To N.Y. To Ponder UN’s Future: Security Nightmare,” 
National Post, 12 September 2005, A8; “Canada Has Critical Role to Play In Reforms,” Toronto 
Star, 11 September 2005, A11. 
72 Paul Koring, “Martin Vows to Ease Darfur’s Suffering,” The Globe and Mail, 23 February 
2005, A1; Graham Fraser, “Ottawa Boosts Aid Effort For Darfur,” Toronto Star, 8 May 2005, 
A22; Anthony Mitchell, “Canada Leads Way in Darfur Pledges: $134 million U.S. for 
Peacekeeping. African Union Plans to Increase its Troops in Western Sudan to more than 
12,300,” The Montreal Gazette, 27 May 2005, A16; Dean Beeby, “Troops Poorly Prepared For 
Africa, Report Says,” The Globe and Mail, 10 October 2005, A4. 
73 Mary Janigan, “Why are we in Afghanistan?,” The Globe and Mail, 17 September 2005, F3; 
Terry Pedwell, “Canadians Take Over Kandahar Patrols,” Canadian Press, 11 August 2005, 
A10;  
74 Paul Koring, “PM Will Name Hillier to Top Defence Post, Sources Say; Ex-commander of 
International Forces Outspoken On Need to Modernize Military,” The Globe and Mail, 13 




scumbags.”75 This prompted significant coverage as it was seen as a departure 
from traditional comments about the Canadian Forces’ peacekeeping heritage 
and signaled a much more aggressive tone to Canada’s Afghanistan mission.76 
Nonetheless, reporting on a Department of National Defence poll of the 
Canadian public, it found that 57% of Canadians surveyed preferred Canada in a 
“traditional peacekeeping” role.77 The Canadian military, in response to this, 
took great pains to emphasise that this would not be a peacekeeping role, but 
rather an aggressive, offensive combat role.78  
At the end of 2005 a vote of no-confidence brought down the Liberal 
government and prompted a new electoral campaign. Both the Liberal Party and 
the Conservatives promised significant increases in the Defence budget as part of 
their platforms alongside support for the Canadian mission in Afghanistan.79  
2006	
The election of the minority CPC government did not see an immediate shift in 
foreign policy in the media. Writing in the Toronto Star, James Travers noted 
that Canadians abroad still benefitted from the image of Canada as a “middle 
power peacekeeper,” despite the fact that this image was dated and peacekeeping 
had given way to peacemaking.80 Chris Cobb writing in the Ottawa Citizen noted 
the efforts to debunk the peacekeeping myth on the part of the military but 
nonetheless echoed the fact that Canada’s image abroad remained largely 																																																								
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unchanged.81  Graham Fraser wrote in the Toronto Star, “less than six months 
after forming a government, Harper is showing that he is shifting Canadian 
foreign policy in a number of dramatic ways.”82 Fraser further explained that 
Harper was creating an ideological delineation between countries that were 
approved of and those that were not.83 He concluded that Harper was tilting 
towards a more interests focused approach rather than the values approach of 
Martin, emphasising Afghanistan over the Sudan.84 Barbara Yaffe writing in the 
Vancouver Sun noted that leaders could easily distinguish themselves in foreign 
affairs, as they look “decisive and proactive without getting bogged down in day-
to-day politics.”85 This speaks to the idea that foreign policy ultimately, is not 
often the deciding factor in elections, as the electorate tend to focus on domestic 
considerations rather than foreign policy. With Prime Minister Harper’s address 
to the United Nations General Assembly in September it was suggested that the 
foreign policy prioritised the promotion of democracy, freedom and rule of law, 
which opened the government up to accusations of being too pro-US.86 In 
relation to the Afghanistan mission however, middle power had little currency. 
However, there was significant reflection as to how the mission echoed Canada’s 
peacekeeping tradition.	
The Canadian Forces deployment to Kandahar, as noted in the previous 
chapter also triggered some criticism. Indeed The Globe and Mail reported on a 
poll in January that suggested that Canadians were largely against the 
deployment of forces to Kandahar and were skeptical of operations that were not 
UN peacekeeping.87 Indicative of the reporting that followed was an editorial in 																																																								
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the Toronto Star where academic Sean Maloney argued that Afghanistan was not 
peacekeeping and tried to draw the continuity between Kandahar and Vimy 
Ridge as the frontlines for Canadian Forces.88 Harper visited the Canadian 
Forces in March of 2006 and warned that it would be a long mission, with the 
sentiment relayed in the press.89 This was his first international visit as Prime 
Minister and reflective of his foreign policy priorities. Writing about the visit, 
John Ibbitson saw this as part of a wider scheme to remake Canadian narratives, 
arguing that Harper had embraced the Kandahar mission and made it a reflection 
of “core Canadian values.”90 Linda McQuaig also suggested that a continued 
combat mission in Afghanistan would threaten Canada’s image internationally 
and its reputation for promoting peace and justice.91 Nonetheless, a new poll 
released in March showed that public support had swung behind the mission.92 
Public opinion, however, proved a fickle metric swinging back and forth during 
the course of the year and ultimately, there was a Parliamentary debate on the 
Afghanistan mission despite the Harper government’s previous objections.93 	
Several outlets reported on NDP leader, Jack Layton’s remarks 
suggesting that Canadians do not support a combat mission but rather a 
peacekeeping one.94 The Globe and Mail published an article in which each 
party’s member with the defence portfolio contributed their party’s views; this 
along with a series of articles triggered intense debate.95 As a consequence, 
coverage of April’s debate on the Afghanistan mission was mixed. Mike 																																																								
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Blanchfield writing for the Canwest news service suggested the debate was tepid, 
with all parties supporting the troops.96 Nonetheless, the government took some 
criticism for equating debate over the mission to defeatism or a lack of support 
for the troops.97 With another debate on the mission’s renewal following soon 
after there was some confusion in the media. Indeed, as noted in the previous 
chapter, the government called this debate with very little warning and received 
significant criticism from the other parties. Nonetheless, there were some voices 
who suggested that this debate was an opportunity for MPs to demonstrate where 
Canada truly stood on the Afghanistan issue, despite the mission’s growing 
unpopularity.98	
There were also a number of articles which questioned the peacekeeping 
narrative in Canadian foreign policy. Writing in The Ottawa Citizen, diplomat 
Chris Berzins noted that politicians frequently invoked Canada’s peacekeeping 
tradition when criticising the Prime Minister. Exploring the narrative he suggests 
that the mythology fixes Canada to one point in time.99 Echoing this sentiment 
Antony Anderson writing in the Toronto Star, also noted that Canada’s narrative 
of being a neutral peacekeeper was wrong, rather Prime Minister Lester Pearson 
had been a ruthless pragmatist.100 The Globe and Mail also followed this vein 
with Michael Valpy arguing that while the mythology of the Canadian 
peacekeeper remained persistent, it was no longer as easy to distinguish 
peacekeeping from fighting wars.101 	
2007 
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The Afghanistan mission had clearly triggered a significant amount of debate 
over Canada’s participation and also the broader foreign policy narrative. The 
Globe and Mail noted that the mission in Afghanistan was the news story of 
2006 and the Canadian soldier the top newsmaker.102 As an ardent defender of 
Canada’s peacekeeping traditions and middle power status, former General 
Romeo Dallaire urged Canada not to abandon its traditional position in the 
international system.103 Writing in the Ottawa Citizen, Allan Gregg opined that 
Harper’s challenge to Canada’s honest broker middle power peacekeeping 
narrative was a major undertaking, but nonetheless anachronistic and the Prime 
Minister would have to go against the tide of public opinion.104 Nonetheless, as 
the Ottawa Citizen reported, Prime Minister Harper insisted that middle powers 
like Canada had an important role to play through leading by example.105 Others 
like Carol Goar at the Toronto Star suggested that the Pearsonian middle power 
ideal no longer informed policymakers in Ottawa.106 
Indeed, there was recognition among many mainstream outlets that 
traditional images of Canadian foreign policy endured. There were a number of 
articles throughout the year noting the attachment to the myth of the Canadian 
peacekeeper and the challenges this presented to the military.107 As Michael 
Valpy pointed out in his article, despite Canada’s active role in Afghanistan 70% 
of Canadians saw peacekeeping as a defining characteristic of Canada, while the 
country only contributed less than 0.1% of the UN’s peacekeeping troops.108 The 
peacekeeping narrative underscored how different the Afghanistan operation was 
from Canada’s previous troop deployments overseas. A steady stream of 																																																								
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casualties from 2006 into 2007 further compounded the diminished peacekeeping 
narrative. Allegations of abuse against Canadian soldiers serving in Afghanistan 
served to create more uncertainty about Canada’s international role.109 Later in 
the year, Jack Aubry, writing in the Ottawa Citizen, warned that Canadians 
across the political spectrum were increasingly skeptical of the mission’s chances 
of success though polling indicated that many thought it enhanced Canada’s 
standing on the world stage.110 Also in the Ottawa Citizen, Chris Cobb 
questioned at what point Canadian voters would become fed up with the mission 
as casualties seemed to have a negligible impact on the mission’s support, though 
2009 was likely as far as Canadians were willing to continue their support.111 
Writing in Maclean’s, Paul Geddes suggested that Afghanistan was no longer the 
foreign policy priority for the Harper government and that the benefits imparted 
by the mission for Canadian foreign policy would be lost.112 Nonetheless, the 
government did not suggest that Canada would withdraw, with Stephen Harper 
counting on the fact that Canadians still supported the moral purpose of the 
mission.113 Coverage in 2007 thus focused on the changing attitudes towards the 
mission and reflected the general uncertainty in the Canadian public over how 
much would be sacrificed and how the mission would end.  
2008 
While 2006 had seen a surge of coverage of the Afghanistan campaign, 2007’s 
more muted, uncertain view of the war suggested an uneasiness with the relative 
open-endedness of the campaign. In relation to Canada’s middle power 
peacekeeper narrative, while it lingered, there was a clearer recognition that 
Canada’s mission was not peacekeeping and its soldiers were not peacekeepers. 
Barbara Yaffe insisted that there needed to be more serious contemplation of 																																																								
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Canada’s place in the world despite its middle power position and what 
Canadians should identify as foreign policy priorities.114 Similarly, Don Martin, 
writing in the National Post observed that Prime Minister Harper was relishing 
his position as a middle-power leader no longer relegated to peacekeeping.115 
Beyond this however, the middle power narrative in relation to the Afghan 
mission was notably scarce in the press.  
The release of the Manley Report also forced a re-examination of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative and how the Prime Minister would seek to 
define Canada’s future role in Afghanistan. As reported in The Montreal Gazette, 
John Manley was skeptical of the peacekeeping mission outlined by Liberal 
leader Stéphane Dion while also pressing the need for Canada to remain engaged 
in Afghanistan.116 Furthermore, Jeffrey Simpson writing in The Globe and Mail 
noted that the Manley report also placed pressure on NATO to take some of the 
burden off Canada in Southern Afghanistan though he was skeptical that more 
troops could stabilise the situation there.117 In a similar vein, Richard Gwyn 
suggested that the report represented a choice between international isolationism 
and engagement, the starkness of which was built on years of resting on a 
complacent peacekeeping image.118 Manley also invoked the memory of Pearson 
in justifying the mission’s continuation, a comparison seen as wholly 
inappropriate by Linda McQuaig at the Toronto Star as, despite the UN mandate, 
this was a combat mission led by the US.119 In Maclean’s Paul Wells suggested 
that the Harper government’s response to the Manley report highlighted the 
collapse of Canadian diplomacy which had been geared towards supporting the 
US War on Terror.120 Nonetheless, as noted in the previous chapter, Parliament 
accepted the findings of the Manley report and authorised the mission’s 																																																								
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extension through 2011. With the collapse of the government triggered by Prime 
Minister Harper in September 2008, electioneering actually turned away from 
Afghanistan. As Terry Glavin in the National Post explained, all the key political 
parties had something to lose in the election by discussing Afghanistan.121  
Other journalists such as Andrew Coyne suggested that the Conservatives 
were trying to reinvigorate older Canadian traditions while pushing aside 
peacekeeping and other Liberal components.122 Paul Wells, echoed this 
sentiment though he was much more critical of the Harper government’s frequent 
U-turns on policy for political expediency, particularly regarding Afghanistan.123 
Despite this, the peacekeeping image of Canadian Forces remained deeply 
entrenched with a survey conducted by the Department of National Defence 
concluding that the public still overwhelmingly saw Canadians as 
peacekeepers.124 Writing in Maclean’s Noah Richler lamented that Canada’s 
peacekeeping heritage was being maligned and dismantled both inside and 
outside of Parliament, and effectively the peacekeeping heritage had been 
discarded in favour of a warrior narrative.125 This was reflected in polling of 
Canadians who continued to support humanitarian interventions, although the 
relationship between this and peacekeeping remained unclear.126 During 
Remembrance Day ceremonies, while the press was often reflective over 
Canadian casualties, there was greater questioning of whether Canada had 
changed. As Michael Valpy observed, the military had become a much more 
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visible presence in the daily lives of many Canadians with uniformed soldiers 
present around the country.127  
2009 
In this year, there was a growing recognition that the narrative informing 
Canada’s foreign policy was no longer as relevant as it once was. Writing in The 
Globe and Mail, Doug Saunders argued that Stephen Harper had sought to shake 
off the middle power image with much more aggressive language and a 
confrontational attitude towards allies not seen to be pulling their weight, 
alienating Canada from the international community.128 Retired Canadian 
diplomat, Jeremy Kinsman, reflecting on the decade from 1999-2009 opined that 
Canada’s “middle power status” could allow it to thrive in a multipolar, 
networked and democratising world.129 Brian Stewart, also writing for the CBC 
noted that the traditional Pearsonian peacekeeping that Canadians knew could no 
longer exist in the current international environment and that the UN’s ability to 
oversee complex operations had grown increasingly limited.130 Retired General 
Lewis Mackenzie also cautioned that the pace of operations in Afghanistan had 
exhausted the Canadian Forces with regular infantry deployments meaning that 
the 5,000 strong force was burning out.131 Nonetheless, Canada remained 
committed to Afghanistan through until 2011 as established after the Manley 
report of 2008. That said, as in years past, the fixation with peacekeeping 
continued to inform the coverage and examination of the war in Afghanistan.  
Writing in a Toronto Star op-ed, Linda McQuaig suggested that Liberal-
party leader Michael Ignatieff reprioritise peacekeeping as a Liberal priority.132 																																																								
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The CBC reported the observance of the first National Peacekeeping Day in 
Canada, highlighting that over 100 Canadians had died in the course of UN 
peacekeeping operations since the 1950s.133 As noted in the Ottawa Citizen, 
despite the increased number of UN peacekeeping operations, Canada was now 
the 63rd largest contributor with only 55 personnel while Canada had been 33rd as 
recently as 2006.134 Similarly, there was increasing anxiety over how Canada’s 
international image was changing with several articles noting the friction 
Harper’s foreign policy was creating in various circles.135 Similarly, there was 
some recognition that the government’s emphasis on hard power may not be the 
most productive avenue for the exercise of Canadian influence.136 Indeed, there 
was a recognition that the Harper government was trying to re-brand Canada. A 
number of outlets outlined the departure from traditional narrative of Canadian 
foreign policy. Commentators Rick Salutin and Lawrence Martin, both writing in 
The Globe and Mail, argued that the previous years of Conservative rule had 
seen the party try and shift the traditional Canadian narrative.137 
2010 
As the penultimate year in Canada’s combat mission there was an increased 
focus on the legacy of Canada’s mission in Kandahar. Given that Canada had 
sustained 138 dead in Afghanistan by this point, the media turned towards 
looking at what the sacrifices had been made for.138 In terms of the broader 																																																								
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exercise of diplomacy, the discussions of Canadian influence in the world had 
also shifted. By this time, the middle power narrative was only really used in 
passing and generally did not signify the same positional or behavioural 
situatedness of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, the only significant usage of the 
term was found in reporting on the Wikileaks diplomatic cables where former 
US Ambassador Paul Cellucci had reported in 2005 that Canadian political and 
academic elites wanted to return Canada to its middle power status reversing the 
country’s falling international clout.139 Writing in the National Post, Don Martin 
suggested that coming out of Afghanistan Canada was a “military middle power” 
well-suited to a non-permanent position on the UN Security Council.140 As 
discussed earlier in this study, Canada did not win this seat, notable for the fact 
that it was the first time it had failed to do so.141 This led to several introspective 
articles considering the nature of Canada’s relationship with the UN, particularly 
under the Harper government.142 In a debate hosted by Maclean’s legal scholar 
and NDP candidate, Michael Byers, he sparred with the editor of Maclean’s, 
insisting that the Harper government was being unnecessarily rigid with its 
foreign policy and in doing so, alienating Canada’s allies and by extension 
diminishing its presence in the world.143 The CBC reported that polling among 
Canada’s allies and trading partners indicated that Canada’s reputation in the 
world was declining.144  
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Indeed, the narrative surrounding Canada’s relationship with the UN had 
changed somewhat, with Eugene Lang and Eric Morse suggesting in a Toronto 
Star op-ed, that with the Canadian Forces’ increased capabilities coming out of 
Afghanistan, the UN would not be the likely forum for Canadian foreign 
policy.145 With increased focus on future missions post-Afghanistan, the military 
and politicians sought to distance themselves from traditional peacekeeping.146 
Nonetheless, as a poll for the Globe and Mail suggested, the Canadian public still 
believed that peacekeeping should play a central role for the Canadian Forces in 
the future, despite a recognition that peacekeeping was not really a foreign policy 
priority any more.147  
2011 
During the last year of combat operations in Afghanistan focus increasingly 
turned to the next steps for Canadian foreign policy. John Geddes and Paul Wells 
writing in Maclean’s looked back at the Harper government’s foreign policy and 
suggested that the Foreign Minister’s role had been relatively incoherent with 
Harper playing effectively a central role when it came to decisions about 
Afghanistan.148 Moreover, the article quoted a Conservative Party strategist who 
outlined that the party had to create a new Canadian narrative as all the previous 
hallmarks, including peacekeeping, were closely associated with the Liberal 
Party.149 As reported in The Montreal Gazette, Foreign Minister John Baird had 
been outlining new priorities for Canadian foreign policy, largely focusing on 
trade and eschewing the traditional middle power priorities.150 Nonetheless, the 
use of the middle power label saw a relative resurgence related to its 																																																								
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participation in the Libya mission, Operation Unified Protector. One of the few 
examples was Campbell Clark in The Globe and Mail discussing Canada’s 
contribution to the Libya mission and explaining that in these types of 
circumstances the public expects Canada should act alongside other middle 
powers like Japan, Germany and Australia.151 John Ibbitson and Daniel LeBlanc 
also echoed this sentiment, suggesting that Canada used its status as a middle 
power to leverage power within NATO and give teeth to the Responsibility to 
Protect agenda.152 Attention turned more towards the Libya mission as well as 
the sacrifices made by Canadians over the duration of the combat mission in 
Afghanistan. Moreover, there was a broader recognition that the traditional 
peacekeeping narrative had gone by the wayside, at least among policymakers.153 
Writing in the Ottawa Citizen, Brian Crowley argued that the drive to preserve 
peacekeeping reflected a moral weakness and Afghanistan had demonstrated that 
Canada could sacrifice to achieve these ends.154 John Ivison, writing in the 
National Post echoed these remarks when he reminded readers that Harper had 
announced that international actions would be governed by “moral clarity” and a 
keen sense of “moral duty.”155 Indeed, this was reflected in an interview with 
Stephen Harper in July of 2011, where he specifically outlined that he saw 
Canada as a triumvirate, “the courageous warrior, compassionate neighbour, 
confident partner.”156 Taken together, these differ somewhat from the traditional 
middle power characteristics and if viewed in context when examining Canadian 
foreign policy under the Harper government, the change in language signals a 
different conception of Canada’s international role.    
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With regards to the Libya mission, the contours of the operation drew 
quick comparison to Canada’s participation in Kosovo in 1999. Defence Minister 
Peter MacKay had stated that the mission was a moral duty, as well as a duty to 
the UN and NATO.157 Reference to Responsibility to Protect from the 
government was relatively limited although other commentators such as former 
Prime Minister Paul Martin, Liberal MP Irwin Cotler, Liberal Senator Romeo 
Dallaire, Conservative Senator Hugh Segal did invoke the norm.158 As former 
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and former Canadian Ambassador to the UN 
Allan Rock insisted, the international community should use the opportunity to 
structure the response to Gaddafi in terms of Responsibility to Protect.159 The 
press was also obliging of the Canadian influence in helping to create this norm, 
noting that Responsibility to Protect was a guiding principle for humanitarian 
intervention in Libya. That said, despite unanimous authorisation, getting the 
Canadian Parliament onside with a Canadian deployment as John Ibbitson 
observed, Harper had worked behind the scenes to ensure that the mission had 
wide support.160 Nonetheless, the Libya mission was tempered by concerns over 
a long engagement, as several outlets observed; NATO remained deployed in 
Kosovo twelve years after the initial intervention.161 Similarly, some suggested 
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that the Libya mission demonstrated a new era in Canadian foreign policy.162 
Nonetheless, the moral component of the Libya mission was not unnoticed. As 
Peter Goodspeed observed, in humanitarian missions, the moral purpose was 
often lost in the course of the intervention as it is ultimately still warfare.163  
Part II: Non-Canadian NATO policymakers 
While the media provides some insight into the contestation of the foreign policy 
narrative and the ways in which it is transmitted, this narrative does not exist in a 
vacuum. The way in which it is interpreted by non-Canadian policymakers also 
influences the policymaking process within NATO. The narratives that are 
communicated, in part, shape the way in which interactions between Canadian 
and non-Canadian policymakers occur as they indicate what kind of behaviour is 
prioritised. In this way, NATO Allies can expect Canada to play a certain role 
within the Alliance and thus certain routine behaviours as dictated by this 
narrative. The interactions between policymakers in this environment offers 
some insight into the ways that Canada’s behaviours are interpreted by other 
policymakers and how that affects the ways in which Canada is perceived. As 
noted earlier in this study, perception is important in that it not only shapes how 
others see Canada, but also how they react to it and expect it react.164 
The interviewees were drawn from a number of NATO nations and all 
had varying degrees of familiarity with Canadian foreign policy. The bulk of the 
interviews were focused on NATO operations and the related International 
Military Staff personnel. However, there were a few delegations that were also 
willing to be interviewed and offer some insight into their impressions of 
Canadian foreign policy. Taken together they offer an interesting cross-section of 																																																								
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views about Canadian foreign policy from members of staff who interact 
relatively frequently with Canadian policymakers. That said, through these 
interviews it is much more difficult to parse exactly how these different 
understanding of Canadian foreign policy came to the fore. Indeed, the NATO 
personnel interviewed are much more interested in discussing and understanding 
the Canadian foreign policy behaviours rather than the narrative behind them, 
unlike the Canadian interviewees who saw the two elements as inherently linked.  
Perhaps most astute and familiar with the Canadian foreign policy 
narrative was one senior member of the US delegation to NATO. He suggested 
that after Afghanistan there had been a clear change in attitude and that the 
absence of General Rick Hillier driving the Canadian approach certainly had an 
effect on Canadian policymaking.165 Indeed, he remarked that Canada’s 
behavioural change was definitely linked to the new government and indeed, the 
new attitude, particularly with regards to Afghanistan was frustrating to the US 
as it challenged the ‘in-together, out-together’ mentality that had characterised 
the mission.166 He went on to warn that while Canada remained an active ally, it 
was being self-handicapped due to a lack of participation (particularly with 
regards to AWACS and AGS) and as a result, it is no longer certain what 
Canada’s responses will be, having become more of a question mark.167 Indeed, 
the AWACS and AGS withdrawals were symbolic of the changed attitude 
towards the Alliance. The senior US official suggested that Canada had 
withdrawn from these programmes due to frustration over burden sharing in 
Afghanistan and the slow pace of AWACS deployment after a Canadian request 
in 2009.168 Frustration was a common theme amongst a number of the 
interviewees when discussing how Canadian foreign policy with regards to 
NATO and NATO operations had changed. 
As one NATO staff officer explained, while Canada remained a positive 
force in NATO overall, issues like burden sharing were often difficult to square. 
As he remarked with regards to the Afghanistan operation,  																																																								
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it was because it was not burden sharing that Canada meant, Canada 
meant you have to have as many troops killed as we do. You have 
to have as difficult a domestic challenge as we do. That is what was 
meant by burden sharing, not we need to share the burden of 
council approved operations, because Canada didn’t.169  
He noted that Canada no longer contributed to other NATO operations such as 
Kosovo, Operation Ocean Shield or Operation Active Endeavour and that burden 
sharing, as a concept, was more than simply troops in Afghanistan. Indeed, 
coming out of the Afghanistan operation prompted a noticeable shift in attitudes 
in the relationship between Canada and NATO. Another Senior NATO official 
working on operations explained that “for Canada’s role in NATO’s operations 
it’s disappointing and it’s much less forward leaning than it was 10 years ago, 
that’s for sure.”170 In relation to Canada’s previous, proactive role in operations 
many non-Canadian policymakers observed that the foreign policy behaviour did 
not necessarily match with the expectations in terms of the roles that Canada was 
expected to play.  
When speaking with non-Canadian interviewees, however, it is more 
challenging to identify the shifts in Canadian foreign policy between 
governments. Given that Canadian policymakers in Ottawa, both Liberal and 
Conservative, had embraced the Afghanistan mission, it is less clear that the 
behavioural changes in foreign policy were not always directly linked to the 
governments. As one senior NATO official suggested with regards to the 
Canadian mission in Afghanistan, the mission in Kandahar was beyond its means 
and it was unwittingly, perhaps naively, drawn into a major role.171 He noted that 
the mission broke Canadians from the mold of the gentle peacekeeper; however, 
the intensity of the mission seems to have created a ‘we’ve done our bit’ 
mentality and as it has drawn back its legitimacy has been diminished.172 A 
number of staff members who had worked on the Kandahar campaign noted that 
while the relationship with NATO had started to change it was the drawdown of 
Canada’s Kandahar mission that signaled a different relationship with NATO. 
The Director of the International Military Staff Executive Coordinator and 																																																								
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former assistant to Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) 
explained that,  
DSACEUR, John McColl, he was livid with Canada for pulling out 
at the height of the surge in Kandahar. It was a key province and we 
had to find other people to backfill it and it caused all sorts of 
problems. It was a seminal moment I think, which amongst many of 
us we lost a certain degree of respect. 173 
As noted in the previous chapter, it was announced that Canada would take on a 
training role in Kabul. However, even this commitment was slow to be filled.174 
Overall, with regards to Canada, Afghanistan and the AWACS/AGS affair, he 
argued that there was “disappointment because the way it was done and the way 
it was handled.”175 With the de-prioritisation of Afghanistan as a policy priority, 
there was a clear effect on foreign policy behaviour. Canada losing respect or 
esteem is thus tied to a revision of its foreign policy behaviour, which, in turn 
flows from a more profound realignment of its foreign policy narrative. More 
fundamentally, a senior NATO official in operations suggested that Canadian 
policymakers were less inclined to invest in NATO as part of the calculus as to 
whether NATO serves Canada’s security.176 This was the key issue that many 
non-Canadian policymakers were curious about: did Canada still see value in 
NATO and were they willing to support the Alliance? Indeed, the rhetoric that 
had come out of Ottawa during the Afghanistan campaign about its commitment 
to NATO Allies reflected a lingering sense that Canada was not as invested in 
the Alliance.  
Despite the criticism that was leveled towards Canada, there were a 
number of non-Canadian policymakers who were somewhat in disagreement 
with their colleagues about its contribution to the Alliance and offered alternative 
views. One senior NATO Official maintained that,  
[t]hey contribute to the budget only a certain percentage but they 
are not among the biggest contributors. They are not even among 																																																								
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the biggest military contributors, but still they do play an active role 
in the NAC [North Atlantic Council], which is quite surprising so to 
say, I think probably it’s more, the explanation lies in their 
tradition, they’re traditionally active, an active ally of this alliance 
irrespective of the practical commitment. In a way it’s a kind of 
discrepancy between their political role and their practical role. It’s 
not a criticism, I think there’s a lot of merit in this.177  
This speaks to the traditional ‘punching above its weight’ characteristic of the 
foreign policy narrative, regardless of how the actual rhetoric had changed. As 
representatives from two national delegations suggested, Canada was a 
principled member of the Alliance and while withdrawal from the Allied Ground 
Surveillance (AGS) and Airborne Warning And Command System (AWACS) 
had been disruptive, it remained a proactive and fiscally responsible voice in the 
North Atlantic Council.178 As one member of the International Military Staff 
opined, while Canada’s voice had been diminished by not participating in 
operations, it could still deliver capabilities on the upper end of NATO nations 
and there were high expectations when it came to Canada’s contribution to the 
Alliance.179 Moreover, he insisted that Canada’s voice was important in acting as 
an alternative to the US and underscored the transatlantic element of the 
Alliance.180 Indeed, there was a strong recognition among many of the 
interviewees of the importance of Canada as the other transatlantic ally in 
NATO. This constituted an important role for Canada in the view of many non-
Canadian policymakers as it served to moderate the American view of NATO. 
Others interviewed referenced peacekeeping as an important and 
enduring element of Canada’s foreign policy behaviour, with one military 
official claiming, perhaps incorrectly, that the Canadian Forces were designed 
for peacekeeping.181 One staff officer in NATO Operations referred to Canada’s 
focus on UN Peacekeeping operations during the 1990s and thought that 
Canadian policymakers were increasingly focusing on the UN rather than 
NATO.182 Others referred to the ‘legend’ of Canada’s history with the UN while 																																																								
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acknowledging that this was partly fiction and that its diplomacy was more 
pragmatic.183 Staff Officer Erik Sandahl noted that with regards to Canada’s 
peacekeeping tradition, “I think this is very specific to Canada. They’re probably 
the only ones; I don’t see any other country playing this role in different 
environments with the same level of commitment in a steady way.”184 Indeed, 
the peacekeeping and UN relationship formed a clear part of many non-Canadian 
policymakers’ view of Canadian foreign policy behaviour.   
Overall, while there was certainly criticism for the perceived changes in 
Canadian attitudes towards NATO, this was usually couched in a benevolent 
view of Canada more generally. Canada’s sacrifices in Afghanistan were not 
unnoticed; similarly, its historic contribution to the Alliance was not forgotten.185 
As a senior NATO official in operations insisted, “the Canadians have a capital 
of sympathy,” built on their reputation as being frank and honest diplomats.186 
Another interviewee speculated that the Canadians seemed less motivated by 
realpolitik and promoted good international citizenship.187 Indeed, there was a 
relatively distinct narrative of Canadian foreign policy in relation to NATO with 
the country seen as a constructive, positive force within the Alliance with regards 
to European security and to a lesser extent, NATO operations. Moreover, 
Canadian diplomats were held in high esteem for their skills, regardless of the 
current relationship with the Alliance. Nonetheless, while the reaction to changes 
in Canada’s foreign policy narrative was noticeable, it was not nearly as 
pronounced as with Canadian policymakers.  
Part III: Conclusions 
This chapter has explored two different aspects of Canada’s foreign policy 
narrative, the first being the media’s interpretation and transmission of that 
narrative. This clarifies how Canada’s foreign policy narrative is articulated and 
which elements resonate with those outside of elite policymaking circles. The 
second aspect was the interpretation of Canadian foreign policy narrative rooted 																																																								
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in the observation of diplomatic behaviour by non-Canadian policymakers. This 
was done in order to clarify how Canada’s foreign policy narrative is interpreted 
by non-Canadian policymakers who do not have the same attachment to said 
narrative, but nonetheless, are influenced by it. Taken together, they can 
highlight the ways in which various policymakers’ understanding of narrative 
affect their interpretation of behaviour. At the same time, the media affects 
policymakers’ views of the state’s narrative. Even more, the media is a vital part 
of the context in which one constructs said narrative. Media sources can chart 
how different foreign policy narratives are constructed and highlight the dynamic 
process by which narratives are negotiated and renegotiated between the public 
and political spheres.188 Additionally, it can draw attention to disruptions in the 
continuum of the narrative of Canadian foreign policy and can push 
policymakers to better articulate shifts to foreign policy behaviour in terms of 
historical continuity.189 In doing so, this constructs a certain role that Canada is 
expected to play, with specific associated behaviours.  
This conclusion will first examine how the motivations driving the 
interpretations of the middle power narrative were articulated. In particular, this 
chapter highlighted that while the middle power and its associated interpretations 
are present, the motivations as defined by the ontological security research 
programme are not nearly as evident.190 It will then link the narrative with Role 
Theory, before finally examining how these foreign policy behaviours were 
understood by the media and non-Canadian policymakers.   
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With regards to the media, the use of the middle power label was fairly scarce 
throughout the duration of the Afghanistan mission and not particularly notable 
during the Libya mission either. When it was used, it was more as a shorthand 
way of referencing Canadian foreign policy tradition, rather than current foreign 
policy behaviour. As a result, its utility remains as an umbrella terminology 
encapsulating all Canadian foreign policy behaviour, alongside the different 
motivations for those actions. In examining the Afghanistan and Libya conflicts, 
it is useful to go into much more detail as a way to construct the individual 
understandings that reflect the middle power narrative.  
As noted previously, this study draws on Steele’s examination of 
ontological security in International Relations. He uses three historical examples 
to highlight alternative motivations for state action, i.e. Britain and the US Civil 
War for morality, Belgium in WWII for honour and NATO’s actions in Kosovo 
for humanitarian.191 This study has mapped these motivations on to the different 
Canadian governments as a way to understand how the differing interpretations 
of the middle power narrative shaped Canada’s participation in NATO’s 
operations in Afghanistan and Libya. As highlighted in the last chapter it is 
possible to discern Harper’s morally defined motivations as opposed to the 
honour and humanitarian driven ones articulated by the Liberal Party under 
Chrétien and Martin. At the outset of this chapter the interest in perlocutionary 
discourse was suggested as a possible motivator for what could be considered 
moral foreign policy. However, in this case it was not evident that the morally 
defined roles were driven by internal shame, perlocutionary discourse from the 
media or non-Canadian policymakers. Instead, other internal motivations from 
the individual policymaker seem to have driven the creation of these roles.  
What is most notable in examining the Canadian media however, is the 
level of introspection when examining the extent to which Canadian foreign 
policy had changed as well as the deeper concepts surrounding the myths of 
Canadian foreign policy. As noted previously, there is a strain of ‘whither 																																																								





Canada?’ in commentary concerning Canada’s place in the world and this is also 
evident in the media.192 In part, there is an element of the shame previously 
described in Chapter 3 which informs some commentaries of Canada departing 
from its past foreign policy traditions.193 While this is occurring outside of the 
policymakers, it still highlights that in shifting Canada’s international behaviour, 
there was a friction with its interpreted historical narrative. In effect, this can be 
interpreted as the dynamic process by which a form of national Self is created 
through the interrogation of these traditions, although not in the sense previously 
implied in the International Relations literature. Rather than being a unitary Self, 
it is open to the interpretation and understanding of the individual policymaker. 
What becomes problematic here, however, is the differentiation of the motivation 
as outlined previously; honour, morality and humanitarian are much harder to 
clearly discern as, again, the media is often less concerned with explaining the 
internal motivations, i.e. why certain actions occur but rather exploring the 
context and continuity of those actions and whether they conform to the 
established narrative. When examining the Parliamentary language combined 
with the media analysis it is possible to then interpret differing motivations 
driving the different governments. However, when mapping the ontological 
security informed motivations the challenges of this approach become more 
visible. While it gives insight into the importance of narrative at the policymaker 
level, it is not apparent in the same way when examining Other actors in the 
foreign policy process. This helps to elaborate the ways in which these different 
components interact with each other across multiple dimensions and the ways in 
which they affect the policymaker at the individual level. In doing so it helps to 
further illuminate this study’s constructivist FPA approach.  
Narrative and Role Theoretical Analysis 
Echoing much of what was explored in this chapter, Roland Paris applied Role 
Theory to explore the Harper government’s foreign policy and its relationship 
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with the narrative of Canada as a liberal internationalist.194 While Paris eschews 
the middle power categorisation, many of the hallmarks of the liberal 
internationalist label are the same.195 Paris is mainly concerned with public 
opinion, rather than elites and he finds that liberal internationalism is deeply 
embedded in the public imagination, despite the efforts of the Harper 
government to shift this; thus Role Theory in this case must account for the 
resistance from publics to top-down efforts.196 While Paris’ article does not 
examine the relationship to foreign policy behaviour in great depth, it is 
interesting to see that his findings are partly reflected in the responses from non-
Canadian diplomats as well who expressed confusion and a clear preference for 
the liberal internationalist or in the case of this study a middle power-type 
Canada. Indeed, efforts to shift Canada’s foreign policy behaviour were met with 
perplexity, although as noted, it does not have the same emotional resonance as it 
does for Canadians. One can interpret this as an attempt to reconcile the internal 
myth of Canada’s role in the international system with the foreign policy 
behavioural changes that have occurred in the period from 2001-2011. 
Given that this study examines the way in which narratives affect foreign 
policy behaviour Paris’ study reflects the need to account for the way the media 
shapes the discussion of these interventions in the public sphere. In this 
circumstance, there was some critical interrogation of the role that Canada 
should play and whether involvement in Afghanistan and Libya were in the 
country’s best interest. The outside perspective on Canadian foreign policy, both 
from outside the elite consensus as well as outside the institutions of Canadian 
foreign policy offer some interesting insight into the middle power narrative’s 
interpretation. The outside accounts of Canadian foreign policy echo, but do not 
necessarily reflect the same concerns articulated in Parliamentary debates. 
Nonetheless, their focus largely remained more on the types of roles that Canada 
should play in those operations rather than whether they were worth being 
involved in more generally. As seen throughout this chapter, these roles tended 
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to favour an interpreted historic preference for peacekeeping, development and 
multilateral support rather than explicit combat.  
 In this regard, while Canadian policymakers may have a had a notable 
reaction to the reinterpretation of Canada’s foreign policy narrative away from 
the traditional middle power hallmarks, it does not necessarily have the same 
resonance for those on the outside of the policymaking process. As Derek 
Burney noted, this speaks to the fact that foreign policy issues rarely have the 
same impact among the electorate as domestic issues when it comes to 
elections.197 The reference to middle power was used as a way to either describe 
Canadian foreign policy in the present or in the past, rarely accompanied by 
critical reflection. As such, regardless of media reporting and reflection among 
the Canadian electorate or negative responses from non-Canadian policymakers, 
Canadian policymakers in Ottawa had a much freer hand in defining the roles 
they felt best reflected Canadian foreign policy. If one steps back from the 
partisan characterisations of foreign policy, both Liberal and Conservative 
foreign policy share a focus on targeted, principled action informed by a 
conviction about the type of role Canada should play in the world. This validates 
the concerns raised in the academic critiques of the middle power label; it 
effectively acts as a container that can be shaped to suit the purpose of whoever 
is using it and thus retains its utility.198 Indeed, Stephen Harper’s conception of 
Canada as a proactive, moral middle power was driven by different motivations 
from the previous Liberal government’s interpretations of that label.199 It is 
however notable, that the conviction in this case is not necessarily reflective of 
the public attitude, but rather the political leadership. In part, this can be 
attributed to elite consensus as previously noted in that there was a lack of major 
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variation on foreign policy issues between the two main governing parties.200 
Indeed, aside from Iraq the public was not nearly as vocal as to whether Canada 
should be involved in Afghanistan or Libya. As such, while there is clearly the 
process of foreign policy change underway during the period from 2001-2011, it 
does not necessarily represent a disconnect from past traditions, at least for the 
Canadian public. 
The pervasive image of Canada as the middle power peacekeeper endures 
as a subject referent point against which policymakers, both foreign and 
Canadian, then judge how far Canadian foreign policy has changed. Mythology 
or not, it becomes evident that the narrative of Canadian foreign policy had been 
established in a relatively stable, enduring form until the Harper government. 
This accounts for the perception of Canada’s narrative in both the media and the 
interviews which largely revolved around the traditional middle power 
characteristics. The government’s attempt to reinterpret Canada’s foreign policy 
tradition sought to draw on an alternative reading of Canada’s history, however, 
in doing so, it did not resonate at an emotional level with those receiving this 
narrative.201 The Conservative government led by Stephen Harper fundamentally 
had a different subjective understanding of the Canadian foreign policy tradition. 
Nonetheless, the fact that neither party was entirely clear on their interpretation 
of Canada’s foreign policy narrative can be seen as contributing to what Jens 
Ringsmose and Berit Kaja Børgeson suggest was a weak and incoherent strategic 
narrative regarding Afghanistan.202 While as noted previously, strategic 
narratives are used towards specific ends, in this case, this study is concerned 
with how they reflect wider issues concerning the disembedding of wider foreign 
policy narratives.203 Although there was some behavioural change, the greater 
concern for the Conservative government was with the ways in which the actions 																																																								
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were described, that is, their context rather than continuity with past Canadian 
behaviour.  
Behavioural Links 
As explored in this chapter, the explicit middle power label does not have as 
much widespread currency either inside or outside of Canada as it does in the 
academic literature. Indeed, the press was focused more on the tradition in 
Canadian foreign policy and tried, in particular, to examine Canada’s foreign 
policy behaviours in Afghanistan in reference to this tradition. It is notable that 
by the time that the Libya mission occurred, the traditional components of 
Canadian foreign policy, be it the middle power, peacekeeping or Responsibility 
to Protect components were infrequently mentioned. Similarly, as noted already, 
when the term middle power was raised with interviewees, it elicited few 
responses along the lines of the Canadian usage. Indeed, there was some 
recognition of some of the previously referenced characteristics namely, a 
reflexive belief in multilateralism, an inherent support for the international order, 
a preference for multipronged solutions (diplomacy, development) without a 
prioritisation of military involvement and a desire to promote peacebuilding. 
However, the middle power label was seen by some as a reflection of Canada’s 
position within NATO alongside other nations such as the Netherlands, Denmark 
and Norway.204 The term, used in this context, still described a role that Canada 
played specifically in the context of NATO, however, did not entail the same 
definitional vagueness as it does when employed by the Canadian media or by 
Canadian policymakers. That said, it is also devoid of the related motives be they 
honour, humanitarian or moral; rather it is more fundamentally behavioural. This 
can be related to the fact that non-Canadian policymakers do not have the same 
emotional link that would be expected of Canadians and as such, disruption of a 
foreign policy narrative, while important, does not have the same impact.  
This is not to imply that the awareness of Canada’s foreign policy 
narrative did not exist amongst non-Canadian policymakers in NATO. As the 
Harper government sought to reshape the Canadian foreign policy narrative there 																																																								




was a clear recognition not only in the media, but also amongst non-Canadian 
policymakers that the practice of Canadian foreign policy was changing.  
However, as noted previously, the concern over this was subordinated to a desire 
for stable behaviour towards NATO. Fundamentally it was the routinisation of 
behaviour that was of key concern. In terms of the middle power narrative, this 
proved much more problematic. A few interviewees used the term selectively, 
usually in relation to Canada’s position within NATO, rather than as a broader 
label to characterise Canada’s foreign policy behaviour. The influence of 
narratives in shaping foreign policy can be observed as a phenomenon relatively 
common within NATO and as such, reorientations of foreign policy are only 
occasionally remarked on. Indeed, the representative of the US had a much 
stronger opinion about foreign policy under the Harper government and several 
interviewees noted varying degrees of frustration.205 However, with 28 member 
nations, each with its own domestic pressures and varying internal policymaking 
processes, members of the non-Canadian International Staff communicated a 
tendency to remain somewhat aloof and dispassionate towards the foreign policy 
narratives of the various member states.206 Thus, with the process of foreign 
policy change underway, some non-Canadian policymakers were less concerned 
with the emotional component of motivation, but rather the practical side; how 
does this affect the day-to-day.207 When talking of narratives in the Alliance, it is 
interesting to note that there are also institutional stories within NATO about 
different delegations which are not entirely connected to the national foreign 
policy narratives. While this goes beyond the scope of this study, it presents an 
interesting avenue to explore in future examinations of international 
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organisations and how delegations and international civil servants interact within 
them.208  
Conversely, when speaking to non-Canadian interviewees it is possible to 
see the emphasis is not so much on Canada’s sense of place among nations. 
Instead, there is more of a concern over the foreign policy behaviour, less so over 
motivation. Nonetheless, their interpretation of those actions is usually 
characterised by a recognition of the narrative behind foreign policy behaviour 
and that this narrative has value, more so for Canadians. In this case, despite their 
view that Canada’s behaviour towards NATO had changed there still remained 
the impression that Canada was a positive, proactive, honest broker in the 
international system and an ally that could be relied on during kinetic 
operations.209 Indeed, the understanding of Canada’s middle power narrative was 
important as it generated expectations of specific roles and therefore behaviours 
within NATO. Similarly, the UN peacekeeping component of the Canadian 
narrative still shaped many views of Canada’s foreign policy behaviour.210 As 
Wilfried von Bredow observed, Canadians self-perception as peacekeepers 
remains significantly out of sync with the reality of what Canadian Forces 
actually do on the ground.211 Given that this was also reflected in the responses 
of many non-Canadian policymakers underlines how pervasive the peacekeeping 
mythology remains inside and outside of Canada.   
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Chapter 5 – Conclusions  
To conclude this examination, this last chapter will first briefly revisit the 
empirical findings which emerged from this study, specifically it will address the 
way in which Canadian policymakers were influenced by elements of the middle 
power narrative when executing foreign policy behaviour. As has been explored, 
the middle power narrative informed Canadian policymakers’ decisions and thus 
contributed to Canada taking significant roles in the interventions in Afghanistan 
and Libya. Indeed, the middle power narrative is complex in that it contains 
elements of both a narrative and a role, however, with regards to Canadian 
foreign policy, it occupies a unique space in the FPA discipline. This chapter will 
then reflect on the theoretical components of this study addressing briefly some 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the ontological security-informed Role 
Theory approach adopted before turning to avenues for future research and future 
challenges to be addressed. The integration of some components of ontological 
security into this study’s Role Theory-informed approach has illuminated how 
narratives translate into behaviour and helped to understand the role that the 
individual policymaker plays in this process.  
Part I: Empirical Findings 
As this study initially contended, Canada’s participation in NATO’s Afghanistan 
and Libya operations was driven in part by the interpretations of the middle 
power narrative by successive Prime Ministers. Through the analysis of a 
number of sources, this study sought to interpret differing ontological security-
informed motivations driving each subsequent leader and how the roles they 
articulated shaped Canada’s foreign policy behaviour. Each leader’s 
understanding of this narrative was rooted in his interpretation of Canada’s 
foreign policy history and as such sought to alter Canada’s foreign policy 
behaviour to reflect this. Through the interpretivist, hermeneutic examination of 
the Parliamentary Hansard records and the media debate, this study has 
constructed a better understanding of not only how narratives and roles are 
linked; it has also through the interviews conducted in NATO headquarters, 
explored the ways in which they have shaped foreign policy behaviour. In doing 
so, it proved that it was possible to establish a link between narratives, roles and 
behaviours and as such, had a real effect on Canada’s influence in NATO.  
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Chrétien and honour 
The government’s reaction in the wake of 9/11, while in keeping with 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative as previously established by the Liberal Party, 
was fundamentally outward looking and publicly supportive of the United States, 
the response of a good ally. Nonetheless, emotions such as fear and anxiety 
should not be discounted as motivations either, given the nature of the attacks 
themselves.1 As such the responses undertaken by Canada and other Western 
nations sought to reassure and reinforce different national roles. The push by the 
Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO, David Wright, to invoke Article 
V in response to 9/11 was in keeping with the drive to reinforce national honour.2 
In utilising the mechanisms of NATO, this not only forced other nations to 
recognise Canada’s commitment to the Alliance but also then created a role for 
Canada as a vital defender of international order. Moreover, invoking national 
honour required that Canada take sufficient action to support this and, as a result, 
deployment in a combat role to Afghanistan served as a way to maintain standing 
with its allies.3 Taken together, these are all elements that easily fit within a 
broad middle power label. The problem with emphasising this honour-driven 
motivation for Canadian foreign policy behaviour became apparent when the 
United States invaded Iraq. It also required a response from the Canadian 
government in order to maintain continuity in the context of Canada’s role as a 
defender of international order. This was a complex calculus that harks back to 
assertions made earlier in this study, namely that the ‘essence of decision’ lies at 
the domestic level. Policymakers would not take action in Iraq due to the 
mission’s unpopularity among Canadian voters. In this circumstance it is clear 
that the Chrétien government felt that the possibility of domestic electoral 
punishment outweighed the threat of damaged relations with the United States 
and ultimately, the invasion itself did not mesh with their vision of Canada’s 
																																																								
1 Antony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 50; Richard Ned Lebow, Cultural Theory of 
International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 119. 
2 Edgar Buckley, “Invoking Article 5,” NATO Review (Summer 2005), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art2.html, accessed 10 October, 2014. 
3 Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 66. 
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foreign policy tradition.4 In the buildup to the invasion, Chrétien clearly 
articulated that Canada would again stand for international order through his 
criticism of the West and a perception that it was ‘arrogant’ and ‘humiliating’ 
towards the poorer members of the international system to ride roughshod over 
the United Nations.5 Once again, this casts Canada as an honourable actor trying 
to uphold the norms of the international system, while also remaining in line with 
the Liberal Party tradition of the middle power peacekeeper.  
Martin and humanitarian motivations 
When it comes to Paul Martin’s brief government there was a noticeable shift 
towards discussion of Africa and the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Similarly, 
placing emphasis on the humanitarian aspects of Canadian foreign policy 
behavior in Afghanistan allowed Canada to stay out of the deteriorating situation 
in Iraq without betraying the role of a good ally. While there were certainly 
issues related to Canada’s inability to support a deployment to Afghanistan and 
Iraq simultaneously, the Martin government’s emphasis on humanitarian action 
reinterpreted the narrative of Canada’s international engagement differently. It 
defined Canada’s international role as something other than a country that joined 
coalitions of the willing. Instead, Canada’s foreign policy engagements could be 
examined against the humanitarian role by operating within the UN framework, 
better reflecting its traditional concerns and thus helped avoid deployment in 
Iraq. Nonetheless, the pressure on the Martin government from the US to assist 
in Iraq meant that its commitments in Afghanistan had to be realigned to not only 
assuage its ally, but also fulfill commitments already made, humanitarian or not.6 
Though this supported many of the traditional middle power peacekeeping 
components of Canada’s foreign policy narrative, in doing so, it consigned 
Canada to taking over the Kandahar deployment. This fulfilled policymakers’ 
conception of Canada’s duty to the greatest degree possible, even if the new role 
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in Afghanistan did not necessarily match Canada’s capabilities.7 As a result, 
Canada also avoided the charges of tokenism by making a significant 
contribution to Afghanistan and thus was not shirking its duty as an ally, but 
rather fulfilling it. This also set the precedent in terms of participation in the 
Afghanistan mission for the following governments who sought to avoid the 
tokenism charge whilst also seeking the most international credit for the 
contribution.  
The Martin government, in supporting the NATO mission in Afghanistan, 
as was noted previously, took over responsibility for Kandahar province, with 
perhaps some naïveté.8 It was unclear at the time what would be required of 
Canada’s deployment there. At the time these decisions were undertaken, focus 
was very much on the ongoing crisis in Darfur and the government had clearly 
prioritised this.9 These actions were entirely consistent with the image of Canada 
as the good ally and furthermore supported the humanitarian image that Martin 
sought to project whilst maintaining a significant commitment to Afghanistan, as 
many other nations did at the time.10 As noted previously, Minister of Defence 
Bill Graham also sought to emphasize that this expanded role in Afghanistan 
could incur casualties.11 Though the Martin government sought to actively 
discard the middle power label, its actions nonetheless reflected the inherited 																																																								
7 A number of critical voices have been raised about Canada’s contribution to the operations in 
Southern Afghanistan, particularly in relation to capabilities. See Sandy Gall, War Against the 
Taliban: Why it All Went Wrong, (London: Bloomsbury, 2012); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little 
America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (London: Bloomsbury, 2012). Also critical of 
the blind optimism of Canadian policymakers in Kandahar was Sherard Cooper-Cowles, Cables 
from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West’s Afghanistan Campaign, (London: HarperPress, 2012). 
8 Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar, (Toronto: 
Viking Canada, 2007); Matthew Willis, “Canada in Regional Command South: Alliance 
Dynamics and National Imperatives,” Whitehall Papers, Vol. 77, No. 1, 49-67; Bill Schiller, 
“The Road to Kandahar,” Toronto Star, 8 September, 2006, 
http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2006/09/road-kandahar, accessed 20 Februrary, 2014; 
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appui.aspx?lang=eng, accessed 30 March, 2014. See also Paul Martin, Hell or High Water: My 
Life In and Out of Politics, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2008), 392.  
10 While Canada maintained consistency with its foreign policy narrative, naïveté was not only 
limited to Canada but many NATO Allies in the scope of the what would be required in 
Afghanistan. “German General on the War: NATO's Naïveté in Afghanistan,” Spiegel Online, 15 
October 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-general-on-the-war-nato-s-
naivete-in-afghanistan-a-584261.html, accessed 15 November 2014; for a comprehensive account 
of the lack of Western understanding in Afghanistan see Mike Martin, An Intimate War: An Oral 
History of the Helmand Conflict, (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2014).  
11 Mike Blanchfield, “New Peacekeepers Meaner, Tougher: Contrasts with PM’s promise,” 
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tradition associated with this narrative; as such, Canada balanced a role 
consistent with its past behaviour whilst shifting away from previous language.12  
Harper and moral foreign policy 
It is when seeking to define the Harper government’s approach to foreign policy 
that it is possible to discern a distinct reinterpretation of the Canadian foreign 
policy narrative. As the exploration of the media demonstrated, there was a 
recognition that Stephen Harper was seeking to redefine the Canadian narrative 
as a whole; foreign policy appeared as more of an afterthought.13 In addition to 
this, foreign policy had previously stood at arm’s length from domestic policy 
and while not unrelated, often operated somewhat distantly from partisan 
politics. However, in this case, when trying to affix the moral motivation to the 
parameters of the Conservative Party foreign policy, it is difficult to differentiate 
this realm from the domestic sphere, more so than with previous governments.  
John Ibbitson has suggested “[i]f the question is: Is Stephen Harper’s foreign 
policy motivated by principle or by electoral calculation, the answer is: Yes.”14  
As some have posited, on taking office Harper was not overly concerned by 
foreign policy having scarcely traveled outside of Canada.15 Thus, the 
Conservative Party’s foreign policy, while a departure from the Liberal Party 
tradition in Canadian foreign policy, reflects more of a domestic calculus than an 
international strategy. In these circumstances, it is hard to ascribe a singular role 
to which Canada was directed but fundamentally, foreign policy reflected a clear 
focus on doing the morally right thing as interpreted by the government. This 
encompassed a range of behaviours, whether it be a foreign policy statement or 
action but generally eschewed quiet diplomacy and sought to clearly break with 
Canadian foreign policy traditions. This then led to Canadian policymakers 
acting in the role of the earnest, vocal defenders of a number of foreign policy 
issues such as the mission in Afghanistan, at least as long as it was domestically 
expedient to do so. In other circumstances such as the Libya operation, when the 																																																								
12 Government of Canada, Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and 
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mission was again in keeping with many of the tenets of the middle power 
narrative, there was less conflict with the Canadian foreign policy narrative and 
ultimately Canadian military participation proved much less controversial. 
Indeed, as noted previously in Chapter 3, at times in Parliamentary debate, 
mention of Canada as a peacekeeping nation was studiously avoided by 
Conservative Party MPs, and Canada’s military tradition was invoked when 
operations on the ground would have highlighted the discontinuity between the 
actual operation and the debate on mission renewal.16 In the Libya operation 
however, while not overtly referring to the peacekeeping tradition, constructing it 
in terms of Responsibility to Protect and emphasising a UN mandate, rendered 
the mission much more palatable to Canadian policymakers more generally.17 
Between these two operations, this created conflicting interpretations of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative between the Canadian policymakers in Ottawa 
and policymakers in NATO. The middle power narrative and its attendant 
behaviours were ingrained into the fabric of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
CIDA and to a certain extent the Department of National Defence, civil service 
agencies all of which operated at arms length from the domestic level decision-
making apparatus. As a result, they did not readily or easily adopt differing 
interpretations of the Canadian foreign policy narrative. This created friction 
between the government elected to represent or put forth a specific agenda and 
the civil servants who carry out these tasks. The various government departments 
were exposed to this new Canadian foreign policy, but nonetheless, when 
discussing the institutional narrative as constructed by the staff, they tended to 
remain outward facing and concerned with Canada’s role in the world instead of 
driven by a purely domestic calculus suggesting the resiliency of the previous 
foreign policy narrative. As noted in Chapter 3, the multilateralist, honest broker 
traditions previously considered central to the practice of Canada’s middle power 
foreign policy, had been largely eschewed by the Conservative government in 
favour of a more instrumental and transactional approach.18 As a result, this 
created confusion as to what the overarching aim of the CPC foreign policy 																																																								
16 See Chapter 3, pg. 172. 
17 See also Andrew F. Cooper and Bessma Momani, “The Harper Government’s Messaging in 
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Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2014), 176-188. 
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actually was, both among Canadian policymakers and non-Canadian 
policymakers.  
As a result, though Canada’s foreign policy behaviour is justified in 
relation to its traditions as articulated by Canadian policymakers in Ottawa, the 
practice of diplomacy is a different exercise and, as discussed in this study, 
routine interactions remain important. Perhaps most vitally in this circumstance 
however, is that the reflexive interaction between Canadian policymakers in 
Ottawa and policymakers in NATO was not a major factor in the policymaking 
process.19 During the Harper government diplomatic instructions flowed from 
Ottawa in a unidirectional fashion and rarely accounted for the perceptions or 
recommendations of policymakers in NATO. As a result, policymakers in NATO 
were then left somewhat adrift in the policymaking process as the government in 
Ottawa eschewed traditional Canadian diplomacy, ignoring the diplomatic 
component and instead announcing their foreign policy initiatives without 
extensive consultation. As a result, this disrupted the ways in which the narrative 
and behaviour interact with each other and in part, become disconnected. The 
interviews conducted in this study reflected, in part, how Canada’s relationship 
with NATO chilled over the course of the past few years, particularly towards 
the end of the Afghanistan mission as the Conservative government sought to 
promote a different Canadian foreign policy narrative. With the significant re-
interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy narrative by successive governments, 
most pronounced under Prime Minister Harper, it has become clear that 
Canadian influence within the Alliance is diminished as compared to the past.20 
Nonetheless, these interviews were conducted prior to the Russian annexation of 
Crimea and the subsequent NATO reassurance mission and it is necessary to 
recognise that in light of this, the Harper government reinforced Canada’s 
military presence in the Alliance.21 Whether this represents a profound and 
lasting change in the Canadian relationship with NATO remains to be seen, 
however, it nonetheless remains in keeping with the Harper government’s 
																																																								
19 Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, “Interpretive Theory,” Theory and Methods in Political 
Science, 2nd Ed., David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Eds., (London: Palgrave, 2002); Interview 27, 2 
March 2014. 
20 Interview 23, 14 November 2013; Interview 26, 15 November 2013. 
21 Department of National Defence, Operation Reassurance, 13 November 2014.  
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad/nato-ee.page, accessed 1 December 2014. 
		 274	
morally motivated foreign policy and instrumental view of NATO for pursuing 
its foreign policy preferences.  
This does not mean however, that the middle power narrative and its 
associated influence have disappeared nor does it entail a permanent or dramatic 
change to Canada’s foreign policy in the longer term. Indeed, as seen in Chapter 
4, many of the middle power hallmarks continue to inform the image of 
Canadian foreign policy internationally.22 As several of the interviews in this 
study demonstrated, Canada’s international image still remains positive, although 
as a senior NATO official noted, part of this was founded in good will from 
Canada’s past behaviour but this is shrinking over time.23 Though Adam 
Chapnick has suggested that the idea of Canada as a middle power has 
disappeared from the Harper government’s approach to foreign policy, its legacy 
lingers on in the way that many perceive of Canada’s role in the world.24 While 
the middle power label itself may have faded in policymaking circles, its utility 
as an academic concept in the study of Canadian foreign policy should not be 
quickly discarded, particularly when discussing the importance of narratives. The 
effect that it has had in shaping the outlook of Canadian diplomats as well as 
Canada’s reputation internationally is an important component of the practice of 
Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, recent publications such as career diplomat 
David Mulroney’s 2015 book Middle Power, Middle Kingdom focuses on 
Canada’s relationship with China highlights the enduring influence that this 
narrative continues to exert.25 As this examination has highlighted, the re-
interpretation of the Canadian foreign policy narrative had a direct impact on not 
only foreign policy behaviour, but also on the way this affected Canada’s 
influence among its NATO Allies.  
As outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, the middle power characteristics 
continue to inform both Canadians’ and non-Canadians’ understandings of 
Canadian foreign policy. Despite the sustained challenge from the CPC to shift 
this, it remains powerfully entrenched in both the institution of Canadian 
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diplomacy and in the public imagination.26 In this case the legacy of the ‘middle 
power peacekeeper’ could then be classified as a ‘meta-narrative;’ though not 
meant in the terms of the grand theories of International Relations, but rather as 
offering a hermeneutic understanding of a specific, national narrative of 
Canadian foreign policy.27 As noted in the introduction, it is necessary to be 
comfortable with a degree of ambiguity in the interpretation undertaken in this 
study.28 Nonetheless, this approach fails to fully capture the complexity of the 
ways in which many of the middle powers’ constituent components form the 
foundation of the practice and understanding of Canadian foreign policy. To a 
certain degree this is being explored, as seen in David Bosold’s examination of 
the middle power and how this narrative acts as a container into which one can 
fit Canadian foreign policy actions, however, this needs to go further than merely 
examining the construction of this narrative.29 Recognising the post-modern 
critiques of meta-narratives it nonetheless helps to understand how future studies 
of Canadian foreign policy can and should be explored, as they need to 
interrogate, or at least acknowledge the presence of this narrative that informs the 
way in which policy is formulated and as a result has consequential ontological 
and epistemological ramifications.30  
As a result, this national narrative does not require acceptance or even 
explicit recognition but instead is woven into the fabric of the institutions and 
their internal narratives. Fundamentally, the middle power narrative has moved 
beyond International Relations or foreign policy scholarship to become a way in 
which Canadian foreign policy, consciously or subconsciously, is established 
across a number of dimensions. As explored in this study, the middle power 
carries with it a number of related roles, however, this does not actually prescribe 																																																								
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what those roles entail. As such, one sees here the flexibility that allows a role 
preference to be articulated which is responsive to the dynamics of the foreign 
policy situation into a role position, as was the case in Afghanistan.31 This 
informs the core assumptions about the nature of Canadian foreign policy 
behaviour as well as the Canadian foreign policy institutions, and is ingrained 
within the policymaking process itself. In relation to policymaking, this does not 
necessarily dictate the nature of the foreign policy behaviour, however, it did 
nonetheless require Canadian policymakers to articulate a course of action. The 
parameters of this action were then defined by the individual leader or elites 
depending on their view of what would be in keeping with Canada’s foreign 
policy tradition and behaviours and as such they remained labile. This does not 
mean that there is absolute freedom of action for policymakers, however, as 
behaviours which fall outside of the broad historical parameters defined by 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative can trigger introspection and if sufficiently 
divergent, potential electoral consequences. Thus the middle power constitutes 
the milieu in which preferences are generated and maintained, as well as 
establishing the ways in which future elites conceptualise their potential foreign 
policy choices.32  
Part II: Observations on Theory  
The theoretical approach undertaken in this study sought to integrate several 
competing methods of interpreting foreign policy narratives. The constructivist 
FPA approach offered an avenue to explore the individual level in which 
policymakers’ preferences are shaped by their understandings of foreign policy 
narratives and history and in doing so, generate attendant roles. It was not the 
intention of this study to build a new theoretical construct but rather, speaking to 
Hudson’s assertions about FPA, to aim to be integrative and bring together 
aligned approaches in such a way that they provide a more complete 
understanding of the phenomenon under examination.33 Building on this, this 
study has attempted to integrate some of the admittedly flawed ontological 																																																								
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security research programme as a way to further explore the dynamics by which 
narratives actually form the motivations which define national foreign policy 
roles. While it could have been possible to explore the topic along the lines 
outlined in Lebow’s Cultural Theory of International Relations, this approach 
does not sufficiently engage with the empirical side of foreign policy. Instead it 
presents a much more theory-based understanding of a phenomenon whose 
implications go far beyond International Relations scholarship and ultimately 
should remain engaged and rooted in practical discussions of foreign policy. 
While this study has sought to remain grounded in foreign policy it should be 
acknowledged that in seeking to reconcile these different components, it offers 
an addition to the growing association between International Relations and FPA.  
Nonetheless, the key objective of this work was not only as an FPA examination 
but also to offer a contribution to the work being done on Canadian foreign 
policy. In particular, it aims to invigorate more creative and innovative 
approaches to the study of Canadian foreign policy, which as previously noted in 
Chapter 2, tend to rehash the same descriptive, issue-specific and theoretically 
limited themes repeatedly in the same ways.34  
As noted in Chapter 2, there have been ongoing criticisms of the lack of 
theoretical innovation in the examination of Canadian foreign policy and this 
study has sought to expand on previous work examining the middle power 
narrative and its associated influence.35 Indeed, the tropes that have informed the 
study of Canadian foreign policy remain intimately tied to policymakers and 
public understandings of Canada’s foreign policy narrative. While this study has 
touched on many of the same themes explored in the Canadian foreign policy 
literature including the concern with Canada’s place in the world, it has sought to 
do so through newer theoretical lenses. Moreover, it reflects many of the 
assertions put forward by David Bosold and Tom Keating in their examination of 
the middle power acting as a guidepost as well as the importance of 
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understanding how others see Canada and its international role.36 An increasing 
number of examinations have explored similar themes as this study. Indeed, 
Canada’s foreign policy journal of note, International Journal, released two 
issues in 2014 exploring the field of Canadian foreign policy theory as well as 
further examining foreign policy under the Harper government.37 The works 
examining the Harper government’s foreign policy in particular are continuing to 
open up Canada’s foreign policy tradition to greater scrutiny.38 
Role Theory’s utility in FPA 
Ultimately, in examining this subject, the theoretical approach adopted in this 
study sought to address Valerie Hudson’s central tenets of an FPA analysis, 
namely viewing foreign policy decision making as multifactorial, multilevel, 
interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented and actor-specific.39 Indeed, the 
empirical work undertaken in this study alongside the constructivist FPA 
approach highlighted many of the key areas of existing scholarship outside of the 
usual Canadian foreign policy canon. By utilising Role Theory along with some 
components of the ontological security research programme, this has allowed 
some insight into the mechanisms through which narratives and behaviour 
interact. This has offered a way to understand how differing interpretations of 
Canada’s foreign policy narrative and leaders’ motivations thus led to differing 
foreign policy roles and, in turn, different foreign policy behaviours. In doing so, 
this has helped to shed light on the ways in which a foreign policy narrative 
translates into foreign policy behaviour. The roles that flow from the differing 
individual motivations inform the actions that policymakers aim to take at the 
international level. In doing so, this study’s approach has introduced some of the 																																																								
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concepts of FPA into the study of Canadian foreign policy whilst also offering an 
outside-in perspective on Canada’s involvement in these conflicts through 
interviews with non-Canadian policymakers in NATO. As explored in Chapter 4 
outside perspective is useful in that it offers a way in which to explore not only 
how Canadian policymakers see themselves and more importantly, describe their 
actions, but also how this is perceived by other actors involved in this interaction. 
Indeed, the process of policymaking is not unidirectional and was highlighted in 
the interviews with non-Canadian policymakers, many of whom noted that 
Canada’s behaviour within NATO had changed. This helps to understand the 
reflexive interactions which form the practice of policymaking and help to situate 
foreign policy narratives within this process.  
The individuals interviewed all had differing, personal interpretations of 
Canadian foreign policy and as a result, this study has had to fit these varying 
accounts into broader roles. Given the interpretivist approach this study utilised it 
was necessary to find common elements which allowed this, in this case it was 
founded in Canada’s middle power narrative. In the discussions that took place, 
it was clear that there was a unifying component that linked both Canadian and 
non-Canadian expectations in terms of its foreign policy behaviour. In particular, 
there were a number of roles articulated by policymakers, founded in this 
narrative, which many saw Canada as neglecting or abandoning.  
In this case the theoretical elements used help us to describe the 
disconnect that many policymakers expressed between their understanding of 
Canadian foreign policy and the actual behaviours. What is notable in these 
circumstances is the role of shame in shaping how narratives and behaviours are 
linked and in particular, how this had differing effects between governments. As 
was highlighted in Chapter 3, Canadian policymakers in NATO do not have the 
same freedom that policymakers in Parliament have to reshape policy and as 
such, there is a pronounced sense of concern over their relationship with NATO; 
in this context this is the shame that Steele describes, namely a radical disconnect 
between action and narrative.40 As Lebow suggests when discussing ontological 
security, “[p]olicies at odds with these narratives and the values they encode can 
bring shame on officials if public opinion judges their behaviour incongruent 																																																								
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with their state’s identity.”41 While relevant to policymakers, in relation to this 
study’s analysis, individual shame pushes individuals to conform to expectations 
of the roles which are seen as their best selves, or in this case, the best 
representation of their national foreign policy. When falling short of the 
expectations levied by their selves and by other actors it forces an introspective 
examination of their own behaviour; actors seek to either rectify or justify this 
through foreign policy narrative.42 In this reflexive process it is possible to 
understand how the use of these narratives which constitute such a central part of 
the foreign policy process actually then constitute and drive, in part, behavioural 
foreign policy change.  
 As the chart below highlights, this study has examined the gradual 
changes in motivations and by extension, the differing roles between different 
governments. In doing so it lends greater understanding to the ways in which 
foreign policy behaviours changed.  
Government Primary Motivation 
(not exclusive) 




Honour – esteem 
seeking  
- focused on 
maintaining Canada’s 
status in the world 
- continuity with past 
behaviours 
- ‘good’ ally - upholder of international 
order - committed multilateralist 
and promotion of the 
‘peacekeeper’ tradition 
- military invasion of 
Afghanistan  - refusal to join coalition of the 
willing in Iraq - support for future multinational 
effort in Afghanistan  
- recognition from US and 
NATO Allies over role in 







derived from past 
action/inaction 
- aims to correct errors 




- supporter of international 
humanitarian causes  - aggressive defender of 
Canadian ‘values’  - committed multilateralist 
- greater focus on Darfur - deployment of PRT to 
Kandahar along with military 
mission - escalation of the military 
mission in Afghanistan  
- little change from previous 
government - greater visibility in NATO - commitment to an 
unforeseen long term kinetic 




Moral – reconciling 
internal and external 
sources of shame 
- aims to correct past 
foreign policy actions 
seen as ‘wrong’  
- is conflicted about 
international 
engagement that does 
not serve specific ends 		
 
- defender of Canadian 
interests and promoter of 
values - uncompromising moral 
actor in international affairs - stands without 
equivocation 
- steadfast support for Canadian 
Forces in Kandahar with some 
caveats related to domestic 
support - support for international 
initiatives deemed to be in the 
Canadian interest with a notable  
change in policymaking 
priorities - acute sensitivity to domestic 
considerations at the expense of 
international commitments 
(inward looking) 
- Diminishing visibility in 
NATO  - Confusion from Allies over 
changes in behaviour - Gradually diminished 
influence in the Alliance - Distancing from traditional 
venues of Canadian 




41 Richard Ned Lebow, Cultural Theory of International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 63. 
42 Ibid, 565. 
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None of the individual motivations as explored previously (honour, moral or 
humanitarian) are mutually exclusive, but rather, must be interpreted by the 
individual studying them. As Steele suggests, it is possible to broadly categorise 
the ontological security informed relationship into humanitarian, honour, or 
morality-driven motivations as depending on the priorities articulated by these 
policymakers.43 These motivations then carry with them associated roles – both 
preferential and positional, which policymakers then translate into foreign policy 
behaviours.44 As the chart elaborated in Chapter 1 highlighted, one can see how 
foreign policy narratives translated into behaviour.  
           Foreign Policy Narrative 
 
 




           Honour     Moral        Humanitarian 
 
 




Behaviours        Behaviours          Behaviours 
 
Indeed, the roles that were defined by the different governments were subject to 
pressure both from their own preferences as well as those dictated by 
capabilities. The leadership of Chrétien, Martin and Harper was critical in  
developing the different interpretations of Canada’s foreign policy narrative and 
shaped, to a limited degree, Canada’s participation in the Afghanistan and Libya 
missions. Not only were middle power capabilities a consideration, but also the 
middle power tradition in the policymaking process. This highlights that the 
changes in interpretation of this narrative between the different governments can 
be linked to fundamental changes in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy in 
NATO headquarters. In this way one can see how the middle power narrative 
defines the broad scope of Canadian foreign policy behaviours.  
Afghanistan and Libya both represent very different operations as 
undertaken by NATO and each operation was justified through different means, 																																																								
43 Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2008), 
44.  
44 Michael J. Barnett, “Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System,” 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37 (1993), 275. 
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however, Canada had to participate in some way in each one in order to satisfy 
policymakers that they were maintaining their own understandings of what 
Canada’s foreign policy is. In this way, the theory utilised in this study has 
helped to highlight the ways in which narratives shape behaviour and provided a 
foundation on which to develop the empirical analysis that was undertaken.  
Part III: Future avenues of exploration and refinement 
The FPA framework utilised in this study helped to provide a deeper 
understanding of the reasons behind Canada’s decision to take part in these 
interventions, particularly with regards to the examination of the individual level. 
It is not meant to invalidate other interpretations or examinations of these 
operations but rather to expand the understanding of how these operations relate 
to Canada’s foreign policy narrative and behaviours. Indeed, there is also a clear 
synchronicity between this study and the work being done on strategic narratives, 
specifically, to examine how strategic narratives are embedded within broader 
foreign policy or national narratives and how this shapes the practice of 
policymaking and the policymaker.45 Additionally, it also helped to highlight in a 
much more profound way, the importance of charting and exploring foreign 
policy change and how this relates to narratives. This was alluded to at several 
points, however, future constructivist FPA scholars may seek to develop this 
further and integrate ontological security as a way to examine and better 
understand the drivers and impact of foreign policy changes within states, 
particularly at the individual level, rather than just between different actors. 
Indeed, a refined ontological security research programme could offer some 
additional insight into why policymakers as individuals, feel the need to maintain 
a consistent foreign policy narrative and how this relates to broader individual 
self-identities. 
Moreover, there is ample room to accommodate a post-structural 
dynamic through the examination of the Self-Other interaction which, though 
somewhat sidelined in this study, is worthy of deeper interrogation. Indeed, in 
examining how identities are negotiated within states there are a multitude of 
Selves and Others created in this process. Similarly, when looking at 
																																																								
45 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Laughlin and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication 
Power and the New World Order, (London: Routledge, 2013). 
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policymakers it could be useful in future examinations to try and draw out more 
on the dynamic between their interpreted national Self and how this affects 
interactions with Others in relation to the maintenance of their interpretation of 
wider national narratives. Indeed, while this study has looked at the individual 
level of policymaking, there could be even greater clarity still to the role of 
ontology at the individual level.46 While the ontological security framework 
purports to do so, the mechanisms by which it examines this as noted in Chapter 
1, namely the examination of the national Self and ascribing individual level 
motivations to it remain unconvincing. Instead it would benefit from integration 
into other cognitive approaches in FPA or International Relations more 
generally.  
Indeed, the interpretivist approach employed in this study is both an 
interesting strength and weakness. Namely it gives the researcher the freedom to 
construct and explore a unique understanding of how events unfolded whilst 
opening constructivist FPA to greater insight into the individual level processes 
and motivations. That being said, it becomes difficult to assess the weight these 
different motivations have in shaping the actual policy responses, particularly 
without access to the leaders who formulated them. Motivations like shame, 
morality, honour, fear or anxiety are also intensely personal emotions and as 
such, whilst exploring them in the academic context, operationalising a study of 
their influence in foreign policy becomes deeply challenging. Future cognitive 
and psychological approaches as explored by other researchers such as Peter 
Hatemi, Rose McDermott, Kai Opperman and Alexander Spencer could add a 
quantitative element to this research programme which would provide further 
elucidation to the decision-making process.47  While the interviews undertaken 
for this study were illuminating and certainly provided insight into both the 
narrative underlying Canadian foreign policy as well as the actual way that 
policymaking practice reflects this narrative, they are as much reliant on the 
responses of the interviewees as they are on the researcher’s ability to interpret 																																																								
46 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the 
Rationalist−Constructivist Divide,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 4 
(1997), 473-495. 
47 See Kai Opperman and Alexander Spencer, “Thinking Alike? Salience and Metaphor Analysis 
as Cognitive Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 9, No. 1 
(Jan. 2013), 39-56; Peter Hatemi and Rose McDermott, “A Neurobiological Approach to Foreign 
Policy Analysis: Identifying Individual Differences in Political Violence,” Foreign Policy 
Analysis, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr. 2012), 111-129. 
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them. Indeed, drawing out narratives and motivations driving foreign policy are 
difficult things to explore explicitly without overly affecting the responses. 
Nonetheless, it does give a deeper understanding as to how policymakers view 
the various pressures that drove Canada to get involved in NATO’s Afghanistan 
and Libya operations and reasons why it contributed what it did. It does not mean 
that this is generalisable, as was noted in the introduction, but provides a 
launching point for similar inquiries in the future looking to explore and 
understand other Canadian foreign policy behaviours.  
This study opens up a number of avenues to explore in deeper fashion 
related to the narrative inherent in Canadian foreign policy and will hopefully 
spark deeper critical interrogation of not only how Canadians define themselves 
but also who they are perceived to be. If policymakers are more cognisant of the 
narratives and emotions which inform and shape preferences for certain foreign 
policy behaviours this gives them more agency in not only defining future 
foreign policy actions but also in shaping and reflecting on these narratives. As 
was demonstrated in this study, this has important implications for Canada’s 
ability to implement its foreign policy agenda and its international influence 
more generally. This also speaks to many of the central questions of FPA and 
should highlight this approach as a promising avenue of study for observers of 
Canadian foreign policy.48 With the reinterpretation of Canada’s foreign policy 
narrative during the Harper government there is ample material in which to 
conduct examinations of foreign policy, both past and present and engage the 
discipline with new approaches. This can help to navigate whether the changes to 
Canadian foreign policy that have occurred since 2001 have fundamentally 
affected Canada and Canadians. In doing so this would help to explore and chart 
not only how Canadian foreign policy has evolved but also hopefully spur a new, 
innovative phase of foreign policy creation in government. As noted previously, 
NATO remains a vital way in which Canada exercises international influence 
beyond what it would be able to do otherwise and fundamentally damaging this 
relationship could have longer-term ramifications for Canadian foreign policy. 
With the dramatic upheavals taking place in international affairs it is not enough 
to cling to foreign policy narratives or to reject these traditions altogether. 																																																								
48 Juliet Kaarbo, "Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, 
Forward to Identity and Ideas," Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium, Ed. Jean A. 
Garrison, International Studies Review (2003) 5, 159. 
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Instead, it is necessary to start genuinely thinking and exploring innovative new 
avenues by which Canada can bring greater international influence to bear. 
Failing to do so could diminish Canada’s ability to defend its interests and values 








See APPENDIX I for list of Interviews.  
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APPENDIX II – Acronyms 
AGS – Allied Ground Surveillance 
AMISOM – African Union Mission in Somalia 
AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control System 
BQ – Bloc Québécois 
CA – Canadian Alliance 
CBC – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
CIDA – Canadian International Development Agency 
CPC – Conservative Party of Canada  
DFAIT – Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade; also, DFATD – 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (as of 2013) 
DPPC – Defence Planning Policy Committee 
EU – European Union 
FPA – Foreign Policy Analysis 
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force 
JTF2 – Joint Task Force 2 
LGBT – Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender 
MP – Member of Parliament 
NAC – North Atlantic Council 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NDP – New Democratic Party 
NRC – National Role Conception 
OPC – Operations Policy Committee 
OUP – Operation Unified Protector 
PMO - Prime Minister’s Office  
UN – United Nations 
UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution 
